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The Self of the Field and the Work of Donnel Stern 
Daniel Masler 
Antioch University Seattle 
Seattle, WA 
No study has taken an updated and comprehensive review of Donnel Stern’s writings. An 
investigation of his philosophical assumptions, locating Stern’s work socioculturally and 
historically, along with an elucidation of Stern’s background in traditional psychoanalytic 
literature and clinical practice, brings out the meanings and enigmas present in his 
theories of dissociation, enactment, unformulated experience, multiple self-states, and 
reflection. Stern has offered one of the best-integrated theoretical models in relational 
psychoanalytic theory. An examination of his theories within the theoretical traditions to 
which he makes claim (psychoanalytic, interpersonal, hermeneutic, postmodern, and 
democratic) will help elucidate the challenge posed by relational psychoanalysis to the 
Cartesian split and scientism in psychological study and praxis, while also attending to 
important clinical implications of Stern’s model. The electronic version of this 
dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd 
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The story goes that there was once a Greek King Milinda who reigned in Bactria, 
what is presently Northern Afghanistan. One of Alexander the Great’s men, Milinda was 
well-trained in Aristotelian philosophy (Davids, 1890/1963).  
One day, the king consulted the Buddhist teacher Nagasena, asking how long the 
latter had been a monk. Nagesena replied, “I was ordained seven years ago.” 
“So” argued the Bactrian King, “you are a monk, aren't you? Does that mean you 
are you a monk for seven years, or is the monk you?”  
Nagasena gazed on King Milinda’s shadow cast on the ground and across the 
surface of a basin of water. 
Nagesena asked, “Is that shadow separate from the King or is it the King 
himself?”  
King Milinda responded that it was neither. The shadow was owing to himself.  
“Likewise” replied Nagasena, “these seven years of monkhood are on account of 
me but they are not me.”  
Likewise in the case of this dissertation, for me any achievements during these 
past seven years may be on account of a number my own activities. However, what I 
have done since beginning doctoral study and then this writing are in fact nothing if not 
relational, part of a world of which I, too, have been part—but one that is also beyond 
me. It is a world that has constantly surprised me. 
There are, therefore, a number of people who have been essential for this work to 
appear. I would like to give my deepest thanks for their unanticipated support. The great 




confirmation of the point of so much of this study, the point that we are indeed created 
and re-created especially in caring relationships. In particular, I would like to express my 
profound appreciation and gratitude to the following:  
To the huge stamina of Deb Sand, for her skills as a librarian, an editor, and a 
person endlessly inquisitive and open-minded. And to Florin Teodorescu. The two of 
them have consistently been ready to pitch in when needed, and for as long as needed, 
even when a new citation software program could not be coded in a single day, and 
always with refuge available at any elevation.  
To Jonathan Weinstein and Tamara Bailey, who have been there with humor, 
interest, and always a friendly and rowdy table. And to Ruth and Dave Rosner, whose 
discussions of this work and what it means to our lives, our experiences, and our histories 
have been invaluable. 
To my daughters, Kaya and Nora Masler, who managed to thrive throughout, to 
laugh, and to share the intellectual struggle, the psychological conversations, the 
challenges, the philosophical conundrums, even the characterological (that means 
comical) critiques whenever needed. 
To Fernando Vega, who welcomed me into the healthcare profession as soon as I 
told him I was applying to it.  
To William Coburn who did not hesitate to join onto this project practically the 
day we met, who has been a warm and positive presence throughout, and whose laconic 
words and questions stay with me. And to Mary Wieneke, for her understanding patience 




Alejandra Suarez who has helped me realize a relational goal of a practice that is 
multilingual and multicultural.   
To Tien Liang who has always been ready and available, to have tea, to talk, to 
challenge, and to find new perspectives together. To Andy Benjamin, who has been there 
with ready discussion, bringing a compassionate rigor, always well-spiced with irony, 
into the hardest points of psychotherapeutic work. To Piyale Comert, who brought me 
and brought me back to a grounding of wisdom, curiosity, courage, and always to the 
humility of listening, so important in this thought which is nothing if not a matter of 
reflection, feeling, and experience.  
And of course to Phil Cushman. Phil constantly, tirelessly demonstrated the kind 
of critical but always interested and caring thought that is at the heart of relational 
psychoanalysis and hermeneutics—Phil, who regularly amazed me with his ability to 
show how hermeneutic practice and ideas are truly embodied in reflective action, 
bringing the potential of finding a fresh bit of inspiration at any time, usually when least 
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The Self of the Field and the Work of Donnel Stern 
Often appearing as a single unit of study, the self has been at the heart of Western 
psychological inquiry since at least the 1940s (Cushman, 1990). At that time, 
psychological study gained momentum by attaching to the energy and resources of a 
growing U.S. economic and cultural dominance. Much of U.S. mainstream culture with 
its roots in the Enlightenment could be said to have come out of notions of a single, 
bounded, masterful, or “self-contained” individual (Baumeister, 1987; Cushman, 1990; 
Sampson, 1977, 1988; Susman, 1973; Taylor, 1988), from rules thought to frame 
practices as diverse as economic exchange, to architecture, to social explanations of the 
world. The emphasis on a Cartesian self, reshaped with the substance of a rugged 
individualism inherent in European expansionism, was given all the more impetus by a 
psychology that thrived on American soil (Cushman, 1995). Individualism received a 
further thrust from the industrialization and consumerism of the U.S., in particular during 
the second half of the 20th Century.  
For instance, even now, at the core of psychological assessment, with all of its 
legal and educational sway, is the process of comparing an individual’s performance on 
standardized tests (e.g., Groth-Marnat, 2003; Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2009) to a 
representational sampling of the scores of other individuals. Indeed, quantitative 
psychological research (including clinical outcome studies) is predicated on applying 
statistical principles (Madan, 2007) to response sets offered by individuals at given 
moments in time. Western psychological theories and applications in general are




permeated with a special sense of personhood that is a cultural creation. American society 
sees the world through the lexicon of individualism.  
The very assumption of the individual as a single subject of study dates from the 
early modern era (about 1500-1800, Baumeister, 1987). More recently, notions of self 
and individuality have come under scrutiny, not only by Marxists and cultural historians 
(Foucault, 1988), but also by those who have been excluded from, and oppressed through 
the applications of Western social science who, regardless, have managed to find a voice 
within its arenas (Duran & Duran, 1995; Smith, 1999). An increasing number of texts 
from mainstream, American academia challenge the assumption that the “individual” is 
as clear a distinction as the term’s etymology would suggest. Critical social psychologists 
(Cooley, 1902; Gergen, 1973; Hales, 1985; Mead, 1934/1982; Sampson, 1977, 1988) 
have long held that the self is in essence a social entity and thus a subject of inquiry. 
Doubts about the individual self have reached the point of where, more recently, social 
psychologists (Arkin, Oleson, & Carrol, 2010) have posited an “uncertain self.” Even 
among these latter researchers who maintain a stance and methodology rooted in 
empiricism, the self as an indivisible quantum has eroded.  
Psychoanalysis is an area of psychology known for its concentration on the 
internal life of the single patient. Analytic therapy has long been identified for its alliance 
with especially private aspects of selfhood. However, thinkers broadly referred to as 
coming from Interpersonal Relational Psychoanalytic perspectives (RA) have questioned 
traditional psychological conceptions of the self (Frie & Coburn, 2010; Frie & Orange, 
2009; Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002; Sullivan, 1953/1997). 




Relational psychoanalysis is an important, if relatively young intellectual 
tradition. It encompasses a growing body of work. Much publication on RA comes from 
practicing psychoanalysts, whose accounts relate experience in the therapeutic dyad, 
often through years of intense clinical focus. Although writing about RA tends to draw 
from a number of theoretical traditions, few writers have brought forth a detailed 
theoretical model in RA. Prominent authors include psychoanalysts such as Irwin 
Hoffman, Lewis Aron, Lynne Layton, Stephen Mitchell, Donna Orange, Robert 
Stolorow, and Jessica Benjamin. Among these more prominent of RA’s theoreticians is 
Donnel Stern.1 In this study I interpret and discuss his body of published works.  
Stern’s work offers some of the best organized and furthest elaborated theory in 
RA to date. In particular, two books (2003 and 2010) by Stern, composed of his revised 
publications, are grounded in philosophical traditions of the Interpretative Turn (e.g, 
Hiley, Bohman, & Shusterman, 1991). These writings include clinical observations and 
case vignettes, supported by a strong background in theory. Stern has been called “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Given the extreme variability of theories, the interest in questioning authority, and 
perhaps postmodern doubts about the Western construction of authorship itself, even the 
assertion of prominence in RA theory holds a certain fluidity. William J. Coburn has 
commented on the variety of the many RA authors and their theories (personal 
communication, September, 2014).  Stern has written on the idiosyncratic manner in 
which theory informs psychoanalytic practice in the form of “implicit theories” derived 
from an unconscious use of tradition and in situ, creative thought (2012a). Theoreticians 
and clinicians who may not publish theoretical papers still appear to be finding 
communalities in practice which take on different but similar names. The hermeneutic 
stance that historical tradition, a discourse of interpretation at a given moment in history 
and place, helps to explain both commonalities and difference here (see, for e.g., 
Cushman, 2011a, and Gadamer, 1975/2004). That said, there are continued attempts to 
bring cohesion to different RA understandings, as seen, among other places, in numerous 
works by the authors listed above. Stern published in 2013 attempts to compare and 
possibly reconcile differences between a Bionian, Object Relational approach versus his 
own, Interpersonal RA (see Stern, 2013b, 2013d, 2013e). 




central figure in American psychoanalysis” (Spezzano, 2012) and “one of the seminal 
thinkers” of the Interpersonal and Relational schools (Darwin, 2010). 
 Stern’s understanding of transformation in psychotherapy opposes a strong 
analytic current in psychology that is built on the presumption that therapeutic 
effectiveness comes through increased powers of reasoning about problems and hence the 
patient’s greater control over the self. Instead, Stern’s explanation of change suggests a 
Cartesian reversal, wherein moments of dyadic irrationality, moments of “being stuck” 
are prized for what they can reveal of unconscious material that emerges within the 
relationship. In essence, Stern’s theory (2003) proposes the inevitable acceptance and 
subsequent understanding of periods of confusion by therapist, patient, or both (see also, 
Layton, 2009). This is opposed to forms of psychotherapy more in line with the Cartesian 
tradition that advocate for a therapist to facilitate the logical working-out of a patient’s 
problems with operationalized results. In Stern’s description of psychotherapy, such 
working-out may not always be a rational process, and understanding can appear from 
either side of the room, or possibly, figuratively speaking, it may be found somewhere in 
the middle. Such practice is grounded in Stern’s adoption of the hermeneutic challenge to 
the privileging of rationality in all domains, a Western inheritance from the Age of 
Reason and Enlightenment eras. 
A detailed examination will show that Stern’s work with transference and 
countertransference indicates not only the existence of an element of spontaneity but a 
thread of vulnerability (Aron & Starr, 2013; Stern, 2010) for both patient and 
psychotherapist. The RA rejection of Cartesian reflective reason runs counter not only to 
much of psychoanalysis to date, but to the assumptions of most schools of psychotherapy 




with claims to scientism, in which the therapist is depicted as a metaphorical technician, 
or a would-be mental “catalyst” operating from a hypothetical stance of objectivity.  
Further, the relational understanding of therapy has called into question the 
traditional mandate that the psychotherapist was to remain “untainted” by the patient’s 
psychological or emotional material. In the process of questioning the nature of 
subjectivity, Stern and other RA thinkers put into question a number of the tenets of 
medicalized psychology (Hoffman, 1998, 2009; Stern, 2010, 2012a, 2013c). Doubts 
about the applicability of the medical metaphor for psychotherapy are often hinted at in 
Stern’s and other RA writings.  
It will be useful to spell out questions about the medicalization of talk therapy and 
psychological theories in Stern’s writings. Such inquiry will help explain how far RA 
challenges to Cartesian-based models of thinking extend and where they lead. There have 
likewise been exceptions to a complete dismissal of medical, scientized, or 
Enlightenment-influences in theorizing in psychoanalysis.2 It will be important to see 
where Stern’s work figures in the filtering of these different and often conflicting 
approaches to modern thought. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, for e.g., exchanges between Orange and Pariser on neuropsychological discourse in 
psychoanalysis (Orange, 2003, 2005; Pariser, 2005). In later writings, Foucault similarly 
asserted the importance of not simply banishing discourses based on “the formal ontology 
of truth” while he also maintain the long-time focus of his own work, “the permanent, 
ever-changing question ‘What are we today?’” (1988, p. 145). Following the Interpretive 
Turn, the need for a critique from differing perspectives is not only productive but 
essential. This is also germane hermeneutic theory which stresses not a testing of truth 
but an understanding of the conditions that bring about a given interpretation within a 
particular historical context (Gadamer, 1975/2004). In other words, the Interpretive Turn 
suggests not so much a rejection of different discourses as a constant critique and 
dialogue about their origins, their assumptions, and their philosophical directions.   




 Much of Stern’s writing is in the form of commentary on previous psychoanalytic 
theory. His thought also emerges from traditions in philosophy, ethics, social awareness, 
as well as highly nuanced clinical reflection. Coming from such a profusion of sources, 
Stern’s writings hold meaning far beyond the concerns of psychodynamic purists. The 
shift in focus to the co-created, interpersonal field, the questioning of the notion of the 
individual as the basic particle of psychological study, and the grounding of 
psychological practice in history, culture, and time, often run contrary to previous 
theories of research, psychopathology, and therapeutic change.  
As his writing progressed (2010, 2012a, 2013c), Stern’s ideas have become 
increasingly clear on this front: they offer a direct challenge to the mass of voices calling 
for the predominance of evidence-based practice in psychotherapy, nearly a mantra for 
many practitioners, researchers, accountants, and administrators today. An analysis of 
Stern’s theory leads to inquiry that is psychological, philosophical, and historical, into 
what is meant by “technique” and how we have come to rely on this concept in 
psychological practice. The manufacture and sale of psychologically healthful techniques 
has transformed from a cottage industry to an economic force, as government and 
corporate interest have become involved with concerns for health on a social scale and 
with the reparation of social traumas. For example, former APA president Martin 
Seligman, who’s theory of learned helplessness (Maier & Seligman, 1976) has been used 
in the U.S. military program for interrogating detainees, was awarded a $31 million grant 
by the Pentagon to help soldiers develop “resilience” and cope with repeated tours of 
duty (Horton, 2010). He is reportedly one of two recent APA presidents to have been 
linked to torture techniques.  




 As with much of RA writing, Stern’s work suggests some new directions for 
psychological study, as well as for the process of psychotherapy. Using the concept of the 
self as an artifact that reflects its social context, and hence the historical era, I examine 
Stern’s theoretical model, with attention to socio-political contexts, and the location of 
this theory at the surface where postmodern philosophy and psychoanalytic practice meet. 







RA theory appears to be fed from different springs. Relational investigations into 
the self draw from the very close, time-intensive, clinical observation of psychoanalytic 
process, including analytically-informed infant research (e.g., Beebe & Lachmann, 2002; 
Benjamin, 1990; Benjamin & Mitchell, 1988). Indeed, a recent current in psychodynamic 
infant research is, in name, “relational.” The adherence to a particular definition of the 
individual, however, has also brought this merging of science and RA thinking under 
criticism for ideological underpinnings related to the masterful, bounded self (Cushman, 
1991). 
Another source of relational theory comes from postmodern and hermeneutic 
philosophies originating in the second half of the 20th Century, often referred to as the 
Interpretative Turn (Frie & Orange, 2009; Gadamer, Weinsheimer, & Marshall, 
1975/2004; Hiley et al., 1991). RA is composed by reaching beyond psychoanalytic 
theories, particularly to the postmodern.  
We have always enriched our theories by embracing concepts from disciplines 
beyond psychoanalysis. Postmodernism has had an especially powerful impact on 
relational sensibilities. It has exposed how each of our subject positions are 
structured around differences in power. It has also opened up the fixity of 
structure, challenging us to find fluidity, movement. (Suchet, Harris, & Aron, 
2007, p. xvii) 
 
A third wellspring of critiques of selfhood permeates much of RA work. It arises 
from the tradition within psychoanalysis of subjecting all aspects of a patient’s history to 
questioning. Taken to a social level, the culture of psychoanalysis itself does not have 
immunity in the application of its own principles. In psychoanalytic writings, no piece of 




history or language in the widest sense, however nuanced, transparent, or small, is 
exempt from reflection. Thus, commentaries on psychoanalytic theory and conceptions of 
the self include an examination of the lives of relevant philosophers, analysts, their cases 
and contexts. In addition to theoretical commentary, psychoanalytic writers often use 
great scope, encompassing both the time and place of the creation of psychoanalytic or 
other works. From inception, psychoanalysis has attended to both history on the grand 
scale and to the finest nuance of a words or feelings (e.g., Ehrenberg, 1996; Freud, 
1905/1960; Ogden, 1994).  In presenting theories of RA, Donna Orange, for example, 
provided contextual and biographical accounts (“Life and Works” sections) of 
interpretive philosophers and analytic theoreticians (2009, 2011). In sum, a third source 
for RA thinking is to be found in the many commentaries on its own theory that arise 
from within the psychoanalytic world.  
Analytic theorists from neurodevelopmental camps (e.g., Fonagy, Gergley,	  Jurist,	  
&	  Target, 2002; Siegel, 1999) have scrutinized the individual as we have known her, and 
some have joined philosophers and interpersonalists (Sullivan, 1953/1997) in asking if 
the self does not often look like something more of a process than a relatively stable thing 
or a reified entity over time. Even highly technicized or manualized approaches to 
therapy call for a principle of an “ever evolving formulation of the patient and her 
problems” even if that may be directed ultimately towards ratiocination (Beck, 1995, p. 
5).  
RA thinkers grew up in, and occasionally trace their historical influences to the 
counter-culture, resistance to the war in Viet Nam (Harris & Botticelli, 2010), and Civil 
Rights Movements of the 1960s (Suchet et al., 2007) and subsequent analyses of race 




(Altman, 2009; Layton, 2010a, 2010b), the feminist teach-ins and happenings of the 
1970s (Orbach, 1990), and Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transsexual (LGBT) movement 
throughout these decades to the present (Benjamin, 1988; Layton, 2004). Writings by 
indigenous peoples (Duran & Duran, 1995), philosophical deconstructions of the 
Cartesian cogito (Geertz, 1974; Smith, 1999) inspired by continental European 
philosophy, and RA critiques of traditional psychoanalytic practice, all mount ethical 
challenges to the effects of earlier, positivistic definitions of the self and the resultant 
methodologies (Cushman, 2009; Frie, 2006; Hoffman, 2009; Stolorow et al., 2002).  
The experience of querying the subject of psychology has a quality similar to 
venturing from particle into sub-particle Physics. As a given element is investigated, a 
multitude of new questions crop up.  
What methodological presumptions do we accept when we assume different ideas 
of the self? What are the practical effects and ultimately the ethical principles at work in 
different praxes created out of diverging ideas of the self? Do different practices of 
psychotherapy, via their assumptions about the individual, perhaps inadvertently replicate 
the very harm they purport to unravel or to mend? 
Although this body of writings often strongly implies alternatives to previous 
conceptions of the self, few RA authors have developed an organized theory of how a 
non-Cartesian self would appear. RA writers seem to be united in shifting the focus from 
cause-and-effect notions of individual motivations and into events occurring within an 
“interpersonal field.” In adopting this perspective towards a highly complex system, they 
accept a contingency of not-knowing or uncertainty and therefore share ideas with family 
systems authors (see Larner, 2000; Minuchin & Fishman, 1981; Stern, 2003, 2013a). RA 




writings also follow lines of argument that are similar to a small number of humanistic 
thinkers (Boss, 1983; du Plock, 1997), stressing that subjectivity cannot be understood as 
detached from the meanings or context in which the subject lives. Relational 
psychoanalysts have commonalities with narrative theoreticians (Neimeyer & Mahoney, 
1999; White & Epston, 1990) through a belief that language constitutes the social world. 
All of these approaches focus on therapeutic support in the form of helping the patient in 
the process of meaning making. Likewise, RA writings intersect with constructivist 
theory which holds that meaning is not constituted a priori and waiting to be discovered 
(Neimeyer & Mahoney, 1999). Both schools examine the patient’s construction of 
multiple meanings in a changing context.   
Many RA writers draw more from clinical practice, observation, and the 
psychoanalytic tradition and pay relatively less attention to philosophical works of the 
Interpretive Turn. Differences in focus, history, and experience give a richness to the 
literature of RA. Ehrenberg’s pioneering work, The Intimate Edge (1992), for example, is 
rich with case material and theory, but the focus is largely on psychoanalytic praxis as 
opposed to philosophical grounding.  
Another theme in RA (Hoffman, 1998; Ringstrom, 2001) is the respect paid to 
spontaneity in general, particularly within the therapeutic process. To put it reductively, if 
we locate the generation of unconscious meaning that takes place during the therapeutic 
hour within the field created by the therapist and patient, then the course of any session in 
therapy is largely an unpredictable event. Along with humanistic (Bugental, Pierson, & 
Schneider, 2001) and family systems thinkers, RA writers believe that the activity of a 
session has a complexity and a direction of its own (Hoffman, 2009; Stern, 2010). 




Minuchin & Reiter wrote, “there is something healing about unexpected ideas”  
(2014, p. 6). Some writers have suggested that the complexity of a session can be 
understood through the application of complexity theory (Coburn, 2007, 2009), originally 
developed to explain natural systems but a natural science theory that accepts a certain 
disappearance of predictability as well (Norman Packard, personal communication, ca. 
1996).  
  In RA thought, the content and process of a session are thought to be the co-
creation of its participants at a given place and time. It is easy to imagine, then, that a 
type of therapy based on spontaneity would resist theorizing, study, or reproduction. RA 
theory suggests less focus on theory and more a shift in traditional analytic work towards 
the dyadic field, while holding, perhaps inadvertently, to former analytic theories of the 
self and mechanisms of change.  
The term “relational psychoanalysis” (RA) is used in this study more loosely than 
in some other writings on the subject. RA here indicates a broad range of works and 
writers from a psychoanalytic perspective who view relationship as the heart of clinical 
change.  
The degree to which these different thinkers draw from certain traditions (analytic 
experience, postmodern-interpretive philosophies, and the history of psychoanalysis) 
varies greatly. According to Stern, “the definitions of Interpersonal psychoanalysis and 
Relational Psychoanalysis depend on who is doing the defining” (2006b, p. 565).  
 As a rule, RA writers (Benjamin, 2004; Stern, 2003) appear to conceptualize the 
self in a way that is at variance with traditional (and still common) psychological 
definitions. In general, those from an RA perspective adhere to more egalitarian 




approaches to psychotherapy, challenging long-held claims about roles, authority, 
expertise, disclosure (or even the idea of non-disclosability), along with the 
epistemological stance of the psychotherapist (Hoffman, 1983, 1994). RA writers, 
implicitly or explicitly, demonstrate awareness of, and attention to power differentials 
and the intersection of differing traditions in the therapeutic process. I explore 
ramifications of this shift in paradigm, from a focus on the individual to a reading of the 
relational field between patient and therapist. Given RA’s very first philosophical step–
that we are more than previously thought constituted by relationship–RA involves an 
eclectic and generally inclusive group of clinicians and writers. Others not technically 
from a psychoanalytic background might be embraced as being relational in their 
thinking. As will be seen, the parallels between these thinkers from outside the 
psychoanalytic world and RA writers are remarkable. It will also be useful to see where 
theoreticians, both within and outside of RA intellectual locales, are in conflict.   
 In much psychological writing self and individual are used interchangeably. 
Usage of these, along with the term “mind” by different authors varies, and I examine 
how Stern (2003, 2010) appears to have understood these terms in an interpersonal 
context. In general, I refer to interpersonal as Stern has used it and as defined by Sullivan 
(1954/1957).  
For Sullivan, observing the interpersonal context takes into account the fact that 
the observer of another human is necessarily a participant simply by the act of observing. 
In Stern, participation or engagement (this can include perception as well as action) is 
taken a step further to include unconscious activity that is called out by the interpersonal 
field. Regarding Schaefer’s implicit engagements, wrote Stern, “We don’t even know 




we’re participating in them” (2003, p.153). In other words, observing and participating 
here are necessarily intersubjective activities that we can investigate but about which a 
conclusive knowledge is impossible. Concerning this focus on relationship, Stern wrote 
that for Sullivan, “the smallest meaningful unit of experience is the interpersonal field” 
(Stern, 2003, p.147). Such a statement instigates a radical reproach to the American 
concept of individualism with its presumption that any one of us can be defined distinctly 
from the social surround. What we could call the “Interpersonal Turn” suggests not only 
a different kind of psychology, it also holds significant philosophical implications.  
Stern’s own concept of the field has been the renewed subject of his writings, and 
commentaries on them in the year of this writing (Stern, 2013b, 2013d, 2013e), in 
particular with a view to defining an interpersonal approach to RA and recent Bionian 
Field Theory. This discussion between Stern and theoreticians from a deeply Object 
Relational background is important I believe, because it leads to examining significant 
ideas of interiority-exteriority, notions at the heart of almost all psychological theorizing 
and research. The dialogue now taking place will help us to understand how the self is 
playing out in America in the early part of the 21st Century. Ideas and events here in the 
U.S. and within the next several years will likely influence generations to come. 
 Between Stern’s consistently refreshing use of language, the Heideggerian 
tendency to draw directly from poetry in order to bring philosophy into questions of the 
nature of being, Gadamer’s philosophy of interpretation, and Sullivan’s distinctive 
writings (to name a few), ample new terms are available for discussing this psychological 
theory. One of the fascinations of Stern’s works is his use of language that is almost 
conversant, while it also involves very careful reflection. In this study, I delve into his 




unusual terminology through concepts such as not-spelling-out (2003) and his concept of 
enactment (2010), in addition to his handling of the problem of self-deception in a post-
Cartesian world. Further, is may be useful to trace the evolution of significant terms in 
Stern’s epistemology such as the unformulated, along with his particular ideas about 
experience, and language. Lastly, it will be important to provide a brief explanation, and 
some historical anchors for the distinguishing reason from other ways of experiencing the 
world generally attributed to the works of Descartes and the philosophical cogito. 






 Relatively little has been written to date analyzing the major works of Donnel 
Stern. Critiques of Stern’s theories come from two different sides, the one postmodern 
philosophical (Frederickson, 2009; Goldner, 2002), and the other located well within the 
psychoanalytic tradition (Aukamp, 2010; Friedman, 2012; Holmes, 2011). Three of the 
articles reviewing Stern’s work are of his most recent book, Partners in Thought (2010), 
perhaps indicative of his growing importance as an analytic theoretician. 
 Aukamp (2010) accepted Stern’s emphasis on unformulated experience over 
repression. Divergent from Stern, for Aukamp the emphasis on unformulated experience 
arises neither out of a categorical necessity, nor is it the result of philosophical 
investigations. Rather, Aukamp saw working with unformulated experience as a way to 
bring the mutuality of the analyst and the patient through unusually difficult moments of 
psychotherapy. In Aukamp’s reading, unformulated experience and dissociation are 
integral to Stern’s theory of self-states. She argued, however, against Stern’s unilateral 
focus on dissociation and enactment as a necessary condition for therapeutic change. 
Aukamp maintained that dissociation theory does not adequately explain important 
aspects of her own clinical experience. Stern (2010) has upheld dissociation as a primal 
defense that developmentally precedes and psychically precludes all symbolization. For 
Stern, if psychological material has been symbolized then it must somehow have been 
made a part of experience, and hence such material cannot be dissociated.  
 In contrast, Aukamp (2010) described cases of patients diagnosed with 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) who 
exhibited various intra-identities during psychotherapy. An “identity” as such would be 




constituted by symbolic material, yet it appears to emerge through a process of 
dissociation. DID would indicate simultaneously the ability to symbolize and the process 
of dissociation at once. As an example, Aukamp reported on the case of a woman with 
DID who exhibited intra-identities and therefore dissociated material but these were 
absent of any enactment. Aukamp argued then, that dissociation can contain symbolic 
material; hence, symbolization may precede dissociation. Aukamp suggested the need to 
adapt Stern’s theory, in order to allow for differing levels of dissociation.  
 Stern has not responded to Aukamp’s (2010) emendation of his thinking, and it 
raises some important questions. From the historical perspective, is Stern’s privileging of 
one defense over others the artifact of a time (starting in the 1990s) when trauma studies 
grew into a subdiscipline of the social sciences, thus bringing dissociation into its long 
vogue into the present? Furthermore, could the theoretical trend focusing on dissociation 
be a psychoanalytic joining with the resistance against a reprehensible militaristic, 
corporate, and political practices perpetrated by powerful U.S. interests, such as decades 
of wars abroad, environmental destruction, and U.S. support of dictators worldwide?  
 In other words, is reflecting on the historical context of trauma in a society that 
disallows much discussion of its own exportation of traumatic acts bound to produce 
various concepts and descriptions of trauma such as those of Stern? For Barthes 
(1957/1988), Foucault (1975/1995), and others (Eagleton, 1990), the uniqueness of 
bourgeois ideology is found in its claim to be transparent, its claim not even to exist. 
Could the theoretical privileging of dissociation be a homolog to, say, Barthes’ and 
others’ more sociological, post-structural finding that modern power regularly conceals 




itself? It will be significant to locate Stern’s interest in dissociation within its social and 
historical contexts.3  
 Other queries arise with Aukamp’s (2010) prying loose of Stern’s assumption that 
dissociation chronologically precedes symbolization. Stern put dissociation in a primary 
position in his theory and later located it at the heart of early infant development, relating 
it to Fonagy et al.’s mentalization process (Fonagy et al., 2002; Stern, 2010). If we extend 
Aukamp’s thinking, could this primacy of dissociation lead to an accidental 
impoverishment, that is, to a limited discourse on the defenses in RA as compared to 
other psychoanalytic theory?  
 Aukamp (2010) made an important move towards resolving some of these 
questions by suggesting that dissociation can contain previously symbolized material. 
This step allows it to operate at various levels of formulation.  
 Aukamp’s (2010) notion of a multileveled dissociation suggests shifting 
dissociation from a dichotomous term (either something exists within the reach of 
consciousness or it does not) to one of degree. Does this present a useful alteration in 
Stern’s theory or does it punch an unstoppable hole in Stern’s model, given, again, that 
Stern’s dissociation is experience that is by definition unavailable to consciousness and is 
some steps beyond repression or denial in effecting characterological construction?  
 In Aukamp’s endeavor to adapt Stern’s theory to her own experience treating DID 
(2010) she has suggested that Stern’s theory is relevant and useful to psychotherapy, 
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particularly for such challenging cases. Her application, however, brings out the need for 
further investigation into Stern’s (2003) concepts of weak and strong dissociation, the 
very definition of dissociation, and its role relative to other defenses. If Aukamp was 
correct, dissociation is necessarily linked in Stern’s work to multiple self-states, questions 
about dissociation could also affect theoretical constructions of the very structure of the 
self in Stern’s theory of RA. These questions offer ample space for further discussion, 
and they speak to the need to continue refining Stern’s theoretical model within 
historical, sociopolitical, and theoretical contexts. 
 Holmes (2011) summarized and interpreted Stern’s work (2010), referring to him 
as the present “doyen of Relational Psychoanalysis” (p. 145). For Holmes, “‘beta 
elements’ waiting for a container, an alpha function” as conceived by Bion, offered a 
previously published version of Stern’s linked theories of enactment, dissociation, and 
meaning-making through therapeutic dialogue. Holmes was quick to provide a 
hypothetical retort to giving precedence to Bion’s container theory over Stern’s later 
construction of enactment. Taking the side of Stern, Holmes observed that, unlike Bion’s 
construct, in Stern’s model the exchange between analyst and patient is not 
unidirectional. Rather, Stern attempted to capture the reciprocity in unconscious 
communication.  
 One could go further than Holmes, to say that in Stern’s model the 
communication is constituted through its bidirectionality. In Stern’s hermeneutic thought, 
the communication runs inherently both ways and that in-betweenness defines the field. 
While both Bion and Stern examined how the patient’s world is changed in 
psychotherapy, for Stern relation, and the field, remain fundamental. This field for Stern 




is so significant that the role of projective identification, that is, of the psychoanalyst 
being made to feel a certain way by the patient, come into question by (Stern, 2010, 
2013b). For Stern, rather, unconscious aspects of one’s participation holds a far greater 
importance than a singular causality implied by one individual acting upon another.  
 Holmes (2011) also found in Stern’s theory an important solution to a long-time 
problem in psychoanalytic practice. Holmes proposed that fundamentals of “ideal 
psychoanalytic technique” (p. 146) are also ethical tenets of practice. These fundamentals 
include using thought for action, being reliable, and avoiding seduction, encouragement, 
or criticism. According to Holmes, these ideals are nearly universally upheld in 
psychoanalysis. They are also ideals, wrote Holmes, that are regularly breached in their 
observance (even if symbolically). For Holmes, Winnicott’s concept of “good enough” 
parenting (1953) could also be seen in a good enough treatment, allowing for loss and 
reparation as a creative force in psychoanalysis. Holmes welcomed Stern’s recasting of 
such difficult rifts in therapy as enactments that are inevitable and even desirable (if 
unpleasant) aspects of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis. Given this significantly 
progressive step, Holmes argued, Stern’s theory holds an important place in the 
contemporary history of psychoanalytic thought.  
Stern’s theory and case examples received numerous attacks in another, fairly 
short book review from a long-time analytic practitioner, Henry A. Friedman (2011). 
Similar to Holmes, Friedman challenged Stern’s theory as appearing to be de novo when, 
to Friedman, it seemed to be covering old ground. Friedman’s direct criticisms of Stern’s 
2010 book pointed out that Stern’s recent theory of enactment is actually a regression to 
early, mechanistic theories of the self, as found in classical psychoanalysis and ego 




psychology. Friedman maintained that Stern’s relational-dissociative model led to the 
same mistake as had the traditional, psychoanalytic drive-defense model. For Friedman 
(2011), each of these theories requires too much emphasis on inner psychic life and 
internal mechanisms of both the patient and psychoanalyst. In this sense, according to 
Friedman, Stern’s theory suffers from a lack of awareness of psychoanalytic history. 
These are strong words for a way of thinking with claims to the Heideggerian tradition 
(Heidegger, Schmidt, & Stambaugh, 1927/2010) and its principles that human beings are 
in the world and that our thought can only arise out of a historical context. 
Like Aukamp (2010) Friedman also argued (2011) that Stern has operated a type 
of theoretical reductionism, by privileging dissociation as foremost among the defenses. 
Friedman suggested that Stern’s use of hermeneutic philosophy is displaced in the 
context of the analytic hour, and that the hermeneutic connection may be, instead, an 
appeal to “the authority of a philosopher” (p. 169).4 To Friedman, Stern’s placing the 
analyst and the patient on an equal epistemological stance has negative consequences. He 
observed that Stern’s clinical descriptions seemed to come from cases of very fragile, 
possibly borderline patients. For Friedman, the focus on dissociation and the Sullivanian 
adherence to investigating the not-me enactments of both patient and therapist may 
provide fragile patients with an insufficiently “reality-based response from the analyst” 
(2011, p. 169), in addition to relying heavily on such an imprecisely defined concept as 
enactment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The parallel to a harking back to Freud, the German-speaking “father” of 
psychoanalysis is hard to miss here. It can be asked if there is a hint of an oedipal 
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For Friedman (2011), the sharp focus on dissociation obviates perhaps broader 
characterological concerns in the analyst’s perception of the patient. Such focus “reduces 
the functioning of total personalities to a series of dissociations and enactments” (p. 170). 
For Friedman, this reductionism ultimately results in a distancing of the patient.  
Oddly, Friedman’s (2011) line of thinking suggests that Stern’s theories lead to a 
fairly limiting reification of the person in the room, just as Stern argued for deeply 
authentic, intersubjective experiences between therapist and patient. Stern’s strong 
concentration on transference and counter-transference, according to Friedman, also 
precludes important diagnostic work and, he claimed, it denies the common sense fact 
that analysts, given their knowledge and experience, often do indeed know things about 
their patients that their patients do not seem to know about themselves. Important 
questions about the authority, expertise, and the epistemological stance of the therapist 
are in strong relief here.   
In a critique that is both theoretical and clinical, Goldner (2002) attacked the 
contradiction of a profession that would simultaneously hold a stance of equality while 
also holding to claims of expertise over the patient. Although there is a sense of 
excitement for the RA project in her writing, Goldner offered a note of caution to 
Relationalists in general. She stressed the importance of taking into account the 
sociocultural matrix in which analyst and patient are embedded, a matrix which (in her 
paraphrasing of Foucault) “sets the terms for what can be known, thought, or spoken”  
(p. 161).  
In other words, for Goldner (2002) no sensible understanding of the 
epistemological status of psychoanalysis can be had, without also examining the kinds of 




questions raised by Foucault about the object/subject divide and the power relations of 
the clinical setting. These questions include: Who is observing?; Who is being seen?; and 
Who is doing the telling of another’s life? The answers to such questions lead to “the 
relative power of conversational partners to create meaning” (p. 161). 
It quickly becomes apparent in almost any Western therapeutic interaction that the 
“who” here will predictably land on the psychotherapist’s side of the room, that is, among 
Foucault’s ruling experts. Citing Chodrow (1996), Goldner (2002) pointed out that more 
than mere effects of discourse, matters such as gender and sexual subjectivity, are highly 
personal questions; they are “idiomatic, creative acts” (p. 163).  
Goldner (2002) then made a significant point, a theme found regularly in Stern’s 
works (2003, 2010), that the RA project is essentially a blending of constructivist and 
deconstructivist points of view. She next took Stern (among others) to task for offering a 
postmodern clinical perspective that lacks attention to questions of identity, such as 
gender and sexuality, categories fundamental to subjectivity. Passing over them relegates 
questions of gender and sexual identity to the status of “topics” (2002, p. 162), with the 
covert default, that male and heterosexual delineate the frame of reference for gendering 
and for sexual orientations. By assuming a transparency of identity, we blithely continue 
to assume the centrality of a heterosexual, male-dominated status quo.  
In the same publication (Fairfield, Layton, & Stack, 2002), Stern responded to 
Goldner’s objections in a strong spirit of dialogue and with a much longer piece of 
writing (Stern, 2002b). Stern worked towards a synthesis of his hermeneutically 
influenced thought with Foucault’s concepts of power. Stern also considered the various 
RA writers involved in the discussion he held with Goldner. Although today’s 




psychology is largely populated by women professionals, he discovered that the writers 
of RA in his part of the exchange with Goldner were nearly all white males.5 This move 
towards the kinds of synthesis introduced by Goldner would later help steer Stern along a 
vein that would prove productive to his own theory in later works (2010), by grounding it 
in a broader sociopolitical understanding. We can assume that the strength or weakness of 
synthesizing answers to identity and sexuality questions with other elements of RA 
discourse will be essential to the theory’s future usefulness and, of course, to its ethical 
coherence (Aron & Starr, 2013). 
A philosophical critique relevant to Stern is Frederickson’s Heideggerian 
response to psychological theories of multiplicity (2009). Sullivan (1950/1971) held that 
the self arises through our social relations and is therefore multiple and varying. 
Frederickson (2009) cited Heidegger’s direct argument with Harry Stack Sullivan.  
For Heidegger, an interpersonal genesis of self denied the distinction between the 
“ontic” (a factual, historical aspect of being) versus ontological being (the grounding of 
human existence in a recursive sense of being-in-the world). For Heidegger, the ontic 
thingness requires a sense of being outside itself. Therefore, the ontic is only created 
through representations, and hence only through relationships with others. For Heidegger, 
the ontic, a factual, historical existence, is important. However, it is only part of what it 
means to be human. Even ontic being presumes a fundamental, ontological being (Da-
sein) in order to take place. As its thingness is based upon representations, the ontic can 
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only be an approximation of the presence of the ontological being. On the other hand, the 
grounding of ontological being is for Heidegger always something of a mystery to us.  
Frederickson argued (2009) that RA practitioners and theorists need constantly to 
be searching for the ontological being of their patients, caught as they are in the creation 
of historical representations (ontic) about being (the ontological, that is, rather, being 
open to different interpretations and change in time, that which is in a process of 
unfolding). In other words, our discourses, interpretations, and texts about persons are 
never the equivalent of the persons themselves.  
It is possible here that Frederickson may have urged on psychology a task 
impossible for any discipline that is based upon the intellectual study of human beings 
through language and symbols. That said, for Frederickson, a multiplicity of selves (such 
as Stern derived from Sullivan, 2010) is necessarily based on the ontic but it denies the 
ontological. Frederickson’s point is intriguing because it suggests that in denying the 
ontological, Stern’s multiplicity theory could operate on the perception of what a patient 
is, in a similar way to Stern’s (2003) own description of how enactment affects the 
psychoanalyst’s thinking about the patient.  
 Interestingly, like Aukamp (2010), Frederickson turned to cases of people with 
multiple identities, but he came to a nearly opposite conclusion from that of Aukamp. 
Frederickson found in cases of DID not the confirmation of a multiplicity of being but 
rather a pathology, evidence of failures at being.  
For Frederickson (2009) the patient with multiple identities has lost the 
connection with their ontological being, having formed a self-relationship that objectifies 
the self, a constitution of being that is, in essence, “scientized” (p. 56). Implications of 




Frederickson’s assertion that psychologists often engage in a sort of Cartesianism which, 
one could say, identifies with the aggressor (in the form of the cogito) are too numerous 
to detail here. They led him, however, to questions about how clinicians or theorists 
represent patients, and how empathy (“making the patient feel understood”) becomes a 
sort of reification.   
Frederickson’s objections to multiplicity are similar to Native American 
psychological concerns about a “Cartesian Anxiety Disorder” (Duran & Duran, 1995). 
From this point-of-view, the separation of psychology and the world is inherently 
pathological. These authors prescribed an alternative psychotherapy that celebrates “the 
diverse ways of life” (p. 8) which they depicted as following not a logic of the rule out 
(A: Non A), but rather one that looks at difference (A: B). There may be an intersection 
between hermeneutic thought and the works of Duran and Duran. 
While Frederickson sided with Stern’s urging that in therapy we develop the 
ability “embody . . . previously disowned modes of conduct, with a more deeply felt 
sense of being their embodiment” (2009, p. 63), Stern’s theory of a multiplicity of  
self-states and a dissociated space in between each state (2003, 2010), bears further 
examination in light of Frederickson’s interrogation of assumptions behind multiplicity 
via the ontic-ontological split. 
In a review of Stern’s (2010) Partners in Thought, Ahbel-Rappe (2010) has 
presented one of the best organized critiques of Stern’s thought from within the 
psychoanalytic literature, and from both clinical and theoretical perspectives.  
Ahbel-Rappe is one of the few authors to recognize (see also Cushman, 2013a) that 
Stern’s theory and relational practice entail implicit moral understandings, which she 




characterized as “a kind of background music [in Partners in Thought] of ethical-clinical 
conviction and inspiration” (2010, p. 798). For Ahbel-Rappe, this underlying moral 
structure is particularly apparent in Stern’s theory in its emphasis on the engagement and 
the fallibility of the psychotherapist, what she has called the “existential dimension of 
being an analyst” (p. 799). This is not so much here a wholesale acceptance of an 
Existential ethic as an emphasis on the Existential idea of limits to what we can know 
about our own suffering, and to what the psychoanalyst can know about her own 
participation in relationship. “Virtually every clinical example in the book includes and 
even features (without being overly confessional) Stern wrestling with his own 
dissociations for the sake of treatments. That is at once a theoretical and an ethical 
stance” (Ahbel-Rappe, 2010, p. 799).  
 Ahbel-Rappe has also underlined an important aspect of Stern’s approach to 
theory. For her, Partners in Thought (Stern, 2010) carries with it an environment itself of 
the relational. Given his awareness of language, Stern’s writings are often not only about 
the search of the psychoanalytic session but they have the quality of a search, of a 
struggle that is both conceptual and phenomenological.  Ahbel-Rappe steered clear of 
tying this to any philosophy, to remain largely psychoanalytic in her review.  
Stern’s theory itself is at heart dialogical in its moves toward a psychoanalysis in 
which each partner attempts to be open to being changed by the process. Stern’s actions 
in the institutional world also appear to be dialogical (and fundamentally hermeneutic if 
we can write of such a thing), in his openness to commentary, interpretation, through 
psychoanalytic conferences and schools, his frequent responses to the works of others, 
and his frequent calls to responses to his own ideas or reflections on ideas that appear to 




challenge his own approach  (see, for e.g., the discussion of Goldner above, 2002; Stern, 
2002b, and 2011b) and his engagement of Object Relational theoreticians in 2013 (Stern, 
2013b, 2013d, 2013e). 
Another aspect of the relational environment of Partners concerns the way its 
author interacts with other psychoanalytic writers. In this Stern is truly a model of 
generosity. Whether he is acknowledging their influence, making use of their 
ideas, or critiquing them, one feels Stern in relation to other thinkers, not just 
using them for foils or fodder. (Ahbel-Rappe, 2010, p. 799) 
 
 This open discussion of, attention to, and at times wrestling with other theories 
makes Stern’s works both fascinating and sometimes difficult to read. There appears to 
be recognition throughout Stern’s writings that differing ideas are essential for our own 
ideas to grow into something new or different. Again, this is core to Stern’s clinical 
theory, and in particular his concept of enactment. 
 As in indicated Ahbel-Rappe’s review Partners in Thought (2010), concerns 
about moral understandings appear intermittently as one reads Stern’s works. They come 
more clearly to the fore in later writings. I examine considerations and thoughts on 
psychotherapy as a process interwoven with moral understandings that go beyond codes 
of therapeutic guidelines in the Findings-Discussion Chapters.  
 Ahbel-Rappe (2010) also levelled various criticisms at Stern’s theory. This author 
has encountered several of them in his own readings of Stern. First, Ahbel-Rappe took 
issue with Stern’s statement, one of his few statements about any goal to his form of RA, 
that “[t]he most important outcome of a successful analysis is the firm and unthinking 
conviction that one’s life is one’s own, that oneself and no one else is living it” (2010, p. 
102).  




 For Ahbel-Rappe (2010) this argues against the conundrum inherent in Stern’s 
thought that we are at least partially co-created in relationship to others, that we require 
others to understand our own minds. Indeed, Stern’s stated goal of owning or living one’s 
own life appears to fly against his own depiction of the interpersonal field as the 
important site of enactment and knowledge of the new (2003, 2010). Furthermore, this 
kind of firmness of knowledge about oneself works against the hermeneutic assumption 
that we are constituted in language in an ongoing process involving traditions and others 
(Gadamer, 1975/2004). On her side, Ahbel-Rappe located the problem within her own 
experience of reading Stern’s 2010 book:  
But in what sense would the outcome of a successful relational psychoanalysis be 
the ‘firm and unthinking’ conviction that one’s life is one’s own? Surely an effect 
of reading Partners and of the analyses it might inspire is to make this conviction 
more deeply thought, more mediated and flexible via the lived experience of how 
our own self is, at any given moment, in part a function of with whom and how 
we are relating. (Ahbel-Rappe, 2010, p. 800) 
 
 For Ahbel-Rappe, the uncertainty and the constant process (which appear basic to 
Stern’s sense of temporality) would belie this kind of faith in self ownership. To my 
mind, it would rather imply a therapeutic practice of learning to accept how little we can 
possess in some permanent way even of our own experience. With the flexibility of 
which Ahbel-Rappe wrote, lies, perhaps a certain freedom. As Stern would later write 
(2012), the relational possibilities grow with such experience of relational freedom in the 
psychoanalytic hour.  
 Behind Ahbel-Rappe’s “mediating of experience” (2010), I believe, important 
questions about the configuration of the Stern’s self, as well as issues about temporality. 
If we are regularly constituted by relationship, language, tradition, and culture, as is 
presupposed by Gadamer’s (1975/2004) hermeneutics as well as interpersonal thought, 




what kind of self emerges from Stern’s RA? I examine the question of the self in Stern’s 
work as well, in the Findings-Discussion Chapters below. 
 Ahbel-Rappe also questions Stern’s emphasis on the less obvious or common 
sense of different binaries. Ahbel-Rappe wrote: “Despite his philosophical commitment 
to the dialectics of relationships, Stern has a discursive tendency not only to lift up the 
previously undermphasized term in a binary, but also to fall into reifying the elements 
and even picking sides” (Ahbel-Rappe, 2010, p. 804). For her, this was particularly 
apparent in Stern’s description of memory as something that is constructed. It also 
appeared in his emphasis on process as opposed to the actual content of sessions: “Stern 
comes too close for my comfort to privileging relationship at the expense of content, 
forms of relatedness, instead of memory” (p. 800). 
 For Ahbel-Rappe, (2010) memory relates to events, and these may be involved 
with any of the multifarious aspects of relationship. A memory, for her, may in and of 
itself open new territory in practice; it can affect the relationship or the relational session, 
or it may just as well block out aspects of relationship. It would follow that relationship 
may be subject to memory, and content would serve as much attention as process in a 
psychoanalytic session. The question remains a constant, to what degree should the 
psychoanalyst jump at a chance to work closer to process, as opposed to content which 
may risk being understood too well? 
 For Ahbel-Rappe, Stern’s focus on enactment as the royal road to dissociated 
experience also appeared limiting. She objected that dissociated experience may be 
located outside of enactment as well. “The dissociated speaks in many, many ways in 




life” (2010, p. 801), including somatic symptoms, memories, mood shifts, language 
usage, and so on. All of these offer access to dissociated experience. 
 Ahbel-Rappe (2010) also indicated that the primacy of dissociation among the 
defenses in Stern’s thought (over Freud’s repression), required further clarification.  
Repression for Stern requires symbolization which is not necessary for dissociation, for 
that which is not even experienced (see Stern, 2003).  To Stern, dissociation is 
developmentally primary, as is the case in Sullivan’s theory of the self. Elsewhere, Stern 
maintained that dissociation involves symbolized material. Both conceptions are related 
to Stern’s theory that the mind is not a container of fixed but frequently inaccessible 
contents, but rather as something in a Constructivist world subject to ongoing interaction 
and interpretation.  
 For Ahbel-Rappe (2010), there is a conflict between Stern’s (2010) different 
notions of dissociation. She found a contradiction between a dissociation that is 
necessarily unformulated, and a not-me (I would add here, a not-me governed and even 
formed by Sullivan’s interpersonal patterns [1953/1997]), in Stern’s words, “a “closed 
system of stubborn and stable dissociations” (2010, p. 57). The latter is by definition 
formulated and the other is by definition not able to be so.  
 Stern has rejected Freud’s drive theory (2003, 2010). However, Ahbel-Rappe saw 
in Stern’s book an implicit “drive to relate” (2010, p. 803). This is an interesting and rare 
suggestion joining drive theory and RA thought. For her, the conflict presented in Stern’s 
theory between enactment and symbolization is actually the same as Freud’s (1920, 
1923), at its core a push and pull of life and death instincts. Ahbel-Rappe has essentially 




asked, What motivates enactment? Her answer is that is something more than a 
phenomenological sense of loss or confusion. 
It is the death drive, the repetition compulsion, the drive against symbolization, 
toward silence and isolation. And his theory under-represents what it implicitly 
recognizes, the ‘press for registration in consciousness,’ the life drive, the 
imperative to symbolize, to find a witness, to relate, and so to live. (Ahbel-Rappe, 
2010, p. 803) 
 
 She finds in Stern’s book a fundamental interest in relatedness. In Stern’s 
description of change in Partners in Thought (2010) lies a great hope in the mutual 
courage of engaging in a particularly difficult type of relating, the psychoanalytic 
engagement.  
 Ahbel-Rappe’s (2010) introduction of the death drive marks, on the other hand, an 
important move for Stern’s theory. In a sense, she has accomplished something here that 
is right along the line of Stern’s project, joining Interpersonal Relational Theory to 
Heidegger’s philosophy (1927/2010) and the Interpretive Turn.  
 In other words, in Sullivan’s theory (1953/1997) relationship involves anxiety, 
something that is simultaneously organizing the self and delimiting its awareness, 
understanding of, and ability to act on experience. Ahbel-Rappe has related this anxiety 
back to Freud’s opposition of the life and death instincts. This, however, is also in line 
with Heidegger’s concept of Angst (1927/2010), a basic fact of Being, that is, of human 
existence as a being that has awareness of, and interest in itself. I follow similar lines of 
thought. Throughout this study I examine the possible meanings of Stern’s reformulation 
of traditional notions of repression and dissociation, particularly as they relate to theories 
of knowing, and in Chapter 2, the Findings-Discussion Section I examine Stern’s 




configuration of the self. I also connect this to basic tenets about Being in Heidegger’s 
and Gadamer’s philosophies. 
The concerns raised by these authors are significant for RA psychotherapy. They 
require further investigation beyond the short pieces in which they have been published.  
On the one hand, a useful enquiry is to see how well Stern has been able to blend 
Foucauldian and identity objections to his description of the self. Is a synthesis of 
Foucault’s thought with relational analytic practice simply an RA move to “cover one’s 
bases?” Joining these ideas, of RA interpretation with theories about power, is an 
important activity. As Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami has written: “Interpretation is 
everything. And where there is room for interpretation, there is always room for political 
persuasion” (2011, p. 147).  
How does Stern, an RA psychoanalyst, address shifts in power and issues of race, 
gender, and class inequality, and are these responses sufficient for a psychoanalysis that 
would hold itself open to all forms of discourse and would remain egalitarian at heart? 
(Note that Stern appears to eschew the word “egalitarian” and uses, rather, “democratic” 
in describing the relational approach to psychotherapy). Could this theory be reworked, if 
needed, for its sense of social equality, in order to better fit with tenets of a more 
horizontal epistemological field?   
On the clinical side, it will be necessary to continue to attend to reports of front-
line clinicians, such as Aukamp (2010), Friedman (2011), and Holmes (2011), as they 
consider new ways of thinking about psychotherapy and treating patients. While 
Frederickson (2009) did not directly critique Stern, his delineation of an ontic versus 
ontological dichotomy has significant implications for Stern’s description for the self, in 




addition to various assumptions in hermeneutic thought and interpersonal psychoanalysis. 
Ahbel-Rappe’s reading of Stern’s theory also offers basic questions. Is it possible to work 
a theory of drive into one that is based on the social construction of the self, and if so, 
what are the effects of joining these two? Likewise, is Stern’s rejection of contents of a 
self and his questioning of a correspondence theory between memory and event lead to a 
new understanding of experience and therapeutic change? If so, does that preclude 
meaningful material that would not seem to be part of the interpersonal field, as Ahbel-
Rappe has suggested? 






Statement of the Problem 
To date, there has been no comprehensive critique of the works of Donnel Stern. I 
explore Stern’s concept of the self that locate Stern’s theory in historical context, and I 
analyze it in relation to philosophies of the interpretive turn, particularly hermeneutic 
philosophy. For example, I examine why locating the self in an interpersonal context 
addresses issues that are particular to our time. I further examine how well Stern’s 
concept of self-states (2010) accords with hermeneutic and postmodern thinking on 
interpretation and co-created meaning, the philosophical home of Stern’s psychological 
theories. Are self-states equivalent to different ways of being, as first delineated by 
Heidegger? If so, because his theories alternate between clinical observation and 
philosophical tenets, does Stern inadvertently ascribe some kind of “contents” when he 
describes the mind as a “horizontally organized collection of self-states, states of being, 
or states of mind, each in dynamic relation to the others” (2010, p. 139)? Does such a 
description return us, if indirectly, to an “empty self” (Cushman, 1990) constantly in need 
of gratification, prey to consumerism, and malleable to the next formulation of dominant 
ideology, or, alternately, is Stern looking at the subject (if the term still holds) in an 
entirely new way? 





Description of the Study 
Specifically, in this study I investigate the clinical and sociopolitical implications 
of adopting Stern’s theory of self. I focus on the bulk of Stern’s work to date, that is, two 
collections of his writings published in 2003 (Unformulated Experience) and 2010 
(Partners in Thought). I include new works as they have become available, such as 
Stern’s recent commentaries or possible works in press. As the series editor of 
Routledge’s Psychoanalysis in a New Key book series, Stern is not only a prolific writer 
but extremely active as an editor. I have further examined some of Stern’s emendations 
of other authors’ writings.  
Further, I examine what this theory means for long-held clinical ideas. I have 
extrapolated possible future directions for a better understanding of the teaching of 
clinical psychotherapy. Underlying Stern’s and other relational approaches to treatment 
are ideas about personhood and alternative—that is, possibly new—moral understandings 
about what psychologists mean by well-being. 







 The queries in the Research Questions section direct the interpretive, 
philosophical and theoretical research of this study. Each question frames a particular 
intellectual issue, in order to open up further areas to hermeneutic inquiry.  
This study draws from hermeneutic methods, in order to better understand Stern’s 
major texts. Hermeneutic study, with its assumptions very different from those of much 
of social science investigation, has a different goal from much of empirical research. The 
goal of hermeneutic work is not to arrive at better or closer approximation of the truth of 
something “out there.” From a hermeneutic point of view, any method also necessarily 
changes the textuality of the world (Stigliano, 1989). Rather, hermeneutics at the outset is 
a way to study visible or invisible distinctions that make certain social practices possible.6  
Hermeneutics includes a principal assumption that all social practices are located in a 
particular historical context; they are embodied in place and time. The goal of a study is 
to develop a “body of distinctions which [sic] make a practice or network of practices 
possible” (p. 65). The product of such a study, then, is pragmatic: a work about a social 
practice (in this case, the major works of Donnel Stern on psychoanalytic theory) that can 
ground further innovation. Grounding here is significant, and to qualify as hermeneutic, a 
study’s interpretations must be able to stand up to other interpretations, and the evidence 
must be open to public scrutiny.  
Given hermeneuticists’ distrust of the assertions of a singular truth in a text, they 
reject the idea of truth as a correspondence between distinctions and some  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Much of what follows draws upon Stigliano, 1989. 




supra-linguistic, mysterious “real world” to which distinctions refer. For that reason, 
hermeneutics involves entering a process of continuous interpretive conflict. 
“Alternatives” Stigliano maintained, “must always be entertained as genuine 
possibilities” (1989, p. 66). A hermeneutic study therefore may have some qualities of a 
literary analysis, in its ability to bring into the discussion questions about the uses of 
tropes and language, rhetorical strategies, nuance, and a breadth of sources that would 
likely be deemed necessarily external to the canon of empirically based study. 
 In this study, I follow Stigliano’s recommendations for structuring a hermeneutic 
study (1989). Again, it will be important to keep in mind Gadamer’s warning that 
methodology necessarily distorts a greater sense of textuality, and that a priori steps can 
be hazardous to an investigation in search of a new way of understanding a subject 
(Gadamer, 1975/2004).  It has been useful, however, to adhere to a dialectic similar to 
Stigliano’s, while also accepting that there may be reasons (alternative interpretations) for 
breaking guidelines by such an a priori structure. The overall test is the production of a 
dissertation about Stern’s works that can help to clarify historical, philosophical, and 
psychological contexts of Stern’s writings, in order to refine theory that is useful and 
germane to present understandings, therapeutic practice, and possibly political 
arrangements as well.  
In such a discussion, arguments and alternative interpretations have been 
examined regularly. While this may appear at the outset to readers new to hermeneutic 
study as an unstructured approach to academic research, it holds a certain rigor that is 
lacking in empirical research methods: with its attention to language, history, and shifts 
of power, poststructural and hermeneutic study offer a means to avoid the inadvertent 




reproduction of covert ideologies inherent in many if not most psychological studies 
(Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).  
Assumptions and ideologies on all sides have been interrogated. In this case, such 
interrogation would investigate possible ideological assumptions embedded in a 
particular text. Hence, innovation includes a goal of passing beyond a simple rephrasing 
of the status quo in a given social practice or discipline, and possibly overcoming the 
ideological repetition compulsion we often see in modern psychological writings.  
 Stigliano’s (1989) approach consists of four phases. The first involves selecting a 
text, in this case Stern’s two books of collected works (2003, 2010). The second step 
Stigliano names “distantiation.” Distantiation is an effort to understand a text as a system 
of references located in a particular sociocultural context that contains historical 
precedents, social concerns, and perceived possibilities. Distantiation helps to help reveal 
assumptions, distinctions, or attitudes hidden to those who are embedded in the field 
being studied. Many of the questions found in this proposal were formulated through 
such a process. The third phase Stigliano calls “appropriation.” It involves understanding 
the other (in this case, Stern’s words, social context, and theory), and an attempt to attain 
a certain fluency, which can be attained only through one’s own voice (my term) or 
perspective, and through reflecting on that other set of distinctions (here, Stern’s 
theoretical writings and their context).  
One way to understand this better would be to draw an analogy to the learning of 
a new dialect in one’s own native language. By assuming the stance of an outsider (we 
could even say a newcomer), the embedded researcher questions language that may at 




first glance appear unremarkable. In terms of field theory (Mead, 1934/1982), the 
researcher analogously shifts focus between background and foreground. 
The last stage is “reconstruction” that is, Stern’s theoretical system is presented in 
a new light, subsequent to its examination alongside competing arguments, 
contextualizations, or interpretations. This last stage bears a surprising resemblance to 
some depictions of later stages in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, a sort of recapitulation 
of the dialogue, witnessing a shift in horizons, that is, a text upon a text, similar to 
therapeutic commentary on past sessions, mutual experiences, and narratives.  
This involves an exploration of themes within texts, and then contextualizing 
them. Concepts found repeatedly in a text can be re-examined against a larger, historical 
context, to see how the effects of social practices, both purposefully and unintentionally, 
function politically. The present study is, then, deconstructionist-interpretive. It has 
emerged from joining concern with meaning and the good, as well as a deconstructionist 
attention to hidden rules or political assumptions in the texts examined and conclusions 
drawn from them.  





General Research Questions 
I have approached this analysis of Donnel Stern’s major works to date (2003, 
2010) by addressing the following questions: 
RQ 1. What are the definitions and role of the self in Stern’s theory of multiple self-
states, dissociation, enactment, and the relational field?  
RQ 2. What sort of cultural, historical, and political contexts would give rise to Stern’s 
relational theory, his conceptions of selfhood, and his egalitarian standards of 
psychoanalytic practice? What kinds of sociopolitical functions would such a conception 
of self fulfill? 
RQ 3. How does Stern’s theoretical model confirm, challenge, or extend assumptions of 
traditions from which it arises, namely: psychoanalytic clinical practice, psychoanalytic 
(and especially Interpersonal) theory, and the Interpretive Turn? 
RQ 4. How can a hermeneutic notion of the self as something that emerges from the 
interpersonal field, and is co-created and a reflection of the cultural clearing, be 
reconciled with the long-held binary of the interiority and exteriority of the individual, an 
assumption that has long been native to psychoanalysis?  
RQ 5. How does Stern’s theory address questions about the effects of, and shifts in power 
within the therapeutic relationship? Where does such a theory locate psychotherapy or 
psychoanalysis as a social practice? 
RQ 6. What are the implications of the necessary emphasis in Stern’s theory of 
therapeutically working with surprise, and curiosity, and what is not known, and their 
juxtaposition to concepts of technique in mainstream psychology? 




RQ 7. What are the historical and social contexts of Stern’s assumptions involving basic, 
early interpersonal patterns and their determinism in later life? 
RQ 8. What are some of the enigmas posed by Stern’s theory, with its adherence to 
hermeneutic philosophical thinking, psychoanalytic observation and practice, and 
postmodern questions about power, subjectivity, and identity? Does adherence to these 
traditions bring unnecessary limitations to psychoanalytic theory and practice, or does it 
rather elucidate innovative and compassionate ways of practicing?  
RQ 10. Is Stern’s model, located within both psychoanalytic discourse and hermeneutic 
philosophy, in line with ethical tenets of these different currents of thought? 






Topics of Investigation: Enigmas 
In examining Stern’s work, a number of puzzling ideas emerge. At the base of 
Heidegger’s philosophy, being itself is an enigma. That said, for Heidegger, we need to 
“retrieve the question of being” (1927/2010, p. 3). “The fact that we live already in an 
understanding of being and that the meaning of being is at the same time shrouded in 
darkness proves the fundamental necessity of retrieving the question of the meaning of 
‘being.’” (Heidegger, 1927/2010, p. 3). 
In other words, that which is enigmatic is accepted as fundamental. Enigmas, 
however, are interrogated and attempts are made to render their meaning explicit or 
understood.  
This, then, is a theory or practical approach that sets out to renovate, as proposed 
by Stigliano (1989). For all its best intentions it is likely to contain a search for that which 
is new. The attraction of this philosophy and subsequent methodologies and clinical 
practices should be examined for historical and local themes. There has long been a 
cultural thrust towards the privileging of the “newest best thing” in American society. 
The search for new experiencing appears to be inherent in much of RA theory. In this 
study, I offer an exploration of questions concerning the new through a reflective reading 
of Stern’s texts.  
The enigmas in theory and practice identified and explored below could be seen 
to arise out of the difficulties of applying the thought of the Interpretive Turn to Western 
readers’ everyday lives as they have likely been experienced. That is, the questions below 
emerge from the traditions in which psychotherapists live and practice, and are 




influenced by the Cartesian split. Postmodern critiques and hermeneutic philosophers 
suggest that new languaging is essential to coming into different relationships or to ways 
of understanding the world, ways outside the mainstream power and as an alternative to 
the limitations of empirical science as it has traditionally been practiced (Bordo, 1987; 
Gadamer, 1975/2004; Illich, 1976/1995; Kuhn, 1970; Taylor, 1992).  
Language, in any case, plays a central role in psychoanalysis. It will be 
worthwhile to examine the commonalities and differences between psychoanalytic theory 
and the discourses of postmodern philosophies. RA theory would benefit from a better 
understanding of where it clearly meets with philosophical tenets of the Interpretive Turn, 
and where it diverges from these traditions. RA writers are often undecided on where 
they stand, along the line of the linguistic, and the possibility of linguistic versus extra-
linguistic meaning or experience (Frie, 1999; Fonagy et al., 2002; Stern, 2010; Stigliano, 
1989). There appears to be little unity among writers who do declare a position regarding 
lingustic versus extra-lingustic experience. As I explain below, Stern’s writings appear to 
vacillate between a radically linguistic turn, and a view closer to traditional psychology 
that maintains the existence of extra-linguistic experience, including pre-verbal 
development. Attention to where Stern’s theory travels between these poles will be 
important for seeing where and how it makes sense and where it may fall into old 
assumptions Stern may have earlier rejected. That may provoke further questions about, 
or may contradict some of his theoretical assertions. 
Enigma 1: Health 
 The notion of health is among the most problematic in all of Western psychology. 
Clinicians, therapists, and researchers seem better at discussing aberration than what is 




normal or strong in humans, in part because positing health means also expressing 
notions of how to live well and what is good. The province of virtues is at least 
consciously avoided by most social scientists, and when psychologists do venture into 
outlining virtuous living they often enter the realm of popular psychology, or they 
inadvertently extoll values of mainstream society, in some cases both, as noted by social 
critic Barbara Ehrenreich (1995). Discussions of what psychologists posit as health may 
offer some of the clearest evidence of ideological and sociocultural assumptions behind 
psychological theory. Ehrenreich has pointed out that in the contemporary U.S., health 
and virtue have been conflated, often resulting in a blaming and victimization of people 
with chronic illnesses, in a practice she calls “healthism.” In spite of weak intellectual 
grounding of health and healthism in the field of psychology, it may be impossible to 
work with disturbance and human suffering from a psychological point-of-view without 
generating implicit or disguised assumptions of what it means to be well and to live well. 
The hermeneutic point is that both theoretician and clinician must work to make hidden 
assumptions explicit and overt.  
 If Ehrenreich critiques our concept of health as the equivalent of an unwritten 
moral imperative, Crawford and others have shown how concepts of health have been 
appropriated by, and have come to shape a political discourse. Crawford (2004, 2006) 
described a cycle of control>anxiety>control>anxiety that has long been building 
momentum in American society. Crawford (2004) defined a vicious circle of increasingly 
detailed, medicalized information about danger, a cycle that grows at a speed with which 
the person (a mortal I would add) is unable to compete and to which, we can assume, any 
person will inevitably falter, assumedly due to its sheer proportions. Crawford has tied 




the social goal of health to the recent, American neoliberal economic context, with its 
drive for placing greater responsibility (moral, economic, and otherwise) on the 
individual and less on the corporation or government agency. Layton, similarly, has 
written (2010a, 2010b, 2013) on the increasing vulnerabilities of patients in the context of 
increasing neoliberal social, political, and economic control.  
As patients take on political, economic, and moral responsibilities for an 
increasing data-laden status of well-being, disorder is felt on the personal level and even 
“in the board room” (Crawford, 2004, p. 513). Whereas this suggests a longer discussion 
than the present proposal, it has been helpful to examine Stern’s work (which often points 
to a radical turn away from much of psychological theory) for explicit or hidden 
assumptions about mental health. Furthermore, theorists such as Crawford have been 
concerned with the effects of social anxiety, offering a parallel to concerns of 
interpersonal thinkers with roots in Heideggerian thought, as well as theoretical 
constructs built around Harry Stack Sullivan’s security operations (1953/1997). As an 
interpersonal clinician and writer, Stern is well located in a nexus relating psychological 
study with enormous forces of relational and social anxiety. 
 No matter how much they may wish to distance themselves from it, whether in 
private offices, or by protest against its aberrations, psychotherapists remain, of course, 
integral to the health industry of the U.S. Any examination of a psychological theory, 
therefore, requires an examination of the concepts of health, not simply as a definition but 
as a changing entity (Illich, 1976/1995), concepts that are affected by historical 
antecedents as well as the politics and culture of the present era. How does our present-
day healthism, with its mass market publishing, immense research, and entrance into just 




about all facets of daily life in the U.S., fit into a theory such as Stern’s, which is nearly 
all relationship and process? Could a modern psychological theory be free of the effects 
of a growing and embattled “Medical-Industrial Complex” (Ehrenreich, Ehrenreich, & 
Health/PAC, 1971). Her term could be accurately updated to “Health Industrial 
Complex.” If health is a virtue of sorts, is it worth ignoring as simply a transcendental 
factor of being human, or does this changing referent, which populates American thought 
and publication, demand a more consistent definition than most psychotherapists would 
care to try? Without definition or at least questioning, could notions of health remain on 
the level of a common sense idea, one which effects our practice at all levels but one 
which to us remains transparent or invisible? And if a psychological theoretician fails to 
examine what lies behind an almost universal aspect of practice (the goal-to-health), what 
might be behind such a refusal?  
Enigma 2: The Locations of Things—The Shifty Nature of Self 
 Stern makes the startling (but perhaps relieving) assertion that “the era of psychic 
geography is dead” (2010, p. 3). With this sentence, the brain seems to have lost its 
contents–a declaration with implications beyond psychoanalysis and going to the root of 
psychological, psychoneural, and possibly neuropsychological study in general.  
For Stern, the statement serves not only to do away with the Freudian psychic 
topography. Stern also launched into a removal of the “mind” and “memory” from that 
which is “housed within a single skull” (2009, pp. 5-6). Coburn has likewise sided with 
writers who refute the notion of a “mind” that is physically separate from a physical 
exterior (2007). Stern maintained that instead of the individualistic notion of a cerebral 
structure, it is more meaningful to find unformulated experience, and presumably most of 




psychological life, in “relatedness.” Such a relocation of the subject of therapeutic 
exploration offers to clarify a number of activities and influences often ignored in 
psychological work, such as social forces, the effects of gender and ethnic distinctions, 
linguistic tropes, and shifts in power. Stern’s assertion also stands against the cultural 
shift in today’s psychology towards ever-greater technologization in the name of 
neurological practices, that is, towards machines that address a single brain. 
That said, “relatedness” itself can seem like a moving target. How does one focus 
on relatedness from an interpersonal perspective without focusing on everything else as 
well? Does there remain any aspect of ourselves that might lie outside of relatedness?  
 Fundamental to Stern’s (2003) Interpersonal perspective is a notion of self-states. 
Stern quotes Sullivan’s famous dictum: “For all I know we may have as many 
personalities as we have interpersonal relations” (Sullivan, 1950/1971, p. 221). Stern 
attended to, then put aside a notion of multiple selves as developed by theorists such as 
Bromberg (1996, 2000) and Mitchell (1991). Instead, Stern posited that there are “self-
states” that we occupy, amidst moments of dissociation. Stern (2003) suggested a 
redefinition of the self into something that allows a person to be both in greater flux and 
perhaps more cohesive than Bromberg’s concept of multiple selves, while also allowing 
for deep shadows in our self-awareness.  
 From a historical perspective Stern (2003, 2010) was likely among those reacting 
to the effects of “self-contained individualism” (Cushman, 1990), the result of a 
particularly American ideology. Due to globalization and cultural dominance, this type of 
individualism has become a major American export. Such individualism continues to 
pervade much of the social sciences. Individualism has been linked to genderism, 




colonial transgressions against native peoples, and to alienation on economic and 
emotional scales.  Stolorow, et al. also attributed the Cartesian self with activating 
“isolated mind thinking” (2002, p. 23 ff). By maintaining a notion of self that claims to 
be both cohesive and “in flux” (Stern, 2009a, p. 48), Stern appears to have offered an 
explanation of the self that is also relational.  
Given their historical context, however, ideas about multiple selves or self-states 
bear examination for their potential relationship to ideologies built upon consumerism, 
individualism, and an explosion of communication-information technologies. What 
effects would a concept of shifting self-states have on definitions of personal 
responsibility, family or social roles, or a comprehension of what it means to be a 
“relational” being? Could a society with no experience of multiple television channels, 
urban centers, tract homes, websites, or supermarkets, or a supply and demand economy, 
also be capable of conceiving of such a multiplicity in response to varying emotional or 
relational demands?  
Multiplicity would seem like an unlikely theory to appear in, say, a fiefdom of the 
European Middle Ages, and its presence would likely be read as a form of possession, 
with all its social consequences. In short, is Stern’s response to the apparent dissolution 
of the self as Western society has long known it an inadvertent repetition of ideology 
based on individualistic freedom and possibly a Romantic prescription for experiencing a 
modern, technologized world? 
 
 




Enigma 3: The Stormy Relationship between Psychotherapy and Moral 
Understandings  
Stern’s writings (2001, 2003, 2010) lead to a conclusion that psychotherapy is a 
practice that can be known to encompasses a constant striving for moral awareness. 
However, Stern’s theory and works are also woven into a fabric of psychoanalytic 
clinical work, and this connection between RA and moral interpretation is not always 
explicit. It requires a teasing-out. Questions of moral thought and activity are fraught 
with political and economic complications. In 20th and 21st Century American society, 
the encroachment of corporate interests (Layton, 2010a) into public and private life, for 
example, has generally led to disappropriation or marginalization of the majority, and to 
trauma on a societal and extra-societal societal scale.  
Through its history, psychoanalysis has been firmly status quo (Roth, 1998). 
Perhaps just as often it has been a marginalized practice and form of thought (Aron & 
Starr, 2013), even from its founding. Today, however, psychoanalysts generally offer 
therapy to the highest paying patients who can afford the luxury of years to work on 
themselves in the presence of highly trained experts. Economic, political, and ideological 
forces have strongly affected the practice of psychoanalysis, whether to bring it into a 
covert sort of conformity or into a place of resistance (Cushman, 1991, 2000, 2013b). 
How, then, does psychoanalysis as a process of moral struggle fit into a society of 
growing economic inequality? I investigate in the third part of this Findings-Discussion 
Chapter Stern’s psychotherapy as a process of moral understanding.  







Chapter 1: The Health Enigma  
As a type of Western psychotherapy, Stern’s relational psychoanalysis is 
embedded within the medical field. In so far as the mainstream medical regime has 
assimilated and joined with psychological practice, Stern’s own education as a 
psychologist places him in a central position among those providing healthcare in the 
United States. With its attention to the unseen, such as denial and dissociation, its interest 
in inescapable breach, conflict, rupture, and breakdown (Benjamin, 1990; Racker, 1968; 
Weiss, 1993), its central myth (e.g., Davies, 1996, 1998, 2003), its interest in sex and 
belief in natural bisexuality, and its constant attentiveness to the unconscious and 
therefore the non-explicit and the unspoken, psychoanalysis could be considered a 
philosophy of rebellion. Because of its tradition of examining areas of taboo and its 
model based on competing forces, psychodynamic practitioners have long held a 
conflicted relationship with many other areas of U.S. mainstream and scientific cultures.  
In spite of, and perhaps due to its own regular internal uprisings and 
modifications, the influence of psychodynamic theory and practice on North American 
psychology is vast. A large number of influential psychological theoreticians were trained 
as psychoanalysts, and many rose in opposition by deploying critiques of it. These 
include but are not limited to Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Reich, Karen Horney, Clara 
Thompson, Erich Fromm, Aaron Beck, Fritz Perls, and Salvador Minuchin. Stern’s 
theory, then, is located on fertile ground for influencing psychology at large.  His 
writings (2003, 2010, 2012a, 2013d) stand as a subtle and occasionally stark critique of 




theories generally well within the psychodynamic realm. Stern’s commentary often 
occurs at an epistemological level, to question the premises behind theories and practices 
(e.g., 2003, 2010, 2011a, 2013c). Because they address basic assumptions that 
psychoanalysis has shared with other forms of theory and treatment, Stern’s analyses of 
psychodynamic thought can be applied beyond the psychoanalytic movement, to reach 
far into the field of psychology and other social sciences.  
Stern’s knowledge and references to psychodynamic and other traditions within 
psychoanalysis and psychology are also wide ranging. His writings refer regularly to 
early American psychological research, such as Bartlett’s Ghost Tale (1932), and the 
theories of William James (1890/1981). His work also includes a long review of the 
history of interpersonal psychoanalysis and cognition (Lionells, Fiscalini, Mann, & Stern, 
1995), as well as discussions of Object Relational and Neo-Bionian thinking that involves 
merwritten extensively on subjects strongly present in Humanistic Psychology, with 
frequent reference to the Existentialist movement including philosophers Paul Ricoeur, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jean Merleau-Ponty (Stern 2003, 2010). Additionally, he has 
focused on the intersection of Relational Psychoanalytic thought and Humanistic 
psychological practices (Stern, 2009b, 2011a) 
In sum, Stern’s works address, both widely and deeply, important concepts and 
beliefs in psychology. Stern’s writings have been inspired a broad sweep of theory, while 
presenting such wide-ranging epistemological challenges. The practice of psychotherapy, 
on the other hand, is located within the social realm of healthcare, and it undergoes 
increasing effects of both a medicalized scientism and an increasing powerful managed 
care system (Cushman, 1991, 2000, 2011b). How then does Stern’s psychotherapy and 




theory of knowing fit in with a health-delivery system that is increasingly pressured by 
practices such as accounting, corporate management, and empirical medical research. 
The condition of present-day American healthcare brings out questions about 
psychotherapy within a democracy largely controlled by Neoliberal ideology. 
Neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005) has been said to have created within itself its own 
opposing forces. Dominated by bourgeois or middle class values, contemporary Western 
society has demonstrated a phenomenal ability to assimilate even the formerly 
revolutionary within its practices (Barthes, 1957/1988; Comaroff, 1982). Likewise, older 
values in the process of being discarded may remain as social residue. Newer values or 
one-time subversive practices are “frequently sanitized and incorporated into enlightened 
opinion” (Lears, 1983, p. 5). Medical health practices have increasingly brought social 
control to fields where medicine was previously not present (Armstrong, 1993; Zola, 
1972).  
Simply submitting oneself to the medical arena can be a condition for losing one’s 
own wealth, livelihood, social, status, and home. In a 2007 study of bankruptcy files 
nationwide (n = 2314), researchers found that by conservative estimates 62.1% of 
American bankruptcies were due to illness and consequent medical debts. Most of these 
debtors were well-educated, middle class homeowners and 75% had medical insurance 
(Himmelstein, Thorne,	  Warren,	  &	  Woolhandler,	  2009). 
Medicine therefore addresses and produces disorder about more than biological 
questions. It also profoundly affects fundamental lifestyle and economic stability, that is, 
it affects the most basic of human needs.  




Likewise, the demobilization of families amidst a medical crisis is bound to have 
a huge impact on the basic requirement for attachment security (van IJzendoorn &  
Sagi-Schwartz, 2008). We have, then, an American medical industrial system with both a 
phenomenal ability to sustain life and well-being, and one that simultaneously causes 
unimagined damage to patients and their families. It is likely that only a society which 
creates the strange outsider status conferred on a person once she has fallen into the 
category of patient (Crawford, 2006) would allow for such incidental damages in the 
name of healing on a grand scale.7  
To better understand the position of Stern’s work within the medical field, I 
review important critiques of Western medicine and health as a social event, in order to 
examine his writings compared to their findings. When we look at Stern’s thought as 
representative of RA within the contemporary North American health context, various 
questions arise.  
For example, does Stern’s theory offer alternatives to the effects of health 
thinking in the contemporary U.S., or does it inadvertently abide by harmful assumptions 
of modern health practice? What does it mean to practice in Stern’s, or in an RA way, 
within a health conscious, consumer-oriented society that is profoundly affected by 
managed care, a burgeoning health insurance industry,8 and major political reforms? Do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  It is possible that this outsider status conferred on the seriously ill can inspire an almost 
ironic euphoria in healthy individuals. Canetti (1984) discussed the excited reactions 
people have when they drive by auto accidents. Similarly, by separating out those with 
diseases, we illusionarily distance ourselves from mortality, to re-affirm our survivor 
status. There is now a sense among those with health, wealth, and coverage, that there but 
for the grace of God go I among the rich and healthy. Health has become an emblem. 
8 According to the World Health Organization, in 2008 the United States spent 15.2% of 
Gross Domestic Product on health care, far more than any other nation in the world. This 
figure continues to rise (World Health Organization, 2011). 




Stern’s rejections of the Cartesian and positivist objectification and the quantification of 
human relations amount to a rebellious stance, in light of today’s increasing powers of 
actuarial data controlled by large-capital health care corporations (Cushman, 2000, 
2011b, 2013b). Could this form of psychodynamic theory in such a social environment 
indicate a possible retreat from offering alternative forms of health practice, or does it 
help us to look at very different ways of practicing that require further exploration?  
Analyses taking into account so many political, class, and ideological forces have 
ramifications for socially conscious practitioners, caught as they are in a web of health 
and information technologies, competing economic notions and institutions, and serving 
an increasingly stressed population. Donnel Stern’s theory may suggest the creation of a 
new space in opposition to some of the deleterious effects of past practices.  
To what degree does Stern’s work represent an act of resistance or offer potential 
alternatives to practices that have a history of at least inadvertently replicating or 
expanding social harm? By further implication, if RA does offer helpful alternatives in 
therapeutic practice, how can these be carried further or extended into new social spaces? 
One example of a recent entry of psychoanalysis into an area it has been little 
seen before is Robert Stolorow’s recent article on global warming, in which he used 
understandings from trauma treatment as a call for better understanding of climate change 
(Stolorow, 2012). In this respect, RA might be following in the history of the Frankfort 
School. It seems natural, given its history as a form of resistance (e.g., Gay, 1988), that 
psychoanalysis would venture into areas that are of interest to science and undergoing 
massive levels of social denial. The degree to which RA can demand that ideology 




become conscious and made public in society may be a test of this tradition’s strength in 
predictably turbulent times to come. 
In order to better understand where Stern’s work sits in relation to the medical 
model, it will be useful to compare it to important critiques aimed at medicine in the 
Western world. These include Foucault’s genealogy of the hospital and the clinical gaze 
(1963/1994), as existing under the figure of the Panopticon (1975/1995), arising through 
the emergence of the community clinic. I also utilize Crawford’s examinations of the 
anxiety and the concept of health in contemporary U.S. society. 
Foucault and the Discipline of Health 
Introduction: The Panopticon and the invisible observer. Behind much of 
Foucault’s thought lies an assumption, even a principle, that knowledge is productive of 
power. Conversely, power produces knowledge (Foucault, 1963/1994, 1966/1994). A 
corollary could be drawn that the effects of power can be found everywhere, at least in 
every place where human knowledge is present, including, for example, in the way in 
which the anatomy (Armstrong, 1983; Foucault, 1963/1994) of the human body is 
conceived, described, mapped, or quantified. Due to this active, productive quality of 
power, even well-intentioned organizations, such as community clinics or schools for the 
poor, are historically the distributive sites of certain forms power. For Foucault 
(1965/1988), within their practices can be seen technologies social control. Rose has 
referred to this as “an accelerated spiral of knowledge and power” (1999b, p. 195). For 
Foucault, the two, knowledge and power, can appear as nearly identical. 
Accordingly, groups form a reciprocal relation with the production of knowledge. 
That is, institutions such as clinics, prisons, and schools both produce and they are also 




maintained by special forms of knowledge. For Foucault (1975/1995, 1984), to view 
power as a merely destructive force is to be blind to the enormity of its functioning in the 
modern world. Describing Foucault’s conception of a power that is not merely coercive 
but productive, Stern wrote the following: 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, 
do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold 
good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us 
as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as 
a negative instance whose function is repression. (Stern, 2003, pp. 60-61) 
 
During the Age of Enlightenment (ca 1637-1789), institutions began to document 
knowledge about people under their surveillance with increasing detail. Before the 
Enlightenment, biographical information was often reserved for the exploits of royalty 
and nobility.  
The predominant literary form of this earlier period was the epic. Since the 
Enlightenment, according to Foucault (1975/1995), the threshold of knowledge dropped 
from epics of the Middle Ages with their heroism and depictions of noble virtue, to the 
level of the individual biography. Increasing numbers of documents were produced on a 
growing variety of persons, regardless of rank. The Enlightenment was the 
commencement of a systematic immersion of power into knowledge. Although this 
would have been considered bizarre before the Age of Reason, the concept that, 
regardless of socio-economic status, any life is worthy of examination and 
documentation, is certainly an ideal we maintain today. Those in the clinician role live 
with this fact of life and are in many ways as much constituted as are those in the patient 
role. In recent years, this aspect of power has begun to threaten a hegemony in the health 




science (see, for e.g., Cushman, 2000, 2011a, 2011b), a subject worthy of further 
investigation.  
From the Enlightenment onwards, then, behavioral oversight was calibrated at 
ever-finer intervals as measured in time. For Foucault, this regard for accounting for the 
person led to the appearance of the individual on the social horizon, an individual who 
was charted through a growing rubric of knowledge and ever-greater record keeping. The 
human disciplines (humanities, eventually to include the social sciences) were born out of 
this burgeoning observation and the need for control of a wider multiplicity of individuals 
(Foucault, 1963/1994, 1975/1995).   
Foucault’s writings (1966/1994, 1975/1995) follow institutions and relevant 
social practices from both historical perspectives, as well as their knowledge bases, 
ranging from human anatomy to the human sciences to the natural sciences. His 
genealogical project involved “determining the conditions of possibility of . . .  
experience in modern times [and] . . . to disentangle the conditions of its history from the 
density of discourse” (1963/1994, p. xix). Even considering the very social focus of this 
statement, one can see the affinity to psychoanalysis. 
Foucault saw history in terms of epistemes (1966/1994), that is, themes 
overarching social activities and related knowledge. An episteme does not connote a 
necessarily coherent concept. Rather, it can consist of competing or opposing ideas that 
have arisen along different courses, over time. Foucault’s genealogy therefore permits a 
Nietzschian rejection (Nietzsche, 1857/1953; Sarup, 1988/1993) of the orthodox Western 
portrayal of history as a necessarily progressive, linear process that follows a clearly or 
perhaps latently rational path. This rejection involves a nonacceptance of essentialist 




studies which maintain that history is a dialectical demonstration of hidden truth. It also 
comprehends a refusal of the notion that we might be able to read the march of history as 
a score marking the way to spiritual revelation, human progress, or expansive knowledge 
of hidden universal laws. Rather, Foucault’s work has been aimed at delving into the 
opaqueness of accepted discourse, an activity similar to what Structuralists and others 
refer to as unpacking an idea.9  
In the process of looking at language in a historical context, Foucault’s writings 
involve a vigorous search for the hidden workings of power as it produces knowledge, an 
ordering, he has found, that has frequently become habitual for society. Ideas become 
institutionalized. They create and are recreated by institutions (1963/1994, 1966/1994). In 
this, again, Foucault has located the functioning of knowledge in relation to power. In 
Foucault’s exploration—through semantics, politics, economics, and critiques of 
everything from customs, to penal methods, to the historical treatment of insanity—the 
results have often been startling. 
According to Foucault (1975/1995), a great shift in Western thinking was marked 
by the advent of the Bentham’s Panopticon circa 1786. Bentham proposed this structure 
as an architectural redesign of the workhouse and the jail. In the penal setting, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 There is also an affinity between Foucault’s attention to opacity (1975/1995), 
hermeneutic unpacking, and psychoanalytic interpretation. I note this not only to indicate 
lines of influence but also to continue a thrust present in all three ways of thinking. 
Fundamental to each is an underlining of assumptions, patterns, processes, or 
suppositions—an attempt to look into that which is not being recognized, or if 
recognized, that which is not brought to light or consciousness, or is selectively ignored, 
as the case may be. All of these ways of understanding involve to one degree or another 
philosophical questioning, attention that which is veiled in language, and an historical, 
genealogical approach, for a start. It could be argued that each of the three disciplines, 
hermenteutics, psychoanalysis, and Foucault’s type of historical critique, engages the 
other two, whether the presence of the other two approaches is recognized or not. 




Panopticon was a multifaceted tower placed in the center of the prison with windows on 
each of its sides. The incarcerated were held in separate cells along the walled-in circle 
surrounding this tower. External windows illuminated cells, and another set of windows 
faced the inner circle and therefore the tower as well. In this way, detainees were profiled 
by the outside light, to be observed by those within the central interior of the Panopticon. 
Observers in the darkness of the tower were, on the contrary, invisible to the prisoners 
celled around its outside. This set up a template, a modern social condition, of what could 
be called the observer-unobserved. 
By Bentham’s dream and in Foucault’s reading (1975/1995), the Panopticon has 
historically transcended its architectural structure. For Foucault, it became, instead, a 
linguistic figure within a new episteme of discipline, highly productive new kind of 
power and hence a new type of knowledge.  
The panoptic structure afforded a number of social utilities that were coming into 
place at Bentham’s time. Efficiency of observation was aligned to an efficient use of 
labor, a notion that was being perfected in the workhouses of the era, precursors to the 
modern assembly line and factory. The economy of Western Europe changed and travel 
became more popular. As a result, a wider spread of populations was brought under 
investigation and social discipline. The Panopticon allowed for a greater multiplicity of 
people to be taken in both physically and figuratively.  
Self-reliance and a disciplined examination of the self and the world at-large were 
important values in both Protestant and scientific currents of the time. Therefore, motions 
of increasing and self-imposed discipline were also particularly attractive to the 
coalescing middle class of the era. Tradesmen and craftsmen were caught in social 




upheavals, above them an unruly gentry, while a growing “rootless underclass of beggars 
and the unemployed” also threatened their sense of social order (Taylor, 1992, p. 231). 
It follows that another benefit of the Panopticon was the prisoner’s internalization 
of the condition of being watched by an unobserved observer, regardless of whether 
observation was actually taking place. The episteme of the Panopticon (1975/1995) then 
carried with it an allure of liberalism, because it brought about milder forms of 
punishment as compared to the public tortures of the Middle Ages. It was also in 
harmony with expansionist, colonial and scientific ideologies of the era, since it allowed 
for a far more pervasive form of punishment and discipline, one that was constitutive of 
knowledge or data about the bodies on which it acted. Different from the Feudal Era 
when prisoners were paraded through the streets or fixed on display in public stockade, 
the prison became more capacious, expanding into a more efficient, closed, hidden affair 
located on the outskirts of the town or the growing city, what Sarup (1988/1993) has 
termed “the great confinement.” The Panopticon transformed social discipline from 
periodic to ongoing, a change in temporality worthy of further psychological exploration. 
Regarding the new kind of Western discipline arising in the 18th Century, Foucault 
wrote: 
Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, 
analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of composition to the point of 
necessary and sufficient single units. It ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless 
multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements—small, 
separate cells, organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, 
combinatory segments.  (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 170) 
 
Values of efficiency, analysis, and individuation (again, Foucault’s play on the 
word discipline, power interlocked with a production of knowledge) began to have a 
transforming effect in different social spaces, such as the workhouse, the school, and the 




hospital, and later the dispensary or community clinic (Armstrong, 1993; Foucault, 
1963/1994). For Foucault, the structure of language is the structure of power, a point that 
frequently appears and is simultaneously veiled in psychological discourse. This idea of 
the multiplicity individual elements is significant because it suggests that operations of 
power may be hidden within concepts of individual freedom inherent in social practices 
(see, for example, Binkley, 2011). 
Changes in these institutions led to fundamental changes in the thought of the 
Enlightenment. In Foucault’s genealogical formulation, these changes led to new 
practices of incarceration, education, medicine, social work, and psychology (Foucault, 
1975/1995) that continue to exist today in one form or another. In this reading of history, 
the power of the Panopticon grew concurrently with the academic divisions, particularly 
the human sciences. Foucault attributed to this kind of observation of multiplicity the 
power to constitute the self of the prisoner: 
Discipline “makes” individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards 
individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a 
triumphant power, which because of its own excesses can pride itself on its 
omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, 
but permanent economy. (1975/1995, p. 170) 
 
This gentler, operational force, along with the production of ever-greater 
knowledge, political, clinical, educational, and military power, energized cross-
disciplinary exchanges of technology. The movement of techniques into new institutions 
raised the level of expertise for calculating behavior. The recombination of technologies 
resulted in measurements of human activity with greater specificity. Under Medieval 
monarchies, sovereign power was held as absolute. The ruler’s word was a matter of life 
and death, (Foucault, 1984a, p. 258). Previous binaries under monarchic, feudal systems 




(for example, a subject was with the king or against him; a person was righteous or 
unrighteous, holy or cursed), gave way to more nuanced but quantitative forms of 
measuring, what Foucault has called “the penalty of the norm” (1975/1995, p. 183). As 
the panoptic figure extended into the community through hospitals (1963/1994) and later 
community clinics and public health campaigns (Armstrong, 1993), bodies were mapped, 
and they were lined up next to each other. No longer limited to the particular physical 
person, now the space between bodies was measured on a grand scale.  
This invokes ongoing common practices in contemporary psychology, such as 
statistics and the use of the bell curve (which Foucault referred to as “political arithmetic” 
1988, p. 151; Madan, 2007) in addition to the underpinnings of much of developmental 
and testing theory (Rose, 1999a).  
We could say that by Foucault’s reading (1963/1994), with the commencement of 
the Enlightenment, power became relational. Under the metaphor of the Panopticon was 
to be found a discipline that utilized its own data to serve its own expansionism, 
knowledge and power in a continuum. For Foucault, the individual, understood through 
language, the object, the instrument, and the creation of power. Knowledge of this subject 
necessarily adds its own measurements to the knowledge base which observes on both a 
particular level and in terms of the variations of large numbers aligned (the norm). It has 
been called the “object operationalized” (Rose, 1999c).  
The clinical gaze. Under the figure of the Panopticon Foucault located power 
realized in medical terms, the medical or clinical gaze. During the Enlightenment and 
into the 19th Century, the medical gaze was able to bring the type of power and the type 
of observation, control, and documentation of panoptic thought into the hospital, then the 




clinic, and the dispensary. Armstrong (1993) has traced the clinical gaze to community 
clinics and health centers of the 1960s, and Rose (1999a) argued that in the same period 
in the U.S. and U.K., there was an analogous extension of power and observation, via 
notions of development and education, into the Nursery School and the home itself 
(Rose, 1999c). 
Foucault’s method and writings exist in part as a project to promote human 
freedom (1988). In examining scientific discourse, then, Foucault was concerned with its 
involvement with power and control, in particular where basic assumptions have been 
taken for granted: 
It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that are a part of their 
landscape—that people think are universal—are the result of some very precise 
historical changes. All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in 
human existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which 
space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made. 
(Foucault, 1988, p.11) 
 
Foucault was suspect of traditional, universal forms of logic and his work 
included their Destruktion in the Heidegerrian sense (Foucault, 1984b, 1988). That is, for 
Foucault, taking apart the hidden assumptions of a text as a way to locate essentialist 
views that are the result of an adherence to an Enlightenment notion of reason and their 
often hidden laws or structures. In addition to his stance against “global theorizing” 
Foucault was “critical of systemicity” (Sarup, 1988/1993, p. 58). Foucault’s language can 
be historical as well as literary in its use of rhetorical figures and in presenting them as 
complex parts of language, rather than as elements of a formal logic.  
It is therefore a risky proposition to attempt to break up or decontextualize any of 
Foucault’s epistemes, such as the clinical gaze, into a list of elements. Foucault himself 




regarded his own lifelong historical project as purposively philosophically incomplete, 
and he considered himself a “teacher” as opposed to a “philosopher” (Foucault, 1988,  
p. 9). His main work, then, was in “the history of thought.” For Foucault, “the way people 
think is not adequately analyzed by the categories of logic” (p. 10).  Rather than 
presenting a philosophical model, his was an undertaking to provoke questions that might 
not otherwise be asked.  
My role—and that is too emphatic a word—is to show people that they are much 
freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which 
have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called 
evidence can be criticized and destroyed. To change something in the minds of 
people—that’s the role of an intellectual. (Foucault, 1988, p. 10)  
  
Given the importance of historical context and language in this thought, an 
attempt to analyze any one concept in Foucault is problematic. Analysis of Foucault risks 
a return to the panoptic project, to registering ideas that were drafted at least in part as 
resistance to driven categorization and control driven by governmental power.  
Pace Foucault, I will nevertheless attempt my own register of some of the 
attributes of the panoptic episteme and the medical gaze, in order to further Foucault’s 
lines of questioning and to see how they can shed light on Donnel Stern’s writings 
beyond his own use of Foucault’s theory. In particular, I examine where Stern’s theory 
might imply a tacit acceptance or shared assumptions with medical disciplines that 
Foucault critiqued, and where Stern’s theory diverges from the activities of the medical 
gaze. Therefore, in order to examine Stern’s works relation to power and surveillance, I 
suggest the following headings for important attributes of the medical gaze in Foucault: 
a. The eye that speaks illuminates the invisible. 




b. Being open to knowledge and multiplicity, the clinical gaze undergoes constant 
expansion. 
c. The clinical gaze is realized through the particular, measured language of 
science. 
d. The clinical gaze therefore requires individuals that are objects and are 
operationalized. 
The first heading for attributes of the clinical gaze concerns seeing that which 
cannot be seen. It holds is an aspect of revealing. 
  a. The eye that speaks illuminates the invisible. Knowledge as a hunt for the 
hidden is an ancient idea in the West. “Nature loves to hide” declared Heraclitus of 
Ephesus in Fifth Century B.C.E. Greece (Herakleitos, 1892/1945, p. 33). 
In the Western thought, this seems to have undergone constant revision and 
reinvention. Reading early Enlightenment texts on medicine and anatomy, Foucault 
(1963/1994) described a way of examining disease as something that is perceived as 
covert. For Foucault, anatomical study instigated a politics of the body, while the study of 
populations generated a biopolitics (Madan, 2007). Illness (Foucault 1963/1994) in the 
Age of Reason was an entity that was hidden within the body and latently seen in a 
collection of symptoms, while it also gave out signs of itself. The medical or clinical gaze 
was created in the description and categorization, that is, in the creation of entities called 
disease. Foucault wrote: 
Hence the strange character of the medical gaze; it is caught up in an endless 
reciprocity. It is directed upon that which is visible in the disease—but on the 
basis of the patient, who hides this visible element even as he shows it; 
consequently, in order to know, he must recognize, while already being in 
possession of the knowledge that will lend support to his recognition. And, as it 
moves forward, this gaze is really retreating, since it reaches the truth of the 




disease only by allowing it to win the struggle and to fulfill, in all its phenomena, 
its true nature. (Foucault, 1963/1994, p. 9) 
 
Foucault brought out the paradox of a gaze that is at once invasive and at the same 
time retreats in acceptance of inevitable, diachronic change. As it produces language, the 
clinical gaze searches for something not seen which may only be ascertained via autopsy, 
in death. Often the case in Foucault’s writing, his very definite words lend themselves to 
extrapolation. The medical gaze holds an aspect of Descartes’ cogito. Its results are 
analogous to those of the reason said to be held somewhere in the mind of Descartes’ 
thinker. Like the cogito, the medical gaze remains separate from its subject while it is 
also imagined to penetrate it. This is what is still commonly known in much of Western 
thinking as an objective form of reasoning, a logic that is privileged for its special access 
to clarity. It holds a privileged claim to a bridge of rationality between theory and 
evidence, perception and unobstructed knowledge of truth, in which linguistic 
construction is thought to be a process created from culturally, ethically, and politically 
neutral material. 
Stern has referred to Interpersonalist writers who used a correspondence theory of 
truth to guide interpretation. In this line of thought, psychoanalysis can be scientifically 
researched according to how accurately a given interpretation signifies nonverbal 
experience, through an “assessment of nonverbal accuracy” (Stern, 2013c, p. 167).  
Stern’s objection to such thinking comes from a perspective of the Interpretive Turn. 
Stern is both constructivist, in holding that experience is created, and postmodern, in 
maintaining that language is the material through which we organize experience. For 
Stern, the rejection of a latent meaning to be signified does not lead to an aimlessness, 
extreme relativity, or complete lack of rigor in interpretation. 




Giving choice and conviction their due in the process of thought, as 
postmodernism does, is not at all the same thing as saying that we can conclude 
anything we please and still claim to be carrying out our work responsibly. We 
still have to choose the point of view that works the best, that is most complete 
and satisfying in its account of the phenomena in question. And we do have to 
accept that reality itself has no structure other than that which we impose upon it. 
There are many ways of understanding ‘what is.’ (Stern, 2003, p. 168) 
 
For Stern, then, experience is created in the interaction of the world and person 
(2003). Furthermore, in Stern’s thought (2003, 2010), language is the way experience is 
organized. We can also see in the passage above a certain responsibility, an enjoining that 
we attempt to satisfy concerns to seek viewpoints that “account” best for phenomena. 
 Here and elsewhere (2000, 2003, 2010, 2011b), Stern’s epistemology offers 
glints of an attention to a particular psychotherapeutic process: understanding moral 
activity through the greater awareness of experience provided in the psychoanalytic 
session. I cover the question of moral understanding in Stern’s RA theory in the third part 
of this Findings-Discussion Chapter.  
Foucault’s passage above can be read as describing something more than a 
medical attitude that confronts mortality head on. Additionally, this gaze brings an appeal 
to a universe of data in an indefinite temporality. The medical gaze is one that 
simultaneously probes and retreats from its own subject in time. Recall that the 
Panopticon was created to address populations of multiplicity. A later incarnation, the 
medical gaze then holds in itself a certain liberality, an openness, indeed, a constant focus 
on change, an embracing of diversity as an infinite material of categorization. In this way, 
Foucault (1963/1994, 1966/1994) has invoked the mortality implied in disease, as well as 
the mythical essentialism and the timelessness assumed by much of scientific and social 
scientific practice that continues to this day.  




This provides a connection in Foucault’s thought (1963/1994, 1965/1988) to the 
study of medical thought. It also leads to the critique of a psychology in which human 
beings are fantastically able to step outside of the cosmos in order to engage in a pristine, 
bias-free contact with another human being (Taylor, 1988). The object operationalized 
offers both a power operation and a claim to an innocent, neutral form of knowledge. 
Political power then meets with a seemingly pristine belief in the cure. As Madan has 
written, the “technology of the norm . . . the notion of the norm is what permits power to 
assume a therapeutic guise” (2007, p. 7). Embedded within notions of scientific 
technology, norms are endorsed by virtue of their having disappeared. 
For Foucault, the medical realm provides a gaze that withdraws from its subject 
so that the subject is incapable of having any effect on the proximal side, that of the 
observer aside from adding to the registry by which the subject will be judged and 
measured. When observing the observer ostensibly has no subjectivity, just as in the 
scheme of the Panopticon the dweller within the tower (1975/1995) stays essentially 
invisible. Such a gaze is a process of operational reification in the way, for example, that 
the butchering of meat from the slaughterhouse appears operational: the observer is 
engaged in an act that analyzes and separates but a process that appears to remain 
untainted or unchanged by its activity and the surround, social context, or nature. This 
would be the opposite of Aritstotle’s phronesis (Hiley et al., 1991) in which meaning is in 
fact necessarily derived from action itself. There is a fundamental difference between 
these two perceptions of the relationship between a goal and its means. One could say 
that in operationalized perspective of the clinical gaze, the means to an end are thought to 
be essentially disposable. 




The question grows immensely problematic when a process of observing human 
beings with a claim to powers external to humanity in order to do enter the arena of 
clinical psychotherapeutic work. In psychotherapy, this notion was frequently invoked 
using Locke’s (Hoffman, 1983; Stern, 2003) notion of the “blank tablet.” During much of 
the 20th Century, the psychotherapist was characterized as possessing an ability to 
present to the patient an unaffected and untainted personality capable of recording or 
reflecting, through interpretation or procedure, advancing a pure response to the patient’s 
transferences, displacements, or projection (Hoffman, 1983). This understanding of the 
analyst’s role is called “the blank screen.” Structured after the Panopticon, the medical 
gaze is likewise hidden and it also serves to penetrate that which is invisible (Foucault, 
1963/1994).  
Freud operated via the clinical gaze when he named the psyche as the subject of 
his lifelong examination. Similar to the way biological disease (1963/1994) and later 
madness (1965/1988) was constructed according to Foucault’s reading of modern clinical 
thought, Freud posited a quality of psychic life that was hidden from sight, arguing for 
the unconscious as a legitimate and indispensable theoretical construct for scientific 
study: 
The assumption of the unconscious is necessary . . . because the data of 
consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them; both in health and in 
sick people psychical acts often occur which can be explained only by 
presupposing other acts of which, nevertheless, consciousness affords no 
evidence. (Freud, 1915/1953, p. 166) 
 
Freud’s words possess attributes of a statistical analysis. While measuring a 
continuum of information, gaps in the data are to be discovered and they require 
explanation. Similar to Foucault’s view of physicians, anatomists, and epidemiologists 




who act on human bodies under the knife, the microscope, or in the field, Freud would 
line up moments of consciousness as witnessed in the individual psyche, in order to 
report unexplained intervals and instances of extreme variation. Trained in clinical 
observation as a neurologist, Freud was able to employ the medical gaze of his time in 
order to penetrate the spaces left open by psychic awareness. The medical gaze worked to 
decipher disease in the body. For Freud there was likewise something hidden within 
mental activities. Because the notion of the unconscious may be the only universal in 
psychoanalytic practice, it could be argued that any psychoanalyst by definition employs 
at least aspects of the traditional medical gaze, the beginnings of which Foucault traced to 
the mid-1700s.10  
Freud’s psychoanalysis appears to have functioned at least in part under the 
episteme of the disciplines as defined by Foucault (1975/1995), and Stern’s work (2003, 
2010) may be no exception. Both of these involve exploring for that which is not readily 
apparent or stated and they assume the presence or appearance of signs of the invisible 
over time.  
This could be said true of Stern’s writings as well as any others in the 
psychodynamic cannon. In Stern’s theory, understanding enactments, moments of being 
locked into a narrowed, unconscious, interpersonal patterning, are essential to 
understanding therapeutic change, and in the aftermath of important enactments, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It is interesting to note here that Freud used a clinical, highly scientised method and 
language throughout his works, in order instigate one of the greatest challenges 
modernity has known to Descartes’ primacy of orderly thinking. Freud’s emphasis of a 
frequently irrational unconscious life led to a different way of knowing. It is likely that 
this decentralization of reason could have been achieved through a new discipline with 
the status psychology now holds, solely through the adoption of a scientific 
metapsychology. 




relational shift can occur in psychotherapy. These moments driven by something that is 
by definition not-seen are at the heart of Stern’s theory (2003).  
I believe that enactment is continuous, even when we cannot see any particular 
problematic involvement with the patient. We know that most enactments are 
invisible; to that I will add that they are invisible because they constitute 
nonlinguistically structured organizing activity that is dissociated. (Stern, 2003,  
p. 103) 
 
As with disease in Foucault’s analysis of Western medicine (1963/1994, 
1965/1988), in Stern’s theory there is the constant possibility of the unknown that is 
available to the being put into words within the psychotherapeutic hour. (Even here, 
given Stern’s examination of what happens between the unformulated and formulation, 
one is hesitant to use the word “express.”) Stern wrote that “the ambiguity of what we 
face in the next moment is precisely what I mean by the concept of unformulated 
experience” (2003, p. 30). In the psychoanalyst’s search for what is covert, dissociated, or 
left out through selective inattention, does Stern’s approach function then in accord with 
a medical gaze that discovers the unconscious, in order to bring it to light with language 
in a similar way to a clinician deploying Foucault’s medical gaze?  
Stern’s writings appear to answer yes. In Stern’s two books, for example, there 
appear references to some but a limited number of clinical entities, such as trauma and 
occasionally to schizophrenia.11 References to pathology, however, remain surprisingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is significant that in fact adjusted his terms in a direction away from disease talk in 
both of his books. He described “psychotic transference” as a term formerly employed by 
psychoanalysts (2010, p. 134). He has also re-phrased Bromberg’s “pathological 
dissociation” (Bromberg, 1996) to read “dissociation in the strong sense” (Stern, 2003, 
2010). Stern’s works carry on the thrust of Nietzschean and Heideggerian thinking, also 
seen in much of post-modernism (Sarup, 1988/1993), that because language is 
productive, any worthwhile critique of ideas itself demands a certain creativity in its own 
language. As documented throughout the social sciences, the creation of new or 
alternative language is frequently a form of resistance. Similar to Stern, Roland  




rare in Stern’s writings (2003, 2010, and passim), considering that these are texts written 
by a psychologist and for a very well-versed professional audience.  
Still, fundamental to Stern’s thought is an attempt to develop new understandings 
in the process of dialogue. These understandings come with a constant awareness of, or at 
least a faith in, unconscious activity that will allow new meanings to come to light. Stern 
has gone so far as to suggest what appears to be a redefinition of pathology, one that is 
ontologically distinct from previous psychological diagnostic reification across the 
lifespan: “We can no longer specify psychopathology as a certain kind of mental content, 
or even, as some writers have redefined unconscious fantasy (e.g., Sugarman, 2008), as a 
mental process” (2010, p. 8). 
Trauma, another clinical entity in Stern’s theory, causes the dissociation of 
experience, which renders its effects opaque. Stern’s attention to dissociation and 
process, and his hermeneutic stance lead, therefore, to a radical redefinition of pathology. 
Implicit in Stern’s theory seems to appear a questioning of the assumptions behind 
positing a human subject, a long-time target of Foucault and other post-structuralists 
(Sarup, 1988/1993). 
Stern has also openly stated that for the psychoanalyst there is a constant seeking 
of what is not known. “We learn to search where we are least able to see” (2010, p. 163). 
For Stern, the ability to perform this kind of search is the result of experience and 
analytic training, allowing the psychoanalyst to become accustomed to a high level of 
ambiguity. “To be a psychoanalyst is to love the dark places and the recalcitrant 
meanings” (2010, p. 163). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Barthes (1978) found resistance to oppressive power and even the potential of liberation 
in literature. 




Historically, such seeking of all places unknown may have been seen as a piece of 
empirical investigation. Psychoanalysis invites not-knowing as a proposition of knowing. 
In the act of discovering something that has yet to be seen, psychoanalysis resembles 
Foucault’s concept of the clinical gaze. Foucault wrote that a further aspect of the 
medical gaze was its openness to discovery at the very margin of previous knowledge. In 
its act of uncovering, the gaze may travel to the very limits of language, to reveal what 
that which was previously unseen. Foucault gave the example of the first revealing of a 
cirrhotic liver in medical history, in the 18th Century. For Foucault, this marked the 
beginning of a “language in pursuit of perception” (1963/1994). From this period 
onwards, wrote Foucault: 
To discover, therefore, will no longer be to read an essential coherence beneath a 
state of disorder, but to push a little farther back the foamy line of language, to 
make it encroach upon that sandy region that is still open to the clarity of 
perception but is already no longer so to everyday speech—to introduce language 
into that penumbra where the gaze is bereft of words. (Foucault, 1963/1994,  
p. 169)  
 
Such an act of gazing into the edges of thought via language is reminiscent of 
Stern’s emphasis on imagination and creativity. The ability to examine places where 
words become difficult may be essential to Stern’s form of psychoanalysis. His work 
involves an attack upon stereotypic thinking and the inflexible language of enactments. 
However, Stern’s work also includes a recognition of the almost tragic idea that our use 
of language will never be exactly complete in conveying the unformulated. In a poetic 
phrase, Stern has linked this to a certain, almost existential pain, one that is addressed 
through psychoanalytic work: “We hope . . . we will be able to tolerate knowing that we 
never finish saying anything” (Stern, 2003, p. 89). 




Stern’s theory, however, rejects one of the attributes of the clinical act of looking 
into the invisible. The clinical gaze involves a search for the hidden entity of a disease. 
There is a Platonic quality to the Western diagnostic mode of thought. The medical 
doctor in looking for a disease such as Tuberculosis, for example, is in search of signs of 
a constant that is defined by its contextualization in a certain ontology.  
Stern’s (2003, 2010) psychoanalytic theory, however, obviates this process 
through the denial of the notion of a hidden content waiting, latent within the patient, to 
be penetrated by the expertise of the psychoanalyst. Stern’s rejection is related to his 
social constructionist understanding of memory. He has portrayed memory as existing in 
opposition to the image of a constant mental content waiting in the mind of the patient to 
be retrieved in a more or less pristine form, the imprint of past experience. For Stern, 
psychoanalysis is no longer an archaeological project. It no longer involves rebuilding a 
hidden past, just as in Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1975/2004) the reading of a text can no 
longer be imagined as a precise reproduction of the author’s internal or historical 
experience. Hermeneutically speaking, our subjectivity prevents such a process. For 
Gadamer, meaning and the significance we draw from a text cannot be separated.  
According to Warnke: 
We understand the meaning of a text, or work of art or historical event only in 
relation to our own situation and therefore in light of our own concerns. In other 
words we understand in light of its significance. (Warnke, 1987, p. 68) 
 
Recall that for Stern, too, meaning is interpretation. In a sense, there can be no 
access to original material. How, then, does the psychoanalyst work? For Stern, the 
unconscious is “something more than a container”; rather, it is, in line with the 
Heideggerian tradition, “something we live in” (Stern, 2003, p. 240). There is, therefore, 




a strong sense of working in the present in Stern’s RA, even if this present involves a 
careful examination of the patient’s narratives about events of the past. Stern wrote: 
The interest is directed at what is already known, with the intention of stating 
explicitly the implicit assumptions underlying its construction. Once these 
assumptions have been specified, gaps in the material become evident, and 
phenomena that have fallen through the cracks of the implicit interpretive scheme 
become visible. The analyst pursues and awareness of absence by focusing the 
most detailed attention on what is present. The emphasis shifts from imposing yet 
another interpretation to specifying the schemes according to which the material 
has been interpreted. Levenson (1988) presents such a view, concluding that ‘the 
real task in therapy is not so much making sense of the data as it is, but resisting 
the temptation to make sense of the data!’ (p. 5). (Stern, 2003, p. 240) 
 
From a hermeneutic point of view, there may be no direct access to original, latent 
material. Conversely, from an interpersonal psychoanalytic point of view, all material in 
emerging from the interpersonal field is necessarily original.   
In Stern’s thought, even memory is part of unformulated experience. In this 
concept, it is much less stable than is frequently thought in psychological study. Rather 
than being a storehouse of content to be recalled, even memory or past experience 
requires formulation each time it is reflected upon. “We reconstruct memory every time 
we consult it” (Stern, 2010, p. 4).  
The gaze of the clinician, being a construction of experience, tradition, and 
memory, therefore could be conceived as a voice among others in ongoing dialogue. 
Theory, psychotherapeutic thought, research, and interpretation, none of these have a 
necessarily privileged hold on truth. Instead of dictating with objectivity and  
fact-checking hypotheses against the trained experience and an assumedly precise register 




of knowledge, the mind of the clinician participates with the voice of the patient in the 
ongoing, co-construction of meaning.12  
Stern’s psychoanalyst begins to appear radically different from the historical, 
allopathic notion of a clinician who brings social order to a place where disease or 
psychopathology is figured as an inhabiting enemy that has wreaked havoc. The rejection 
of the existence of a true and hidden content in Stern’s psychology is linked to a 
repudiation of notions of clinical objectivity. Psychological diagnosis and most 
treatments are contingent upon the clinician’s ability to judge norms and to recognize and 
name pathology. To do so, the clinician requires some sort of figurative yardstick, the 
ability to observe norms in a growing number of psychometrical dimensions. Within 
Partners in Thought (2010) is found the unusual statement for a psychologist: “Of course, 
as soon as we reject a single objective reality, the analyst’s old status as the arbiter of 
such a reality also becomes impossible to sustain” (p. 8).  
On the political side of the debate over objectivity in psychoanalysis, Stern has 
also emerged in stark opposition to any theory that subscribes to the generation of a 
knowledge claiming a privileged access to external truth, that is, one that would add to 
the universal register of Foucault’s clinics. In responding to works of the Boston Change 
Process Study Group (2002), Stern wrote: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 We begin to see early roots in the what Stern (2003) would call the “democracy” 
inherent in this theory. To unprivilege the psychotherapist’s personal access to truth is not 
only to maintain Sullivan’s observant-participant status of the clinician (1953/1997), it is 
further to accept a categorically different kind of relationship in therapy. Clinical work 
becomes a partnership in Stern’s terms, to uphold Donna Orange’s fallibilism (1995), in 
which the psychotherapist holds to a certain well-cultivated experience and knowledge 
but in which, to paraphrase William Coburn, “we hold truths lightly” (2009). After taking 
such a perspective, we can also ask ourselves about the kind of anxiety that would have 
led psychologists to take on a stance of infallibility (an anxiety in the face of the 
unknown) in the first place.  




When we accept that truth exists apart from us, we inadvertently make the 
political and social influences on the construction of meaning invisible. I do not 
believe that anyone’s psychoanalytic observations represent discoveries of 
preexisting truths about the world but [they] are instead creations of new ways of 
thinking that will, in turn, be replaced by the next generation of thoughts. I 
believe that to take any other view is to take the chance of inadvertently defending 
invisible ideological aspects of the status quo and to risk making the revelation of 
these underlying influences more difficult and protracted. (Stern, 2010, p. 205) 
 
In relationalist thought if there is a process of diagnosis, it is inevitably two-sided. 
This line of thinking has earned RA practice the epithet “two-person psychotherapy” 
(Levenson, 1991, pp. 239-253). Relational writers further take into account that the 
unconscious of each participant is at play and is affected by the interpersonal field, hence 
arriving at a notion of a joint unconscious only partially understood by each member of 
the dyad, and also the presence of an analytic third (Ogden, 1994), and even a “social 
third” in which patient and analyst join in order to confront reality (Benjamin, 2011), “a 
deliberately created alternative to our unconscious submersion in the unquestioned realm 
of the ideal” (p. 29). This is not to say that these different concepts of interpersonal 
activities or effects (my terms) are necessarily unified. It is simply to indicate how the 
actual relationship, and therefore process in psychotherapy, are deeply embedded for both 
patient and psychoanalyst are in RA thought.  
Diagnosis, then, consists of summary judgments that patient and psychoanalyst 
make of one another early on in treatment. As familiarity grows, some beliefs about 
early, mutual diagnosis become entrenched. As trust becomes strong, safety can allow for 
these early assumptions to undergo challenge. In a sense, one could say that an important 
material for interpretation in Stern’s concept of psychoanalysis is derived from the 
patient’s and the psychoanalyst’s understandings of the very limits of their assumptions 
about of each other: 




As time passes, the influence on the field of the participants’ initial diagnoses of 
one another declines, to be replaced by an intricately woven pattern of implicit 
personal prejudices. I have tried to say that it is prejudice that constitutes the 
field—the transference-countertransference—and that it is prejudice that 
eventually must be analyzed. Of course, in this view, the analyst by this time is 
deeply involved, incapable of anything like rational, emotionally detached 
application of theory. (Stern, 2003, p. 229) 
 
This proposes what would seem to be a diagnosis in reverse. Indeed, the 
psychoanalytic relationship for Stern appears to be a mutual construction of knowledge, 
diagnosis, or prejudices in Gadamer’s sense of that which we have to know beforehand in 
order to understand anything (1975/2004).  Writing on his concept of prejudice, Gadamer 
stated:  
Is not our expectation and readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined 
by the old that has already taken possession of us? . . . . The nature of the 
hermeneutical experience is not that something is outside and desires admission. 
Rather, we are possessed by something and precisely by means of it we are open 
up for the new, the different, the true. (Gadamer, 1966/1976, p. 9)  
 
In RA terms, the development of relationship is followed by the experience of 
some of experience’s deconstruction. In Stern’s theory it seems that when the 
psychoanalyst loses the ability to theorize, there is hope of a strange intimacy within the 
interpersonal field that will bring about a stronger type of change in both participants. 
There may be a loss of the ability to see the background; however, there is the hope of 
much greater activity in the foreground of the interpersonal field.   
To be curious is to be determined to know what is already there—what one is 
already aware of being confronted with—in the most detailed and complete way 
possible. . . . The unbidden emerges from that which has been meticulously 
described. . . . . When the analyst questions what he thinks he already knows 
about the patient, and about his reactions to the patient, uncertainty is preserved 
. . . . These conditions constitute the climate in which unbidden perceptions 
flourish. (Stern, 2003, pp. 249-250) 
 




In a theory where the unbidden is the way know the most important, new things 
about each other and the world, knowledge comes to equal a process of change. In sum, 
Stern’s theoretical writings (2003, 2010) on the one hand, occasionally lead to the 
possibility of a disease, a pathology, a basis of suffering that could be brought into 
meaning through an experienced eye and psychotherapeutic dialogue, in order to engage 
that which is not normally seen through language. In Stern’s understanding of 
knowledge, that would mean using the “given” (2003, p. 3 ff), and it would assumedly 
accept diagnostic descriptions, principles, and so on.  
On the other hand, in such a theory each disease, indeed, each moment of disease 
would reveal not a universal entity of the register of the medical gaze but rather a disease 
never before seen and one that would likely never be seen again. In one of his most 
important passages, Stern wrote: 
The given and the made are a dialectic, neither ever excluding the other and both 
constituting every meaning and moment. Without the opportunity to change 
previously structured experience, and without that previous structure to feel and 
think against, new experience would be impossible. We would be trapped in an 
evanescent subjectivism. But, on the other hand, without our capacity or an 
imagination that goes beyond experiential regularities, without the animation of 
spontaneous expression and the continuous reworking that represents our 
ceaseless effort to understand, we would never be able to redeem our experience 
from the status of dead convention. It is reflection that saves the unconscious from 
being nothing more than a set of strictures, and makes it a precious resource 
instead; and it is the unconscious that offers reflection the fecund, ever-changing 
materials with which to carry out its life-giving mission. (Stern, 2003, p. 30) 
Like the clinical gaze (Foucault, 1963/1994), Stern’s theory appears to undertake 
a constant search for the hidden. However, this vision of the hidden is of an invisibility 
that is always under change. It can only be seen in context. For Stern, change appears to 
be a constant, and when movement has the feel of being stuck, it likely signals an 
important event in the field. “When not-me is evoked by the events of clinical process, 




continuous unfolding is replaced by some variety of enactment” (Stern, 2010, p. 120).  In 
enactment, there is a relational stasis, at least perceptually. Underlying this is the 
suggestion that in fact our perceptions constantly undergo change and demand new 
interpretation, in so far as possible. Moreover, our interpersonal relations change, and so 
too do our experiences, as well as the constant process of our bringing knowledge into 
words. Stern’s theory appears to suggest that, to paraphrase Herakleitos (1892/1945), 
from a fundamentally hermeneutic point of view, one can never step into the same 
pathology twice.  
b. Being open to knowledge and multiplicity, the clinical gaze undergoes 
constant expansion. A commonality between the medical gaze and the Panopticon was 
each, as part of discipline, expanded into its own creation. The individual (Foucault, 
1963/1994, 1975/1995), caught within a disciplined exercise of power, was both an 
object and an operation. In every manifestation of the new (post-Renaissance) discipline, 
the individual was represented. For Foucault it was even produced. With every act of 
representation the individual was inscribed in a growing and complex biography with a 
constant reference to the norm. Conversely, the norm grows by its instances.  
In a more contemporary sense, each individual case adds to a language of 
measurement that is assimilated into its database. An increasing complexity of 
measurement and control was one of the historical consequences of the clinical gaze and 
the earlier Panopticon (Foucault, 1975/1995; Rose, 1999b), with all of the ensuing 
technologies, such as time management, and subsequently, standardized testing, 
personality assessment, interrogatory techniques, coming into place in the 20th Century. 
Foucault (1975/1995) wrote that the Enlightenment gave birth to the need for there to be 




individuals as well as masses of individuals, in order for knowledge to maintain its 
expansionism, its entry into new social terrain, and its ability to deal with ever increasing 
numbers of variant bodies. Knowledge created individuals and individuals generated 
knowledge. This expansion, incidentally, coincided with the historical colonial expansion 
of the West. “Medical knowledge will gain only in relation to the number of cases 
examined . . . Medical certainty is based not on the completely observed individuality but 
on the completely scanned multiplicity of individual facts” (Foucault, 1963/1994, p. 101). 
 It follows that the medical gaze finds a privileged discourse in an openness that 
Foucault described as being infinite. There is an industrial quality to this busy examining, 
cataloging, and control of facts. The potential for new material is, at least on a 
mythological level or unconsciously, considered infinite. Material is created as it is 
categorized. Efficiency requires that this categorization, research, comparison to, and 
alteration of registers be an unceasing, energetic process, in order to keep up with the 
times. Such a keeping-up is, of course, also reflected in lived experiences of clinicians 
and in studies suggesting that primacy should be awarded to the most recent 
technological innovations above the clinician’s experience. There is a pseudo-passivity to 
what in action is often a highly aggressive technological way of being. 
In practice, of course, psychoanalysis generally stands with an at least partial 
resistance to industrialized time-frames (Aron & Starr, 2013). While there is strict 
conformity to Freud’s general principles and the fifty-minute hour, the course of 
psychoanalysis is not term-limited and the frequency of sessions suggests an alternate 
temporality especially to more prescriptive methods of psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis 




involves a slowing down, an attention to nuance, and a profound respect for human 
unpredictability.  
Stern’s psychotherapy (2003) takes this respect for the unknown possibilities of a 
course of therapy one step further. He emphasized that change in the therapeutic process 
cannot be forced. While this theory does not the reject the psychotherapist attending to 
content, it is structured on a constant searching of process (2003).  “We have come to 
believe that the way the mind works is far more important than what it holds” (2010,  
p. 10). In practical terms, the psychoanalyst, as with any clinician, is to remain open to 
the unbidden, that which is unexpected and uncharted. Beyond practice, at the heart of 
Stern’s theory is a fundamental epistemological difference between the RA way of 
knowing and the medical interview with its cataloging of data. If the disease in Stern’s 
theory resists labeling, its course is equally resistant to predictive description. 
Firstly, Stern’s search for knowing takes place not in the form of a structured 
interview but within the interpersonal field. Here, there is no privileging of quantity. 
Granted, the psychoanalyst may be more likely to look for anomaly, the new as located in 
what could be deemed statistical outliers, Freud’s gaps. However, contrary to the 
collection of ever more and new fact, and against the generation of an ever-wider 
geography, psychoanalysis can have a circular, or occasionally even a tedious quality it 
(Stern, 2003), as it works within a space of intimate familiarity. It is by joining in 
thinking together and developing a framed closeness that psychoanalysis begins to result 
in change for Stern (2010). Stern described moments of change in the hermeneutic 
language as the fusion of horizons of knowledge between the patient and the 
psychoanalyst. “Novelty is grasped only from within what is already familiar to us” 




(Stern, 2010, p. 46). Units of any kind are unlikely to be found. Rather, a hallmark of 
Stern’s practice, and much of psychoanalysis, is the development of a tolerance or respect 
for ambiguity and ever-changing understandings.  
The uncertainty does not go away. There is never a ‘bottom’; there are never 
objectively defined meanings that can make the process transparent and a final 
answer possible at last. Does that lead to endless questioning? Yes, that is exactly 
what it leads to. (Stern, 2010, p. 204) 
 
Knowing is a moving target. This appears to mark a point where Stern’s theory 
and praxis are one. In hermeneutics, theory as well as its interpretation is subject to 
temporal context (Gadamer, 1975/2004). Knowledge takes on the ephemeral quality of 
something that is sought and which is repeatedly lost. Stern’s theory presents the 
surprising, potentially anti-positivist move to imply that much of what is important may 
indeed occur precisely because of its not being known: “The Interpersonal influence can 
be effective without being known . . . . The most profound interpersonal influence goes as 
deep as it does because it is not known by either party” (Stern, 2003, p. 185). 
Contrary to the amassing and adjustment of hard facts, this thought appears to 
encourage a nearly paradoxical unknowing. Unlike the clinical gaze, this RA approach 
suggests questioning the ontology of facts themselves. “Meaning becomes creation, that 
is, not discovery” (Stern, 2010, p.184). Therefore, meaning is a process in which 
knowledge follows participation, a process irrelevant of quantities of knowledge. Behind 
this is a regular challenging of the status quo of knowledge, whether that is the held 
knowledge of the participants or mainstream assumptions, or even our resistance to either 
one. Change in these RA terms is often a change of assumptions on either side of the 
therapist-client relationship. 




Secondly, the knowing of which Stern has written is one that may be temporary in 
nature and one that is essentially dialogic. For instance, Modell (1991) wrote of 
psychoanalysis offering a different level of reality from that of other relationships. This is 
a reality that requires, because of the analytic frame, a certain quality of play that can 
later be transferred to relationship in ordinary life. This unusual relationship aims towards 
a certain fluidity. Psychoanalytic knowing, for Stern, likewise involves a great deal of 
self-questioning on the part of the psychoanalyst, such that it could not function as a 
process that is instrumental.  
If we understand the transactions that make up clinical psychoanalysis as events 
of the natural world, in the same category as thunderstorms and the creation of 
diamonds, I believe that we give something up. I believe that viewing clinical 
practice that way makes us less likely to question whether what we are doing with 
our patients reflects unconsciously embraced values that we might prefer not to 
actualize—in a word, whether what we are doing with our patients is the 
manifestation of ideology. (Stern, 2010, p. 200) 
 
Like Foucault (1964/1994, 1984b) and unlike much of medical practice, rather 
than being convinced of the clinician’s own knowledge base, Stern’s psychoanalyst is on 
a constant lookout for signs of power and covert ideology on the clinician’s side of the 
therapeutic interview, as well as anywhere else. Stern’s theory belongs to RA and to 
hermeneutics in part through its attention to the observer’s own hidden mental activity.  
 Unlike much of the natural sciences, Stern’s (2002a, 2003, 2010, 2011a) theory is 
clearly established not only as a form of thinking about complex problems but also as an 
inevitably political and ethical engagement. To possess the particular type of openness 
(and possibly even a hegemony over the multiplicity of possible subjects of knowledge) 
of Foucault’s clinical gaze (1963/1994), a form of psychoanalysis would have to make a 
claim to the same impersonalization claimed by natural science. That would include 




supposing a stance of complete neutrality or amorality. From a hermeneutic perspective 
such as Stern’s, such a psychoanalysis would have to submit that neither the patient nor 
the psychotherapist was a person born into specific cultural traditions, that neither person 
is living in a particular place at a particular time, and that somehow we have transcended 
language in the process of understanding. One envisions a psychotherapy where only 
robots represent either side.13 The infinite expansion of knowledge requires a 
depolititization and decontextualization of knowledge. To contextualize can therefore be 
an act of resistance.  
Stern further offered a direct caution against using quantitative outcome research 
exclusively as a way to understand, verify, or conduct psychoanalysis. Stern argued that 
only the simplest therapeutic methods can be quantified. 
You cannot know exactly what you are going to do as an analyst until you come 
upon the circumstances that will contextualize your intervention. For all the order 
we give our time and fee schedules, when it comes to transactional events we are 
often flying by the (highly educated and seasoned) seat of our pants. (Stern, 2010, 
p. 194) 
 
Stern’s focus on the interpersonal field as the location in which new 
understandings take place and his use of the psychoanalytic time frame are an alternative 
way of thinking about psychotherapeutic cases to the medicalized model. Furthermore, 
the emphasis on mutual experience of Stern’s and much RA thinking suggests this kind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This automated view is not without its proponents. Some promoters of “Health 2.0” 
envision a time when the patient, through a centralized system and multiple centers 
“would be in constant contact with the health-care system, although you’d hardly be 
aware of it” thus minimizing doctor-patient contact to a level approaching zero. (Cohn, 
2013, p. 58). There is a strange value here of removing the human doctor, expertise from 
the interaction. It is as if there were a virtue now in dislocating Descartes’ cogito from the 
“I” who thinks, a reasoning without humans in between subject and conception. In the 
Cartesian formula, “I think therefore I am” may be substituted for a cogito without a self: 
“I think, that’s all there is to know.” 




of practice as a resistance to the amassing of quantifiable knowledge inherent in 
Foucault’s medical gaze (e.g., Hoffman, 2009; Walls, 2012, pp. 145-52). Rather than 
being supported, the amassing and constant categorization of knowledge in Stern’s RA is 
instead seen as a shifting of horizons native to Gadamer’s hermeneutic thought.  
c. The clinical gaze is realized through the particular, measured language of 
science. Foucault (1963/1994) wrote that the special language of the clinician required 
the clinician’s initiation into it. The clinician’s ability to observe and record in a special 
way allowed for the perception of disease. Essentially, these practices—observation, 
auscultation, and so on—were joined under the auspices of sight, their essential 
connection being the unity of vision and speech under language. “It is description, or, 
rather, the implicit labour of language in description, that authorizes the transformation of 
symptom into sign and the passage from patient to disease and from the individual to the 
conceptual” (Foucault, 1963/1994, p. 114). 
This is a gaze that analyzes and then modifies inferences made from the analysis. 
This kind of description is bound with a way of ordering (Foucault, 1966/1994). That 
ordering leads to an educative force and the creation of a language.  
It is to see and to know at the same time, because by saying what one sees, one 
integrates it spontaneously into knowledge; it is also to learn to see, because it 
means giving the key of a language that masters the visible. (Foucault, 1963/1994, 
p. 114) 
 
Foucault subsumed this quality of the gaze, an observing process that regiments 
through language while also taking in ever new facts, under the metaphor of “the 
speaking eye” (1963/1994, p. 114). The image connotes speaking from a narrative 
position that claims objectivity through uniting observation with a specialized language. 
In this way of thinking, what is posited as existing in the world (disease, sign, symptom) 




is equivalent to the language used to describe it. “In the clinic as in analysis [in the 
general sense]” wrote Foucault, “the armature of the real is designed on the model of 
language” (p. 96, brackets added). For both the philosopher and the physician, “the world 
for them is the analogue of language” (p. 96).  This simple phrase may be one of 
Foucault’s greatest indictments of the medical realm’s assumption of its access to truth. 
Even a mathematics requires languages of different kinds (Madan, 2007), and language 
cannot exist outside of history, place, and culture.  
Medical description is language that measures both the things it describes 
(including the physical sense here) and it also measures itself. This dual ability gives rise 
to authority in practice, but it surpasses the mere claim to an eccentric privilege. This 
medico-linguistic type of esotericism requires initiation and something more: 
Now operational mastery over things is sought by accurate syntactic usage and a 
difficult semantic familiarity with language. . . . What it means is to give speech 
to that which everyone sees without seeing—a speech that can be understood only 
by those initiated into true speech. (Foucault, 1963/1994, p. 115) 
 
 Freud’s certainty about the legitimacy and evidential basis of the unconscious, 
and his subsequent arguing for a technologically inspired model to explain it (Freud, 
1915/1953) is an example of a seeing of that which is not seen. As had physicians before 
him, Freud made a scientific claim to invisibility that constantly re-emerges in signs or 
the absence of signs, as in this cases the parapraxes, puns, slips of the unconscious, and 
conversion reactions (Freud, 1905/1960). Contemporary psychological diagnosis 
continues to maintain triplicate points for mapping pathology almost to the letter: 
“Technically, symptoms are what patients complain of, whereas signs are what clinicians 
notice. . . . Symptoms are the indicators of disease that are perceived by patients or their 
friends and relatives” (Morrison, 2007, p. 8). 




The clinician as the one behind the gaze is among Foucault’s privileged and 
initiated who possess the authority to perceive what is clearly present but what others 
cannot see. The expert is then in search of a syndrome, a pattern of symptoms, signs, and 
events (Morrison, 2007, p. 11), which evidence the presence of a disorder. The clinician 
engages in a search for the essential that is defined for her gaze by the latency of disease. 
Furthermore, for Foucault, since a syndrome is a collection of symptoms appearing 
within a certain pattern and which themselves make up the disease,  
there is a strange ambiguity here, since in its signifying function the symptom 
refers both to the relation between phenomena themselves—to what constitutes 
their totality and the form of their coexistence—and to the absolute difference that 
separates health from disease; it signifies, therefore, by tautology, the totality of 
what is and, by its emergence, the exclusion of what is not.  
(Foucault, 1963/1994, p. 92) 
 
Diagnosis involves circular thinking. As the clinician observes symptoms and 
determines the presence or existence of signs, there is the assumption of a natural 
appearance of something, a disease, and a particular one that is exclusive of others. This 
kind of interpretation both includes a linguistic association (the patterning of symptoms 
and signs), and it rules out differing syndromes for which these particular symptoms and 
signs might be mistaken. Moreover, its very signs (symptoms) are exclusive in their 
singular appearance: they indicate ill-health. When indicative of disease, symptoms 
perform two linguistic functions simultaneously.  
Differential diagnosis and the rule-out are essential to this procedural gaze. 
Whatever is referred to as a symptom suggests a relationship with other symptoms, as 
well as the absence of anything else. That which is absence is that which appears in a 
different category (another form of pathology), if it is the presence of any disease at all 
(as in malingering). Illness is constituted, and health excluded by the clinician’s 




language, a language that pathologizes and rules, one that specifies details, and one that 
finds in them the proof of categorization, and rule-outs. 
The procedural language of the medical must generate particular kinds of 
biographies (Foucault, 1963/1994, 1965/1988) that are authored and understood by the 
initiated. Medicine is concerned with obtaining an accurate narrative from the patient 
captured in the right biographical terms and often structured in an exacting form. The 
language of medical description orders. It taxonomizes. As above, it measures both its 
object and itself.  
The Clinician’s Thesaurus (Zuckerman, 2005) is a popular reference for 
psychotherapists. It is exemplary of this type of ordering. This tome is an exquisitely 
collected and finely organized glossary of the disparate, even conflicting language of 
psychology. The work offers a taxonomy of American psychological concepts, ordered 
under subject headings that are followed by columns offering ever-more precise 
terminology. Given the variety and richness of the English language and the enormous 
expanse of contemporary American psychological practice and research today, this 
glossary demonstrates a certain organizational brilliance.  
The title suggests this large-format book is not merely a lexicon, but it has other 
functions. Its language provides a syntax not just in the sense of stringing together spoken 
sentences for the report but as a way to order the construction of therapeutic interviews. 
The author described the work as being helpful in that, with its help, the student of 
psychology can “access the knowledge base you have built from your training and 
experience” for treatment planning “and other clinical decisions you have to make” 
(Zuckerman, 2005, p. 2).  Zuckerman’s conceptualization of this thesaurus goes further, 




to suggest a disciplinary means of regimenting the therapeutic exchange: “The 
Clinician’s Thesaurus can be thought of as an enormous checklist. It is designed to 
approximate your internal checklist—the one on which you draw on to conduct 
interviews, understand and respond to questions, and construct your reports” (p. 2).   
This book of practical language fulfills an important requirement of panoptic 
thinking within the clinical gaze. As a checklist, it acts as a tool of self-discipline for the 
clinician. It serves to enhance the examination of not just the patient but the practitioner 
herself. The practitioner is urged to employ the vocabulary as a checklist, in order 
monitor the correspondence between experiential understanding and internalized 
doctrine. Employing such language, however, falls into a structural equivocation. As 
Madan has argued about the use of the Bell or Normal Curve in social sciences, the 
descriptive becomes immediately confused with judgment and hence questions of power: 
“Its use often vacillates between descriptive and normative” (Madan, 2007, p. 3). 
Description with a certain type of wording creeps into the normal. Descriptive language 
is conflated with political, economic, moralistic, and ideological control.  
Zuckerman’s (2005) psychological lexicon therefore makes itself essential in a 
high-anxiety vocation, as a way to demonstrate bona fides where such constant 
demonstration becomes mandatory (Cushman, 2011b). The clinician employs this 
thesaurus as a large register, in order to compare it to internalized procedures drafted 
from experience and training, and subsequently to render both into the words of the 
already-certified. Experience alone is not to be trusted, nor is a simplistic reliance on 
previous education. The triangulation of separate domains provides an insurance policy 
that the clinician helps to author. Such a directive reaches deeply back into the 




Panopticon, in order to deploy an internal monitoring not just of the one enclosed but of 
the employees of the institution, be it prison, clinic, school, or asylum. Wrote Foucault: 
“We are neither in the amphitheater, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, 
invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its 
mechanism [emphasis added]” (Foucault, 1975/1999, p. 127).  
One idea we can take from this is that the notion, that those in the role of watcher 
are actually in control, is an illusion. The ordering of power constitutes selves. The 
Panopticon in Foucault’s conception is open to all individualities.  
In the case of the psychotherapist’s glossary, more than a compendium of terms, 
there is syntactical ordering to the prescribed use of the Clinician’s Thesaurus (2005). In 
psychological formation, trainings, and continuing education, checklists are constantly to 
be internalized so that the process of the clinical interview can be measured.  
In history, Foucault (1975/1995) traced this procedural and marked-out 
temporality to both the work-houses and Brothers of Christian Schools of the early 
Enlightenment. Time-keeping was the result of cross-fertilization between methods for 
controlling labor, systems for efficiently observing prisoners, and practices gleaned from 
monasteries, and later in schools for the poor. In other words, starting with these 
movements in the Renaissance, procedure marks time in increasingly varied domains and 
at increasingly finer intervals. 
If references and textbooks (e.g., Morrison, 2007; Zuckerman, 2005) for 
contemporary clinical practice carry out the proceduralism inherent in Foucault’s clinical 
gaze, does Stern’s theory in some way suggest a related methodology for the 
psychoanalyst? How does Stern’s theory fit with this kind of control of clinician and 




subject passed on from the generations? Is Stern’s language in some way clocked or 
measured, or does it contrarily work in an alternative way to this comparing of different 
registers?  
As discussed above, Stern’s writings appear to hold less pathological jargon than 
many psychological texts. Stern wrote of clinical process with a more situational sense of 
understanding the patient’s particular problem at hand (Stern, 2003, 2010, 2012c). For 
Stern,  
The way each of us shapes moment-to-moment experience is the outcome of our 
characteristic patterns of formulation interacting with the exigencies of the 
moment. Because ‘exigencies of the moment’ almost always refers to happenings 
with other people, real or imaginary—‘illusory,’ in Sullivan’s description—the 
resolution of the ambiguity of unformulated experience is an interpersonal event. 
(Stern, 2003, p. 39)  
 
 For Stern, experience is formulated through “ongoing interpersonal transactions” 
(Stern, 2003, p. 40). Interpersonal here then suggests a different kind of temporality. The 
session is not so much an experiment as a meeting of two minds, a “partnership in 
thought” (Stern, 2010). Not only is the reader of Stern’s writings affected by a novel sort 
of language for a psychological text, but Stern himself has challenged our use of 
language: 
Conventional use of language is essential to the smooth operation of everyday 
lives but it does not give birth to meaning; it counts it, notes it, passes over it. This 
use of language reveals nothing new, but it does grease the tracks.  
(Stern, 2003, p. 90) 
 
In other words, Stern has not ruled out the use of convention in order to 
understand therapeutic work. Rather, convention is what is necessary to help us towards 
unconventional meaning that makes sense. For Stern, to ask for more than a situational 
understanding, on the other hand, would be to deny a basic hermeneutic and 




psychoanalytic fact: that no understanding or interpretation can ever be absolute, 
sufficient, or complete in and of itself. “We hope...we will be able to tolerate knowing 
that we never finish saying anything” (Stern, 2003, p. 89). Experience and understanding 
build on each other in a process that is interpersonal. 
In Stern’s theory, therefore, a reversal of some panoptic standards appears to be 
taking place. For Stern, experience is privileged over social convention. Unlike the 
confusion between the functions of description and normalization of the Bell Curve as 
described by Madan (2007), Stern’s psychoanalysis permits, or even encourages its own 
malleability in action. Stern has written, for example, of a failed case (2011b), and his 
theory of enactment is a direct focus on misunderstandings in practice. Stern has further 
adopted Schliemacher’s hermeneutic dictum that in general, misunderstanding is far more 
common than understanding (Stern, 2003).  
Chronologically, theory follows experience and not the other way around. 
However, in Stern’s thought, the language of interpretation is not maintained to be free of 
valence. I examine in Chapter 3 of this Findings-Discussion section how meaning and 
moral understandings play out in Stern’s writings with varying levels of reflection. In any 
case, the focus on exchanges of language in the interpersonal field offers a richness, as 
well as the constant possibility of challenging ideological or conventional meanings. 
More than just possibility, such challenges to previous meanings are basic to this theory. 
Stern has written little directly about this subject; however, again, he has inherited such 
critical thinking from the Freudian and Sullivanian traditions, and Stern has not shied 
away the strains of a philosophy of rebellion in these systems of ideas. It is important to 




bear in mind that at the heart of Stern’s theory is a certain kind of interpersonal freedom. 
For Stern, this may not be so different from an external, political freedom: 
And so freedom for us is a more complicated thing than it was for our 
psychoanalytic forebears. The nature of freedom gained in psychoanalysis 
depends upon whom you learn it with. . . . . How do we choose which kind of 
freedom to pursue? Is the kind of freedom we select the best freedom? Who 
makes that judgment? For what purpose? How should we work in order to have 
the greatest opportunity of becoming aware of our own ignorance and avoidance 
of freedom? Do our culture and our theories make us blind to certain kinds of 
freedom we might otherwise think are desirable? What constraints on the 
possibilities of freedom are built into the psychoanalytic situation itself? . . . . 
Each of us is a small piece of culture, a sort of hologram of the larger world, put 
together internally as our social worlds are organized beyond our skins. How, 
then, do we avoid fulfilling the very real potential for psychoanalysis to be a 
(quite unconscious) means of social control? (Stern, 2002a, p. 8) 
 
Stern’s overall take on language appears to deny the unity of signifier and 
signified, a unity implicit in Zuckerman’s (2005) recommendations to the clinician. One 
could paraphrase: What you see, then subject to the right language, is what really is. 
Rather, Stern presented language as a historical a priori that nevertheless makes its own 
supercession possible. “At the root of our experience, there is only always the already 
made. We cannot step outside of language any more than we can experience stimuli 
outside the range of our senses” (Stern, 2003, p. 12).  
Stern grounded the freedom and spontaneity of his theory against the kinds of 
objections often leveled at postmodern thought, that postmodernism offers no frame of 
reference and leans towards a pure, relativistic subjectivity. “The next moment’s 
formulated experience is not predetermined but it has its limits” (2003, p. 1).  Stern’s 
theory, then, is neither relativistic nor nihilistic. Moreover, he maintained that this 
psychoanalysis differs from postmodern philosophy in that RA involves questions of 
agency.  




This problem of self and agency in a postmodern world is key for all the 
intellectual disciplines, but for none more than psychoanalysis, which can only 
survive if it negotiates postmodernism while preserving some notions of what is 
personal and authentic. (Stern, 2003, p. 259 [Note 1 to Chapter 7]) 
 
Additionally, Stern’s statement above assumes three Heideggerian principles: 
first, that humans are in the world; second, that we are thrown into it in an historical 
sense; and third, we are constituted by language. There is an inevitable sense of Being as 
being part of the human community in this philosophy. Stern has written that, “the future 
of meaning is embodied in relatedness” (2010, p. 22). Stern’s philosophical approach is 
not only one of embodiment, it is also one that is at its root relational. The statement also 
suggests a thread of moral understandings that may be embedded in much of RA practice, 
the idea that we are all in this together. 
For Stern, language is made of the given or the readymade. As above, language, 
via dialogue, is also paradoxically the site of the generation of new meanings. Therefore, 
precisely tracing the generation of any piece of meaning is an impossible task. Stern 
pondered this mystery rhetorically, “Who can say how we come to say exactly what we 
mean?” (Stern, 2003, p. 97).  
If meaning has a certain shape shifting quality to it, then overreliance on a 
stereotyped language and the ideas closest at hand would likely obstruct the creation of 
new knowledge. From a psychoanalytic perspective, too much of the familiar might 
indicate a resistance to broader, newer understandings. “We are inside the vicious circle 
when we know the answer before we ask the question” (Stern, 2010, p. 48). 
Following as it does hermeneutic thought, in this theory there can be no external 
database, nor can there be an internal, unaffected spirit of reason to accurately check such 
a mythical, internal register; likewise, this theory rejects a veritable piece of the mind 




between which we verify our physical or lived sense of the world and other things we 
seem to know. “All experience is interpretive and perspectivist” (Stern, 2003, pp. 23-24). 
The appeal to a clinical language, then, would necessarily be neither more nor less useful 
than an appeal to any other form of discourse in Stern’s psychoanalysis. Interpretation 
and understanding are dependent upon all the exigencies that have come in to create 
interpersonal context.  
Furthermore, Stern has on occasion warned of the covert ideological implications 
of deploying appeals to the authority of science in psychoanalytic practice. For Stern, as 
we are controlled or coerced by power, so we lose some of the atmosphere of experience: 
Unconscious ideology, the aspect of culture that serves our minds not as the 
potential for new meaning but as a straitjacket for it, is just as effective as reality 
itself in setting limits on our freedom to experience. Because reality can only be 
apprehended via the tools made available by culture, the distinction between 
limits that are based in reality (and therefore intrinsic to human experience), and 
those that are ideologically based (and therefore imposed on us for reasons having 
to do with the invisible working of power [see Foucault, 1980])] is always at issue 
and painfully difficult to accomplish. (2010, p. 2, footnote 1) 
 
In a different sense, however, Stern’s theory dovetails with the diagnostic practice 
of the medical gaze. The clinical gaze, the thesaurus, and clinicians working in a 
diagnostic mode, all rely on a particular relationship between received information, 
including physical observation (sign, symptom), and the underlying entity of study 
(illness, disease, the nosology).  
Stern’s theory has followed similar but slightly different lines in marking the 
distinction between the verbal and experience that lies outside the verbal. For Stern 
(2003), in fidelity to hermeneutics, all understanding comes through a broad definition of 
language. However, he has marked the difference between experience that is not quite 
known in language, such as nonverbal and verbal understandings, and that which is 




experienced at least as having been grasped. For Stern, these two categories, both under 
language of a more comprehensive definition, are the “verbal” and the “semiotic.” Stern 
(2003) invoked the unconscious as the dividing line between the semiotic and knowledge:  
Knowledge is encoded in words and can be reflected on; action is encoded 
nonverbally, but within the broader bounds of semiotics. Both modes directly 
affect the way we experience and conduct ourselves, though we are explicitly 
aware only of the influences of the reflective mode (knowledge). (Stern, 2003,  
p. 19) 
 
It has been noted that Stern’s concept of knowledge is something far afield of the 
“knowledge base” of the Clinician’s Thesaurus (2005), probably in quality, and certainly 
in scale. The clinical knowledge of the Clinician’s Thesaurus could be subsumed under 
Stern’s reflective knowledge, but reflection in Stern’s thought appears to be a much more 
open process than the triangulation of with what one sees with an internalized catalog, all 
deployed in order to register that in a professional lexicon. It seems likely that such a 
process would be too close to the modern-era correspondence theory of truth for Stern, in 
addition to any potential questions about the technological metaphor of the mind as the 
container of an expert’s database. His reflection holds immensely more potential for 
variation than a reinforcing correspondence between what is seen in the clinical gaze and 
correlated with a regimen of training. Reflection in Stern seems to include a variety of 
human thought that the clinical gaze in Foucault’s conception would not permit. 
Ontologies, as in Bion’s reverie (1962), hold a fluidity that is as much phenomenological 
as it is explanatory.14 In Stern’s writings, reflection encompasses anything that can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is noteworthy that for both Bion and Stern, this capacity for reflection is engendered 
through relationship. Bion (1962) traced the child’s reverie back to the mother’s reverie 
of the child. For Stern reflection appears through dialogue and through language. The 
relationality of these two processes relates directly to psychoanalysis as well, a practice 
rooted in language in the broadest sense, and with a persistent, keen interest in the 




brought into the verbal. For Gadamer, reflection likely held multiple possibilities, as well. 
“Perhaps there are many different forms of reflection.” (Gadamer, 1996, p. 51). As we 
look closer at these concepts, reflection itself begins to appear as a kind of process, a 
particular type or aspect of experience. In psychoanalysis, as well, interpretation is seen 
as a highly creative process. 
Stern’s epistemological steps seem to be different enough to suggest an entirely 
different ontology from that of Foucault’s concept of the speaking eye. Stern’s writings 
frequently suggest that what is can only have a temporal relation to the process of our 
defining it. This, indeed, is the hermeneutic as well as the constructivist assumption: that 
we discover the world through interpretation and that interpretation is a historical 
process, occurring in a given context, in a particular place, at a particular time (Gadamer, 
1975/1994). Interpretation takes place among embodied humans. Likewise, Stern’s words 
emerge from the psychoanalytic tradition. Rather than placing an anchor into a posited 
field based on a claim to certainty (a social register, a clinician’s time-proven experience, 
an evidence-based technique), psychoanalysis is never without the presence of its own 
hardly or entirely unknown variable, the unconscious. Stern’s point of departure has been 
with the Interpersonal or Relational lens. Again, there is a long focus on how events 
appear to arrive before any sense we can make of them.  
Preceding Stern’s works, in Tauber’s thought (Tauber & Green, 1959) there is 
experience that is both prelogical and preverbal. For Tauber, such experience has not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
development of language across the course of therapy, back to the earliest moments of 
childhood and, more often than not, of mothering. Stern’s works, on the other hand, 
suggest more attention to the interpersonal field in session. This is difficult terrain. 
Would Stern’s theory of enactment, on the other hand, imply something akin to reverie, 
with its sense of the therapist feeling distracted (2003, 2010) from something important? 




been sufficiently examined in psychoanalytic theory. “Most interpersonal interaction, in 
fact, goes on in the prelogical mode. We are constantly negating prelogical processes and 
converting them unwittingly into logical syntactical propositions, with a consequent 
falsification of security and communication” (Tauber & Green, 1959, pp. 2-3). 
For Stern, understanding such experience is a function of psychoanalysis. It also 
offers the possibility of new experiencing: “The Interpersonal influence can be effective 
without being known.... The most profound interpersonal influence goes as deep as it 
does because it is not known by either party” (Stern, 2013, p. 186).  
This makes for change that arrives in a mutual struggle for understanding. It also 
suggests a clinical change that is of an entirely different stripe from the types of goals 
suggested in ontologies as proposed by language as found in tomes such as the 
Clinician’s Thesaurus (Zuckerman, 2005). In challenging operationalism, RA thinkers 
have indicated a process with a highly different teleology, one that in fact develops 
during its own unfolding. Other RA writers, especially Stolorow, have pointed to the 
Aristotelian contention that behind even our most intellectual assertions is to be found 
affect, emotional experience. Similar to the Stern’s Interpersonal “preverbal experience” 
(Stern, 2003), Stolorow has written of “prereflective organizing activity” (2011, p. 1). 
 For Atwood and Stolorow (1980), such emotional experience comes into 
reflection via a dialogic process such as psychoanalysis. Affect may be what we 
experience as happening to us, but it is seen as more than a passive event. 
This ineffable and yet limiting quality of language and understanding offers a 
further challenge to a disciplinary language, because for Stern our reflective abilities are 
both made possible and they are simultaneously limited by our cultural traditions 




(Cushman, 1995; Stern, 2003, 2010). From the hermeneutic perspective, a language that 
functions, as in Foucault’s (1975/1995) description, as a direct analogue of universal truth 
would risk a certain arrogance. “It is worth preserving our humility and our capacity to be 
skeptical of this great reflective capacity of ours. The power of language exists only in its 
own little context” (Stern, 2003, p. 26).  
Interpretation is part of a continuous process that extends in ongoing experience. 
There is a nonpossessive temporality implicit in Stern’s perspective. He suggested both 
an uncertainty and a hope of a deeper kind of newness, a mystery to our not-knowing, 
and even a certain fascination with the act of being human. For Foucault (1966/1994), 
there appears simultaneously a vast possibility and the limits of our need to adhere to 
language, to context. Stern suggested a psychoanalytic ability to hold even this ever-
moving chronicity in the name of the new. It suggests an evening out of the privileging of 
our knowledge, in exchange for the potential of a certain ongoing mystery in new 
understandings: “I do not believe that anyone’s psychoanalytic observations represent 
discoveries of preexisting truths about the world but are instead creations of new ways of 
thinking that will, in turn, be replaced by the next generation of thoughts” (Stern, 2010,  
p. 205). 
For Stern, knowledge is only half the story if we are to be changed by it, that is, if 
we are not to be utterly trapped within the conventions of our knowledge, its allegiance to 
the past. The language that Zuckerman (2005) so ingeniously collected, organized, 
tabulated, and offered for future dictation, invokes a process pertaining to a wide range of 
clinical convention. It is the clinical gaze as it speaks, with numerous dialects of 




psychological theory, scientific research, genetics, anatomy, and clinical practice at its 
disposal. It also holds to time-tabling, the procedural quality requisite of the Panopticon.  
For Stern (2003, 2010) on the other hand, meaning appears more evasive, 
something which comes out of a darkness that offers less of a purchase on its own 
definition. In this sense, Stern’s thought is clearly post-structuralist: meaning arises 
through language, and language is referential in a system of signs (Barthes, 1957/1988; 
Foucault, 1966/1994; Sarup, 1988/1993; Saussure, 1927/1972). Moreover, in RA the 
darkness outside the meaning holds a certain importance. In session, silence is often 
maintained as providing a meaning that transcends any single interpretation but as 
something essential to the psychoanalytic process. Silence presents a space that helps the 
patient not to have a solution to his problems. If not an infantilisation per se, a pause, a 
silence, or a “space” in the dialogue has a function similar to that of ritual in many 
societies. It offers order in the practice of incertitude. This is not paradox for paradox’s 
sake, but an acceptance of how one comes to know that which is beyond one’s greatest 
efforts, precisely that which generally brings patients into psychotherapy. Silence may be 
an essential piece of Stern’s (2003) work with the unbidden. 
For Stern, then, the dictates of technique are potentially in conflict with the search 
for meaning. He made a similar point in connecting Interpersonal thought with the early 
RA movement. For Stern, technique holds an important but a particular place. 
“Technique works if you are trying to do something exactly the same way you have done 
it before, and there are many tasks that do require this approach. But there can be no rules 
for the pursuit of understanding” (Stern, 2005b, pp. 700-701). 




Stern connected this immediately to Gadamer’s magnum opus, Truth and Method 
(1975/2004) the title of which, Stern asserted, was an oxymoron. For Gadamer, it is when 
previous prejudices are disconfirmed that new knowledge finds a space. For both these 
thinkers, then, truth is not to be found via method. Discovery, rather, takes place to what 
Stern has openly (2005b) equated with a deconstructive process. “To destabilize one’s 
own perceptions is to discover that other values than those one had previously 
acknowledged are determining one’s conduct” (Stern, 2002a, p. 12). Method resists or 
militates against deconstruction. A deconstructive stance, therefore, assumes that the 
psychotherapist’s experience will also be necessarily fluid, subject to criticism, subject to 
change. Our knowledge is only as good as its ability to challenge what is occurring. This 
is a process of process. In Levenson’s phrase, psychoanalyst asks herself, “What is going 
on around here?” (1972/2005).  
In Stern’s psychology, understanding is subject to Sullivan’s selective inattention 
(1953/1997). According to this theory, some degree of dissociation is not a rare 
occurrence; rather, it is the norm. For us to come to awareness of an idea or experience, 
all the rest of dissociated experience must be left behind while we attend to that selected 
aspect of living and bring it into awareness. Our language emerges in a choice as to what 
in the mass of unformulated experience we will attend to, a choice that is only partially 
conscious. That which we do not attend to is often the result of anxiety brought by 
interpersonal relationship, that is, through interpersonal relationship or context. Both our 
abilities to reflect and to create out of language are limited, just as for Heidegger 
(1927/2010) and for Gadamer (1975/2004), our possibilities are limited by our place in 
history, in culture, and in time. Wrote Stern, in one of his most spiritual of declarations, 




“the potentially meaningful is a small space carved out of the vastness of the possible, the 
All.” (2003, p. 27). 
This ineffability of experience, the vastness from which it merges, controverts the 
operationalism with which discipline, in Foucault’s sense, is imbued. In Stern’s 
description, there is a creativity in our relations and our dialogues. Such ingenuity or 
originality can be engendered or censored, narrowed. In this type of constructionism, the 
creation of meaning is an ongoing, interpretive process.  
Any description of the nature of bodily constraints on experience then cannot be 
simply objective, no matter how irresistibly obvious, sensible, or insightful it may 
seem. It is instead a political and moral statement. We cannot even know the 
extent to which the way we shape and define events, such as . . . sexual feelings, 
rage, and so on . . . are themselves cultural constructions. The conception of 
constraints, although it is useful and perhaps even necessary, can never be 
illustrated or exemplified in concrete terms. (Stern, 2003, p. 205) 
 
In this seemingly simple portrayal of language as event, Stern has removed the 
primacy of a fixed language of knowable power. Within the realm of psychology, he has 
suggested that the basic units of our understanding—our very naming of somatic and 
emotional states, the measurement of cognition, and so on—cannot exist like pins fixed 
in a map of accurate, institutionalized or perfectly trained description. Instead, 
understanding involves rather imprecise, moral and political actions the implications of 
which we can only strive over and over to understand. Stern’s statement here goes so far 
as to challenge long-held notions of instincts. From a hermeneutic perspective, the idea of 
instinct cannot exist outside of a certain cultural history in which it was conceived. 
Stern’s understanding here derives from Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle. 
According to Stern’s explanation of Gadamer’s thought, in order to understand anything 
new, we must do so via context. “Unless an utterance can be placed in the appropriate 




configuration of tradition, its meaning remains obscure” (Stern, 2003, p. 213). This 
assumes that foreknowledge, or prejudice is necessary to understand anything. The 
problem, then, is that all previous understanding is prejudice. “One has to take a position 
about how we avoid seeing nothing more than what we expect to see” (2003, p. 214).  
In effect, this means that our foreknowledge is in a constant process of being in 
some way changed. In such an environment of fluid, dialogic meaning, how are we to 
recognize when we are doing better? Stern’s answer harks back to the hermeneutic circle:  
“Productive prejudices are those that can be illuminated in such a way that new 
understandings come into view” (Stern, 2003, p. 214).  
Because of the hermeneutic circle, the fact that we can only understand and pass 
beyond conceptual constraints via language (the heart of conceptualization), our 
reflective access to experience is always limited. To state it metaphorically, here Stern 
(2003) has moved onto the boulevard of the medical gaze and blocked its view, or 
possibly reflected back its own blinding light. He has taken an epistemological stance 
firmly against operationalizing and objectifying symptoms as signs of an objective 
disease under the rubric of psychiatry or psychology, at least as a general practice. The 
hermeneutic sense of knowing and unknowing challenges how clinicians perceive 
patients as patients, diagnoses, symptomologies, cases, or even individuals.  
Stern’s move is radical because it identifies even the physical grounding of 
psychological symptoms as a cultural construction. A way of summarizing this might be 
to say that a symptom can only be a sign of a cultural creation. Hermeneutically 
speaking, we are always back to context.  An internal “database of knowledge” 
(Zuckerman, 2005) cannot be the knowledge bank of an objectively vetted machine that 




is liberated from the fallibility of the human. Rather, it is a mixture of culture-bound 
traditions, personal experience, and contextual moments. In Foucault’s terms, our clinical 
knowledge is the result of a rigid training regimen that holds an expansionistic ability to 
add to itself (1965/1988, 1963/1994, 1975/1995). Stern’s critique of operationalism in 
psychology could also be applied to various applications of Information Technology and 
human processes. When a machine appears, we imagine objectivity. 
In psychotherapy outcome research, the findings that are even possible to obtain 
depend entirely on the measures employed. The simplest measure generally are 
the most reliable. Validity is a much more complicated question, largely because 
the question of validity plunges us right back into ethics. That is, a measure is 
valid for what purpose? Which meanings are allowed by any particular measure, 
and which others are foreclosed? There are no value-free measures. And so, 
understandably, the measures that are adopted in outcome research are often the 
relatively simple, reliable ones that encourage researches to believe the their 
results can be replicated. The validity of these measures, and especially the vexed 
question of what purposes a measure might be argued to serve, tends to get 
inadequate attention. (Stern, 2011b, p. 349) 
 
For Stern, then, moral understandings even in the most empirical of research as 
well as in psychotherapy, are inevitable. While he accepted that research produces 
necessary information for practice, he maintained that such information should be 
consulted rather than being privileged above other aspects of clinical work. In this view, 
“single, correct answers” (2011, p. 350) do not exist. A researcher’s decision, therefore, 
to choose one phenomenon over another “can be tantamount to favoring a particular 
position about the good life or the nature of what it is to be a human being” (2011, p. 
350). Interpretation is everywhere. To paraphrase Murakami, where there is interpretation 
there are implicit or explicit judgments that are both political and moral (see p. 34 of the 
present study). 




In fact, Stern appeared to question the kind of certainty implied by a 
correspondence between that which is clinically seen and a register of formulaic 
descriptions and orderly procedures. Cushman (1995) described the person as “an 
intersection many cultural and linguistic traditions” (p. 28). The use of “intersection” is 
important here, as opposed to cultural influence (Stern, 2003, p. 261, Note 4). It refers not 
to the influence of culture but to its very crossings. A mingling of cultures in this sense 
could be considered the third person in a three-person psychology (Cushman, 1995). 
Stern and Cushman may be precursors of intersectional concepts.  
If researchers in this way of thinking are forced to relinquish their claims to 
accessing a meaning that is somehow transcendent or one that holds greater validity 
because it reflects a claim to accurately representing a greater consensus, then what is 
left? We receive in return an openness to new forms of discourse, and hence new 
meanings. In accord with the psychodynamic tradition, Stern placed a high premium on 
ambiguity or the unknown. The value of uncertainty is not an abstract principle. 
Uncertainty is good because its maintenance allows multiple traditions to contribute in 
unexpected ways to the formulation of the unformulated. (2003, p. 28).  
For Stern even the carefully measured questions or assertions of the clinical gaze 
are subject to a certain unpredictability, a creativity and doubtless to including the gaps of 
which Freud had written (1915/1953).  For Stern: “Verbal reflective meaning is never 
pre-ordained, and therefore it is always ambiguous prior to its creation in each moment” 
(2003, p. 30). 
d. The clinical gaze requires individuals that are objects and operationalized. 
Does Stern’s theory, then, present the patient as an object of the psychoanalyst’s 




observatory powers? Does the patient become a part of the knowledge base of 
psychoanalysis, an object of its exercise of power? 
A large part of this question is removed by Stern and other RA writers in their 
fundamental shift from the classical therapeutic to a relational stance. It becomes greatly 
more difficult to locate a pathology once the essential unit, the patient as an enclosed 
subject, has been turned into an entity beyond even the well-defined element of an open 
system. That is, once a patient is no longer required to present as a bounded, masterful 
self (Cushman, 1990), the interaction between psychotherapist and patient becomes 
paramount if not the source of everything available within the psychotherapeutic practice. 
Once that perspective is reached, the notion of a clinician observing or hearing and 
recording symptoms, collecting signs, and assigning syndromes, has evaporated, as there 
is no clearly defined subject to harbor disease, no more container of invisible contents.  
In the objectification described by Foucault (1963/1994), the clinician’s side of 
the equation remains somehow separate, untouched and untainted by participation in the 
field. RA psychoanalysts appear to work under quite different assumptions, in a 
relationship that is far from operational. A step beyond Sullivan's participant observers 
(Sullivan, 1927), they are engaged within the field and, far from immune to being altered 
by a patient-object, the psychotherapist in RA thought is also subject to the patient’s very 
presence. Hoffman pointed out the “naive patient fallacy” (1983),which in Stern’s terms 
“assumes that any patient simply takes the psychoanalyst’s behavior at face value even 
while his own is continually scrutinized for the most subtle indications of unspoken 
unconscious meanings” (Stern, 2003 p. 205).  




Lest we hold onto vestiges of psychoanalytic authority, or even to a lower perch 
of objectivity for the psychoanalyst, Hoffman (1983) in a figurative sense switched tables 
on the classical role of the psychoanalyst, writing that the patient might just as easily be 
the interpreter of the clinician as the other way around (see also Aron, 1991). He has 
profiled expertise in psychoanalysis as, if anything, a moving target: “In some cases a 
patient with a particular ‘transference predisposition’ (a phrase that Racker uses that is 
comparable to the notion of schema) may guess something about the countertransference 
that most other independent judges would not have picked up.” (Hoffman, 1983, p. 410). 
There is an implicit notion here that personhood is everyone’s expertise. On the 
contrary to being disregarded or somehow set out of the patient’s perception, the 
psychoanalyst is as much under the patient’s gaze as much subject to the patient’s 
interpretation of him (the psychoanalyst), as the other way around. This is supported by 
Ogden’s ideas about the Analytic Third (Ogden, 1994), and the concomitant notion that 
we are mutually ignorant of important aspects of ourselves in relationship, and it also 
implies the contrary—that anyone may prove capable of great feats in relationship. There 
is a further dialogic principle at work here: that to understand anything at all, we really 
need each other. Stern has further joined this side of the “radical critique” suggesting a 
deprivileging of psychoanalytic technique. “It is only by learning about himself that the 
radical critic believes the analyst can learn about the patient” (Stern, 2003, p.205, 
[emphasis added]).  
In the interaction, then, the psychoanalyst places his gaze on the field and his own 
participation in it. According to Stern, “he continuously queries himself about his own 
participation” (2003, p. 205). Given the mutuality of participation, for Stern the 




psychoanalyst does not possess a pristine ability to rule on dysfunctional types of thought 
or behavior. Far from narcissistic or self-focused practice, this frequently involves a 
struggle for the psychoanalyst. One is reminded of the ambiguity in the title of Orange’s 
book, The Suffering Stranger (2011). 
The psychoanalyst remains, however, searching for anything that might indicate 
dissociation, either individual or mutual. This appears to involve an attention to affect, 
and to the private or mutual process, as much as to content. In Stern’s understandings 
about psychoanalysis there is a constant watch for rigidity of experience within the field 
(2003, 2010). With Stern’s form of RA, the Panopticon (Foucault, 1975/1995) has lost 
both the invisible observer and its centrality. There is a radically critical stance in the 
hermeneutic-analytic concern for process. 
The operationalism and objectification of the Panopticon also needs a dyad, or 
even a dichotomy of subject and object (Foucault, 1975/1995). The gaze (Foucault, 
1963/1994) in this context requires a patient and a psychoanalyst, and it produces an 
individual, which it also requires in order to produce knowledge. 
Stern’s two books (2003, 2010) present, then, an ambiguous stance on the 
existence of an individual, interior self. On the one hand, his writings have upheld the 
existence, or at least the importance of discussing, individual minds that are present in the 
interpersonal field. 
It is claimed by some that the interpersonal and relational views subjectivity has 
been eclipsed—that is, that the individual mind has been disappeared, leaving 
only the dyad. That simply is not the case. To recognize the role of the other in 
the selection of the conscious contents of one’s own mind is hardly synonymous 
with suggesting that one’s mind does not have its own, separate existence. Even 
the idea that the mind is distributed, a claim I make later . . . is perfectly 
consistent with individual subjectivity. Let me be as clear as possible about this 
point: the recognition of the influence of the other, even the recognition of the 




influence of the other on the contents of one’s own mind, does not imply for one 
moment the rejection of the individual mind. (Stern, 2010, pp. 7-8) 
 
Here, Stern unambiguously posited the existence of an individual mind, even if it 
remains the subject itself of some ambiguity. On the other hand, Stern wrote earlier in the 
same text (Partners in Thought):  
Yet it does seem to me that anyone who accepts the latent/manifest distinction, 
and who imagines each mind to be housed within a single skull, has to hold a 
different view of relatedness than I do. I know that even those analysts who take 
the most conservative position about transference—i.e., that it is a distortion 
based on the demands of the inner world—would readily accept that different 
transference configurations are uppermost at different times. [For such 
psychoanalysts] . . . context plays a significant role in analytic relatedness . . . . 
The truth exists in the unconscious and awaits discovery. (Stern, 2010, p. 6) 
 
Stern’s writings appear to have located the mind outside of any single brain, 
assumedly within an interpersonal field. On the other hand, Stern has maintained the 
existence of a private, interior experience (2003, 2010). It may not be equivalent to the 
individual brain organ, but the mind remains, to Stern, some kind of separate, individual 
entity. Stern would later write that “no theory of psychoanalysis can do without the 
individual mind” (2012a, p. 37). Stern’s theory therefore leaves a problematic ambiguity 
when defining individuality, selfhood, the brain, mind, and consciousness. What then of 
the notion of continuity and the self, and the traditionally psychodynamic figure of a 
personality? 
Stern has overtly sided with Harry Stack Sullivan’s dismissal of a “durable, 
unique, individual personality” (Sullivan, 1950/1971, p. 220) and with Sullivan’s 
emphatic, and still somehow surprising assertion that uniqueness of the self is “the 
mother of all illusions” (Stern, 2013, p. 148; Sullivan, 1938, p. 33).  




Trained as an Interpersonalist, Stern worked well along the path cleared by 
Sullivan. If, as Sullivan argued, personality is the sum total of interpersonal relations, 
then a clinical process can only be an incalculable mixture of interpersonal relating. Even 
the existence Stern’s subjectivity and the positing of the individual mind would be under 
question in a strictly Sullivanian vision, a question I take up in examining Stern’s theory 
of multiple self-states, in the second part of this Findings-Discussion section.  
A psychotherapeutic session, being nothing if not interpersonal, begins to belie 
the slightest possibility of a controlled experiment for even a multivariate outcome study 
at the highest level of computation. Relational psychotherapy starts to resemble an 
incalculable changing chaos consisting of the sum total of interpersonal experiences, 
ingredients brought together in a complexity worthy perhaps of poetic commentary or 
complex systems theorizing (Coburn, 2002, 2011), but unlikely to be resolved in a 
framework that is any more reductionist. This unpredictable, interpersonal combination 
thrown into a particular place at a unique time is reminiscent of Freud’s description of the 
id as a cauldron of “seething expectations” (1933/1989, p. 73) suggesting a session 
without the corralling impositions of ego or superego. In elucidating his theory of 
multiplicity, Stern’s used similarly lyrical language to picture these vastly unpredictable 
interpersonal relations: 
The resulting sets of interactions between our various selves and everyone else’s 
begin to seem quick, evanescent, and enormously complicated, a kind of crowd of 
selves whizzing hither and thither like fireflies on a summer night. This is the 
interpersonal field… booming and buzzing. (Stern, 2003, p. 153) 
 
It is possible that Freud’s Id as a cauldron of seething expectations could be 
substituted here for Stern’s theory of Unformulated Experience, the enormous, chaotic 
potential of our experience, as it draws from what Lacan called the Real or the Impossible 




(1961). In any case, through the RA focus on the interpersonal field the products of the 
clinical gaze have been robbed of their precise correspondences to other terms in the 
registry. The gaze itself has lost its objectivity, its claim to a universalist authority. 
Without the severing distinctions of subject and object, psychotherapist and patient, for 
Stern, what is left for the clinician to do? 
Stern’s answer appears to have emerged from hermeneutics. Paraphrasing 
Gadamer’s Truth & Method (1975/2004), Stern wrote that “time and place limit what we 
can know but in genuine conversation we can take those limits into account and 
occasionally transcend them” (2010, p. 26).  
This is a turn from Sartre’s humanism, in which this kind of going beyond oneself 
is inherent in individual consciousness, possibly its main function, accomplished with 
varying levels of awareness, courage, and success (Sartre, 1943). For Stern, what is 
received from the interpersonal field is of the interpersonal field. Interpersonal 
occurrence can change participants who are capable of engaging in a dialogue that is 
authentic, that is, in which each side is curious enough to be open to being altered by the 
other or by the interaction. Subjectivity can be changed, but only in a strong sense 
through dialogue.15 For Stern, dialogue indeed is the location of much if not all of 
therapeutic change.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Note that, as with Ogden’s Analytic Third, in Stern the necessary dialogue for change 
often includes conversations with oneself. For Stern, as with Winnicott, the 
internalization of parents who listened to the self during infancy is elemental to child 
development. For Stern, a perception of early witnessing of the self by the parents is a 
prerequisite for the capacity to witness, another necessary quality in psychotherapy. 
Moreover, self-talk for Stern is essential for the development of personality. “Children 
talk to themselves in cribs. They are forming a self” (Stern, 2010, p. 133).  This very 
expansive view of dialogue may be basic to relational thought as an explanatory theory. It 
presents, however, various problems. Could, for example, Freud’s historically unique 




Finding oneself limited by time and place may be disappointing to clinicians used 
to being privy to universalisms about human nature plotted to transcend culture and time. 
It can be hard to relinquish what could be called the Cartesian Paraclete of Reason, a 
mental agency that lives ethereally beyond all context and which offers the hope of 
cutting through all the illusion of ever-changing context. In Stern’s epistemology, the 
power wielded by psychotherapy seems to lie in a certain humility and a disciplined 
attention to context: “It is worth preserving our humility and our capacity to be skeptical 
of this great reflective capacity of ours. The power of language exists only in its own 
little context.” (2003, p. 26).  
A second way that this theory poses an objection to the supposed penetration and 
naming of fact, and therefore the invention of objects that can be operationalized by the 
medical gaze, is through Stern’s giving primacy to language. Stern has adopted the 
hermeneutic assumption that language constitutes us. Such constitution is an ongoing 
process, suggesting a fluid sense of identity and self, which we will examine later. Again, 
explicating Gadamer’s philosophy, Stern wrote:  
The concept of an exclusive method, prescribing how knowledge is to be 
determined—is legitimate only so long as what is learned is separate from the one 
who learns it. If the truth is separate, the question of the best way to approach it is 
a logical one. But if truth is the outcome of the grasp of being in language, there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
self-analysis be repeated, given a sufficiently courageous or articulate sense of self? (This 
resembles certain Buddhist notions of the essential, for individual strength, what the 
Japanese call jiriki, or self-striving [自力 ], a necessity to reach enlightenment). What of 
schizophrenics who appear constantly to be talking to themselves? Could what we 
imagine to be incoherent speech actually be the equivalent of a relational psychotherapy, 
a conversation with oneself in place? Consider that for Sullivan (1953/1997) denial of the 
need for cultural exchange was of the greatest of all human sufferings. How do we 
distinguish between a self-talk that is dialogic by Stern’s definition (2003) and that which 
could be construed as an act of self-perpetuating social isolation? Lastly, to what degree 
does an individual have control over what she says to herself (full control, of course, 
suggesting an end to all authentic dialogue; zero control connoting total gibberish)? 




cannot be a superior way to accomplish it, because one cannot escape being part 
of the event one wants to capture. One method cannot be recommended over 
others…. The conscious application of a method can never result in revelation. 
(Stern, 2013, p. 209) 
 
Contrary to the reification or the fixing of biographical information as dictated by 
Foucault’s Panopticon, and running counter to the operationalism of an object productive 
of knowledge, Stern suggested that language both fixes us and creates a world, one that 
holds the potential for constant surprise. This contradiction between a language that fixes 
us in old meanings and that also holds the possibility of new meanings, comes from 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1975/2004):  
Every experience worthy of its name thwarts an expectation . . . . Insight is more 
than the knowledge of this or that situation. It always involves an escape from 
something that had deceived us and held us captive. Thus insight always involves 
an element of self-knowledge. . . . Insight is something we come to.” (Gadamer, 
1975/2004, p. 350). 
 
This radical turn would suggest that an over-reliance on fixed language such as is 
registered in the Clinician’s Thesaurus (2005), or the acute recording of therapeutic 
experience against a preordained diction, is in effect a denial of the kind of experience 
that brings about clinical change or even greater understanding of the clinical encounter.  
Understanding, in the Gadamerian tradition (1975/2004), may arise out of previous 
knowledge but it cannot be synonymous with it. More than a rebuke of the subject-object 
dichotomy, this linguistic approach urges clinicians to do constant battle with their own 
previous understandings and to be on the watch for signs of self-deceit, veiled ideology 
or linguistically taking the easy way out. Such a psychotherapy suggests that, far from the 
architecture of fixed observation as suggested by the Panopticon, psychoanalysis is more 
of a literary or artistic process. Wrote Stern, “psychoanalysts love the forms experience 
can take as critics love art” (2003, p. 90).  




The focus on psychotherapy as an art form may appear to be a frivolous 
abandoning of rigor here. For Stern, it encompasses the inescapable reality of ourselves 
being co-constructed in relationship.  
Because language provides the medium in which our meanings and we ourselves 
are constantly being constructed, there is therefore a spontaneity to psychotherapy, and 
perhaps most of human activity, in our experience. The opposite of proposing the fixed 
and measured language of the clinical gaze, and the operation of a bias-free force upon a 
passive object, this theory begins from a categorically different tenet: that life is an act of 
meaning creation that occurs in the world of our surround. Stern answered the question of 
how we understand things about our patients. This is an important question 
hermeneutically, because it also involves the hermeneutic circle and further ideas about 
what psychotherapy is offering to the patient. Stern wrote: 
It seems then, that knowing we author even the most startling of our own thoughts 
does nothing to demystify the common experience of merely recording them. 
Even if we sense glimmers, we do not know with any clarity or certainty the 
articulate meanings of these glimmers will assume when they attain a firmer 
shape. We have no choice but to wait for what the following moment will reveal. 
Quite literally, we do not know what we will think next. Thoughts, images, and 
feelings come to us; they arrive; one feels like a conduit. (Stern, 2003, p. 73)  
 
This implies a creativity in language that constitutes our subjectivity. Attempts to 
objectify the patient and to imagine sufficient distance on the part of the psychoanalyst to 
do so, in my view, assume a demeaning conceptualization of the patient. The naive 
patient fallacy implies a patient who does hold onto any personal observing powers that 
could be motivated by anxiety. In other words, a wholly naive patient would experience 
in relationship no need to observe the other and would therefore have to be either an 
ultimate narcissist or to be stripped of the anxiety which Sullivan has maintained 




(1953/1994) is inevitable for relationship and personality. Alternately, one could imagine 
a patient who was ultimately cut off from the rest of humanity. The arguments of how we 
could envision a patient not affected by, and not affecting the psychotherapist quickly 
become ad absurdum, and it is an intriguing question as to what kind of society would 
dream up such degrees of interpersonal alienation. 
From Stern’s RA perspective, language fixes us within our past traditions. 
Language also offers the possibility of a constantly new creation out of the interplay of 
traditions within each moment’s contextual surround. The goal of Stern’s psychoanalysis 
is far from an operational one. 
Foucault saw the Inquisition as the commencement of practices that developed 
into the juridical or scientific investigation. Inquisitorial process includes a large 
consultation of professionals the truth, a verbal and physical probing for signs, exchanges 
of different perspectives based on expertise. It culminates in the confession. To 
extrapolate, in this process the confession is given as evidentiary basis post hoc in the 
form of a sacrifice (auto-da-fé). For Foucault, therefore, all clinical activity, even 
psychotherapy, can be linked to the creation of a problematic individual, with a historical 
connection to inquisitorial practice:  
All the great movements of extension that characterize modern penalty—the 
problematicization of the criminal behind his crime, the concern with a 
punishment that is a correction, a therapy, a normalization, the division of the act 
of judgment between various authorities that are supposed to measure, assess, 
diagnose, cure, transform individuals—all this betrays penetration of the 
disciplinary examination into the judicial inquisition. (Foucault, 1975/1995,  
p. 228)  
 
As we seek therapeutic change and as we seek to observe the individual, we are 
participating in practices that hold some residue of inquisitorial events of centuries ago. 




After every session, if we are in compliance with the law, we record progress notes, that 
is, we register clinical facts about our patients in role as “experts in normality” extending 
and adding to Foucault’s “functions of the judge” (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 228).  
Foucault was not the only one to write of the clinician entering what had been 
formerly juridical terrain. Zola wrote:  “Medicine is becoming a major institution of 
social control, nudging aside, if not incorporating, the more traditional institutions of 
religion and law” (1972, p. 487).  
Zola described medicine’s movement into areas of power outside its traditional 
province. He wrote of the medical “retention of near absolute access to certain ‘taboo’ 
areas” (1972, p. 495). 
My contention is that if anything can be shown in some way to effect the 
workings of the body and to a lesser extend the mind, then it can be labelled an 
‘illness’ itself or jurisdictionally ‘a medical problem.’ In a sheer statistical sense, 
the import of this is especially great if we look at only four such problems—
ageing [sic], drug addiction, alcoholism and pregnancy [sic] (Zola, 1972, p. 495)  
 
By extension, the billions of people living on earth are all potentially subject to 
such conditions and are therefore at least conceptually within the reach of the 
surveillance of Western medical observation. Health becomes infinitely expansive and 
expandable. For Zola, the search for a good life—a promise of the American dream and a 
by-product of Westernization—cannot be decoupled from a “belief in the omnipresence 
of disorder” (p. 498). 
I at least have finally been convinced that living is injurious to health. This 
remark is not made as facetiously as it may sound. But rather every aspect of our 
daily life has in it elements of risk to health. These facts take on a particular 
importance not only when health becomes a paramount value in society, but also a 
phenomenon whose diagnosis and treatment has been restricted to a certain group. 
For this means that that group, perhaps unwittingly, is in a position to exercise 
great control and influence about what we should and should not do to attain that 
‘paramount value,’ (Zola, 1972, p. 498) 





Zola has related the encroachment of health into other, formerly separate areas of 
life, to economic forces and determinations of value. As has been noted, it is likely that 
patients described in Stern’s analytic vignettes are also among the group with financial 
access to medical solutions. For Zola, this recent invasion of social terrain by health is an 
“insidious and undramatic phenomenon” (1972, p. 487). Rather than by conscious, 
hegemonic actions, Zola attributed that cause to “our increasingly complex technological 
and bureaucratic system” (p. 487). This was in the early 1970s. 
Illich too, saw great danger in the bureaucratization of medical practice. He went 
further, declaring that “the medical establishment has become a major threat to health” 
(1976/1995, p. 3). For Ilich, medical authority has disarmed the majority. “The disabling 
impact of professional control over medicine has reached the proportions of an epidemic” 
(p. 3). For Illich, health in human beings qualifies both aesthetic and political actions. 
Historically, medical technology and administration has taken over the autonomy of a 
formerly healthy population, much the way highways, freeways, and traffic congestion 
took over cities, privileging machines and materials over human feet. For Illich, the 
medical and paramedical monopoly holds sway not only over who is able to practice 
medicine but also over exactly how it is to be practiced, including both hygienic 
methodology and technology. Modern medical practice has thus robbed individuals of 
autonomy in health care and in other areas that pertain in different societies to spirituality 
and other nonmedical practices. For Illich, modern medical doctors hold control over 
priestly functions. At the same time, he observed, the physician had “abandoned his role 
as moralist and assumed that of enlightened entrepreneur” (p. 120).  




Mutual enactments through anxiety and the ritual of healthcare. It is 
noteworthy that one of past five years’ most popular and award winning television shows, 
Breaking Bad (Gilligan & Johnson, 2008-2013) is an American outlaw tale. The story 
enacts a painful fact of life in the U.S. of the last thirty years: The privilege of placing 
oneself under the medical gaze has an increasingly devastating socioeconomic effect on 
America’s middle-class families. At the center of this television series is a perhaps 
ironically named Walter White, a middle-aged, Caucasian high school chemistry teacher 
diagnosed with late-stage lung cancer. White has a teenage son with Multiple Sclerosis, 
his wife is pregnant, and he is utterly determined to provide a basic middle class future 
for his family, even posthumously. By the strange logic of the modern era, he turns to 
manufacturing meth-amphetamines in order to assure his family’s future and to pay off 
mounting medical bills.  
 As he consults with, and submits to a growing cadre of specialists and surgeons, 
White falls into increasingly brilliant and risky tactics to assure his family’s security. As 
his actions become ever more horrific, he and those around him also engage in hugely 
creative acts of denial and dissociation. Perhaps fitting for contemporary America, 
rationalization, denial, and dissociation seem to be the fabric of this tale. Amphetamines 
are cooked and distributed through a franchise of chicken restaurants. In one scene, the 
protagonist’s wife explains away her husband’s growing involvement with drug 
production and murder stating that he is simply human. Citing the popular psychological 
self-help books, New Yorker film critic Emily Nussbaum (2012) described many 
spectators’ anodyne reactions to the violence portrayed in this series as “a Chicken Soup 




for the Sociopath Soul.”16 In other words, as White loses control, the genius chemist 
responds to his dread and terror with ever more actions aimed at gaining greater control, 
both financially and over anyone near him—and audiences nationwide seem to 
sympathize with him. Anxiety that seems to be fueled by momentary relief, control and 
loss of control may be the only constants in the storyline of this television series.  
The acclaim and popularity of this show is likely related to its depiction of a 
particular, contemporary way of being in North America, when anything hints of 
mortality (Becker, 1973).  Outside of the very wealthy, Americans’ growing interest in 
notions of health coincides with a rise in potential for personal loss in the context of 
healthcare. Medical bills now lead as a cause of bankruptcies in the U.S. (Himmelstein, et 
al., 2007).  In present-day America, health as a concept and health care as practice and 
industry, have joined with a pervasive social anxiety (Crawford, 2004). While this 
confluence may represent a collective technological battle for stronger bodies, a happier 
lifestyle, and against mortality, it also brings along toxic psychological and socially 
isolating sequelae (Comaroff, 1982; Crawford, 2004, 2006; Zola, 1972).  
Psychotherapists now find themselves in the midst of treating patients embroiled 
with institutional conflicts over health care. Counselors, then, must strangely address 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In the same review, Nussbaum reported fellow television watchers denying that the 
protagonist had poisoned a child in a certain episode in which the act was evident. She 
wrote of subsequent Internet postings that justified the outlaw hero’s actions. Nussbaum 
attributed such justification to television viewers being conditioned to privileging “the 
fun of masculine adventure” (Nussbaum, 2012). As in many outlaw tales, this antihero 
could be interpreted as functioning to relieve anxiety and resultant feelings of aggression, 
that Americans share, here about a health system in chaos. The dramatic hero-villain 
functions to carry out impulses that are disowned but communally experienced, and it 
offers a glimmer of resistance against a sense of collective helplessness engendered by a 
hypocritical system of healthcare. This is the story of a gangster driven to take over, and 
ultimately to be sacrificed by our collective, medicalized Angst. 




client fears while either confronting or colluding with healthcare management systems 
themselves (Cushman, 2000; Cushman & Gilford, 1999). This occurs in therapeutic 
sessions that may require complex economic transactions on either side, and it all takes 
place in the light of each other’s mortality. If, as claimed by Stigliano (1989), becoming 
socialized involves becoming the interpretations society makes of us when we embody 
certain social practices, then being a conscientious psychotherapist today is fraught with 
powerful oppositions. 
The ability of healthcare issues to force families into long-term financial distress 
is not to be discounted. The stresses come, perhaps somewhat ironically, to a society that 
puts enormous energy, thought, and significance behind its notions of health.  
The concept and practice of looking after health has long been an important 
preoccupation for Americans. Health (Comaroff, 1982) is the site in different societies, 
where the sacred is challenged as a way to return the relationship between the natural and 
the social to a state of order. In secular America, in addition to economic costs 
(Crawford, 2000), the state or at least appearance of being healthy has achieved a nearly 
sacred status. Being healthy keeps us busy, as can be witnessed by fads of exercise 
boutiques, yoga schools, massage studios, coaches, and nutritional-medicinal services in 
U.S. cities. Health for Americans involves long-term fine-tuning and regular  
self-discipline. Such values receive great force in a society with Protestant roots that 
upholds hard work, will-power, and self-betterment as visible signs of being closer to 
God (Crawford, 1994; Weber, 1905/2001).  Being healthy has become a requisite for 
work, as essential, visible evidence that an individual is responsible and compliant 
(Crawford, 2004), and as assurance to employers that the worker is able to contend in an 




increasingly competitive marketplace (Crawford, 2006).  During the modernization of the 
U.S. and Europe, a healthy self came to denote a sense of freedom, “what it meant to be 
modern, progressive, rational, and distinctive” (Crawford, 1994, p. 1349). Distinction in 
America has long been tied to having status in bourgeois society, and health has also been 
emblematic of being middle class in America (Crawford, 2006).    
Ill health carries with it social risks, a sign of lacking certain virtues.  
It has been proposed that those unwilling to help themselves by engaging in 
health-promoting behavior (exercising, eating the right food in moderation, and 
refraining from smoking and excessive drinking) must bear the costs not only 
morally but also financially in terms of more expensive insurance premiums. 
(Guttmacher, 1979, p.19)  
 
Being healthy in the contemporary U.S. is often a mantle of the American Dream. 
The appearance of health demonstrates that a person entertains a certain amount of social 
freedom and has access to the good life: 
In medical culture, health has become the secular salvation of a society that either 
does not believe in the eternal life or makes it a mere residual to the incarnated 
one, a society for which this one-and-only life becomes everything. Health is 
conceived as the condition for the possibility for the good life or even the good 
life itself. Health seekers look to the start of medical knowledge for the secret of 
delaying the final destination; but also for something more: the key to a life free 
of illness, pain, or suffering. (Crawford, 2006, p. 404) 
 
The rise in endorphins after a good workout does more than cause muscular 
relaxation and a sense well-being. In America, fitness offers a valuation of the self that is 
hard to come by elsewhere. To appear healthy can amount to earning a mark of being 
among society’s prized, a “social cynosure” (Crawford, 2006, p. 404). A 19th Century   
American morality that was based on hard labor (Cushman, 1995) was in many ways 
replaced by an emphasis on consumerism, and this led to a prominence of virtues related 




to salesmanship and celebrity culture. In this culture qualities such as personal magnetism 
and attractiveness took on enormous value.  
The fame of the well-conditioned, athletic star today dovetails with a notion of 
health offering a personal celebrity-like look that is continuously messaged as obtainable 
even for the average citizen, an almost evangelistic “you-can-do-it too” attitude which is 
perpetuated by the mass media and drifts into private life. From a legal standpoint, to 
become a citizen of the United States is to have had one’s health certified by a civil 
surgeon (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2012).  The applicant for 
citizenship must swear to two conditions attributed to a healthy lifestyle: to be neither 
“prostitute” nor a “habitual drunkard” (p. 8).  Being healthy has become an essential 
mark of responsibility, and hence, upright citizenship in America:  
Personal responsibility for health is widely considered the sine qua non of 
individual autonomy and good citizenship. Individuals are expected to acquire 
medical knowledge. Large numbers of people eagerly seek out health information, 
and the media oblige them in devoting extensive coverage of health matters and in 
offering advice on a variety of health concerns. (Crawford, 2006, p. 402) 
 
As maintained by Illich (1976/1995), health has a way in America of filling in 
spaces that are commonly held by the political, the moral, and the spiritual. Given its 
locus as a site for competing forces, and for attentions that range from the 
microbiological, to the corporate, institutional, and political, and to matters of individual 
spirituality (Crawford, 2006; Ilich, 1976/1995), questions of health are central to 
understanding present-day U.S. culture. As patients come into psychotherapy with a 
nexus of concerns over conflicting definitions of health, how any psychotherapy 
approaches this subject requires thoughtful examination. 




Crawford has given particular attention to harmful effects (2004, 2006) of 
contemporary American health culture. He has suggested (2006) that in present-day 
neoliberal society, in an economy that has for decades put the majority into a state of 
downward economic mobility, the preoccupation with health offers a Sisyphean exercise 
for control over both identity and situation. To the bounded, self-contained individual, 
health practices offer the dream of continuing a separate, highly individualistic lifestyle 
while also maintaining a social demonstration of power and control. In Crawford’s view, 
this “solution for political inefficacy” (Crawford, 2006, p. 416) is actually a failing 
proposition: “the alarm raised about the condition to be prevented remains while the 
pathway to increased protection becomes uncertain” (Crawford, 2006, p. 416). This 
failure occurs not only because it involves a denial of the ideology behind modern-day 
health practices, that is, of a misplacement of political aims into a highly personalized 
and therefore isolated practice. For Crawford, the disproportionate apprehension of health 
concerns as compared to their solutions furthermore lies in the powerful production of 
knowledge destined to bury even the best of remedies carried out on an individual level. 
Good citizens or not, Americans are bombarded with health knowledge that constantly 
offers new information on threats and new requisites to address them.  
This all occurs in a scientistic context in which all knowledge is expansive and 
replaceable (Foucault, 1975/1995). Crawford has put this succinctly: 
The pursuit of health cannot provide the sense of control that the ideology of 
individual responsibility requires. The health-conscious individual cannot or will 
not keep pace with the prolific demands of medically determined safety and 
cannot escape the knowledge of the gap between what is required for health and 
what can be achieved. Thus, working on the self by working on the body’s health 
cannot deliver the symbolic assurance needed to offset either anxieties about the 
dangers of a toxic society or the deepening insecurities of contemporary 
American life. (Crawford, 2006, p. 416) 





Health, then, becomes a ritual aimed at the management of anxiety, in a battle 
waged on a “porous border” between lifestyle choices and a toxic society. Crawford has 
pinpointed an important contradiction in medical culture, between the massive absorption 
of knowledge and the generation of anxiety. 
The continuing expansion of knowledge about health hazards, the informational 
deluge, the frequent exaggerations of risk and insatiable consumption of medical 
news, all framed by the professional and lay mandate to protect and improve 
health, aggravate the very insecurities they are designed to quell. A pedagogy of 
danger is combined with a pedagogy of recommended practices in a spiral of 
control > anxiety > control > anxiety. The more knowledge acquired, the larger is 
the gap between the perception of danger (real or imagined) and the efficacy of 
action (individual, institutional, or governmental). The attempt to control the 
conditions of health point to all that remains undone or undoable. (Crawford, 
2006, pp. 415-416) 
 
It is likely that certain psychological theories of the self and of psychotherapy do 
play a part in this spiral of control and anxiety. How, then, does Stern’s psychoanalysis 
(2003, 2010), with its interpersonal roots, its dialogical approach, and its attention to 
covert ideology, work in a social surround of health consciousness and frequent personal 
failure to achieve the American health ideal? I examine Stern’s writings through three 
queries related to contemporary sociological thinking about health: 
 
Questions 
1. How does Stern’s psychoanalysis relate to the American health ritual? 
2. Does Stern’s psychoanalysis address economic concerns that compound 
Americans’ health anxiety? 
3. If the American way of health is often productive of anxiety, what is Stern’s 
approach to treating anxiety?  Does it add to Crawford’s (2006) cycle of  




control > anxiety > control, or does it address these issues in a different way?  
Q 1. How does Stern’s psychoanalysis relate to the American health ritual? 
At first glance, it appears undeniable that psychoanalysis plays a historical role in both 
the provision of health services and as a form of ritual. In RA thinking, the 
psychoanalytic relationship is mutual and asymmetrical (Aron, 1991). The two 
participants are assumed to be of relatively equal status, but RA involves a business 
transaction, generally fixed meeting times and lengths of sessions, and an agreement to 
focus on the problems of the patient. Even the arrangement of furniture suggests the 
asymmetry of this relationship and is in itself the creation of a ritualized space (Hoffman, 
1998; Winnicott, 1958). This shaping is based upon the needs of the patient, in order to 
provide a focus such that the psychoanalytic hour be spent on the patient’s concerns. The 
psychoanalyst brings the discourse back to patient issues. Even when material that 
appears to be irrelevant, the psychoanalyst may examine her own, often private musings 
for any relevance to the patient’s treatment (e.g., Bion, 1962; Ferro, 2002; Ogden, 1994). 
For Stern, the psychoanalyst may recount to the patient how the patient came to a given 
interpretation “but this is done because that will help the patient to see the interpretation 
in the patient’s own frame of reference” (Stern, 2003, p. 175). To paraphrase Stern, the 
partnership in thought is a partnership in thinking largely about the patient, whatever 
form that may take.  
As such, Stern’s psychoanalytic therapy is mapped on healthcare, both socially 
and by the frame which is requisite for its functioning as psychoanalysis per se. Stern’s 
theory does not propose any deviation from this mode of practice.  




For thinkers located in or near the RA tradition (e.g., Altman, 2002; Modell, 
1990; Ringstrom, 2001; Stern, 2003; Winnicott, 1953, 1958, 1971/2005), the 
psychoanalytic space is also one in which play is central. The connection between play 
and psychoanalysis is an observation often traced to Winnicott’s work with children. For 
Winnicott (1971/2005), play was not an element that was introduced into psychoanalysis, 
but the reverse was true. The psychoanalytic approach inevitably called for play.  
It is play that is universal, and that belongs to health: playing facilitates growth 
and therefore health; playing leads into group relationships; playing can be a form 
of communication in psychotherapy; and, lastly, psychoanalysis has been 
developed as a highly specialized form of playing in the service of 
communication with oneself and others. (Winnicott, 1971/2005, p. 56) 
 
Stern described something similar to play, when writing on “curiosity and creative 
disorder” (2003, p. 77). For Stern, curiosity is essential for the psychoanalyst, and, in rare 
moments of teleological description, increased curiosity appears as desired goal for 
patients. In Stern’s theory, 
The ideal patient and the ideal analyst are curious about everything, and to be 
curious requires the toleration of uncertainty. Curiosity preserves the attitude by 
which unformulated experience is maintained as creative disorder. In these terms, 
psychoanalysis is the progressive awakening of curiosity, a movement from 
familiar chaos to creative disorder. (Stern, 2003, p. 77) 
 
The psychoanalytic ritual, then, holds a paradoxical quality. It is framed in a 
regular returning to the familiar (three to four sessions per week, of a fixed duration, in a 
set place, and so on). The psychoanalytic session also holds to an almost anthropologico-
religious respect for letting in the world of chaos, making space for the unspoken, the 
taboo (Freud, 1913/1950), to the degree that Modell would assert that the session offered 
a demarcated space that provides an illusory experience (Modell, 1991).  




The comfort of the analytic ritual, however, involves frequent challenges. “Patient 
and analyst create expectations in interaction with each other, and in response to these 
expectations, and it is then the most significant task of the analysis to discover them” 
(Stern, 2003, p. 243) For Stern, this frame involves the ability to examine unformulated 
experience in a way that is relatively unrestrained. Stern described curiosity as “allowing 
oneself to make constructions” (2003, p.77). Far from a laissez-faire, laziness of the 
imagination, Stern defined this openness as an active capacity.  
It means that rather than employ a focused beam of attention, a searchlight to look 
for things in experience, which in one way or another usually seems to result in 
conventionalizing, one allows the possibilities implicit in experience to impress 
themselves on one’s consciousness. One takes one’s hand off the tiller and lets 
what Schachtel (1959) calls ‘global attention and perception’ drift as it will. When 
an interesting construction begins to form itself of this preattentive material, one 
may stop and perform a more focused search on and around this construction to 
fill in the details and give it the convincing quality Freud (1934/1982) knew it had 
to have to be useful. (Stern, 2003, p. 78) 
 
This “allowing the possibilities of implicit in experience to impress themselves on 
one’s consciousness” (Stern, 2003, p. 78) holds, as an ideal, free association, a process 
that makes up much of psychoanalysis. Inquiry about what appears through the 
associative process appears to comprise the other significant part of Stern’s 
psychoanalysis. For Stern, as the patient and psychoanalyst are able to come up with new, 
convincing constructions regarding the patient’s experience, the session will inevitably 
hold an element of surprise, pulling in new understandings.  
Effective surprise marks the symbolization of unformulated experience, the 
creative use of language, the flowering of explicit meaning. The formulation of 
experience is a mystery: it belongs to us more truly than anything we own, but we 
do not control it. It decides for itself when to occur. It provokes in us the feeling 
of recognition, the shock of recognition, because we have seen its outlines 
before—in parataxic, amorphous, felt form, in our feelings of tendency. And yet 
we may become aware of this feeling of prior acquaintance only in the moment of 
its transformation, its disappearance. We feel as if we had been looking through 




poorly focused binoculars without realizing it. Somehow the adjustment is made, 
and suddenly and unexpectedly, the view leaps out at us in fine detail. In just this 
way, by creating between them a world of thought and curiosity, patient and 
analyst rescue unformulated experience from the oblivion of the familiar. (Stern, 
2003, p. 79). 
 
Stern’s psychoanalysis works as a form of ritual, as does any psychoanalysis. It 
pertains to a particular space and it is practiced in generally set ways at specified times. 
The pre-determined, asymmetrical relationship is ritualistic, as well. Roles are defined 
between psychoanalyst and patient and a breach in those roles is considered a breach in 
propriety that threatens the praxis.  
What is said in sessions, however, appears to unscript any sign of the ritual. The 
frame of psychoanalysis may have all the orthodoxy of a religious ceremony. The 
process, however, appears to be without sacrament, and it seems to transcend the rules of 
any text. Unlike other psychotherapies, psychoanalysis suspects the formulaic and veers 
towards the non-directive. This appears to be another dimension in which Stern has 
travelled in the opposite direction of medical orthodoxy and has driven his 
psychoanalytic theory towards a language of freedom.  
Throughout Stern’s writings (2003, 2010) is to be found a strong suspicion of any 
kind of pretensions to prediction and to any typology of analytic prescription. There is a 
constant examining acceptance of the possibility of play and spontaneity entering the 
psychoanalytic relationship, both to provide material for reflection and as a way of 
experiencing the new within the familiar. Notions of health here appear to pertain to 
decreasing the rigidity of experience, while ideas implied in the American conception of 
health—autonomy, class-consciousness, belonging, will-power, and so on—are up for 
discussion in the psychoanalytic hour. Implicit American values of health are available to 




reflection, questioning, and resistance, rather than being implicitly enforced in Stern’s 
theory of RA. 
Q 2. Does Stern’s psychoanalysis address economic concerns that compound 
to Americans’ health anxiety? Stern’s writings appear to eschew questions that are 
economic in nature. The patients in all but one of the vignettes in his two books are 
described as being “professionals” and one of patient appears to have been sufficiently 
well-off to have taken a long hiatus in his professional work, in order to explore his life in 
nonvocational ways. The geographical location of Stern’s practice in uptown Manhattan 
would suggest a clientele that is upper middle class to economically elite. Unlike some 
but few RA writers (e.g., Altman, 2009) Stern has not written specifically about free or 
community clinics or the treatment of marginalized populations. If we can draw any 
conclusions from this data, it is that Stern may have addressed economic inequalities in a 
practical way through occasional reduced-fee or pro bono cases but he did not include 
these questions in his discussions of theory or technique. There is, as in much of 
psychoanalytic writing, relatively little examination of socioeconomic disparity or 
clinical material.17 
Q 3. If the American way of health is often productive of anxiety, what is 
Stern’s approach to treating anxiety and does it add to Crawford’s cycle of control 
> anxiety > control, or does it address the issue in a different way? Stern has been 
well-placed to propose a theory that involves questions of anxiety. His training was 
largely in Sullivan’s interpersonal theory. For Sullivan, the very development of much of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Clear exceptions to this are Muriel Dimen (2012) who directly addressed clinical 
meanings of financial exchange in the dyad, and Lynne Layton, who has directly taken on 
questions of the political, of gender identity, and the effects of neoliberal policy on 
psychoanalysis (2004, 2010a, 2013). 




personality, “the self system” is a function of efforts to ward off anxiety by adjusting 
within relationships with others (Sullivan, 1954, 1956/1973). “The chief handicap to 
communication” Sullivan maintained, “is anxiety.” (Sullivan, 1954, p. 217).   
Anxiety here is that which attacks one’s self esteem, especially in regard to 
another person who is held as being significant. Sullivan’s view was mostly oriented to 
the dyadic clinical interview. That said, in both Sullivan’s theory and in contemporary 
writings on healthcare (Crawford, 2004, 2006), anxiety is seen as impacting a person’s 
sense of well-being and their identity, their patterns of relating. The antihero of the T.V. 
series Breaking Bad (Gilligan & Johnson, 2008-2013) is seen in constant moments of 
battle to regain his sense of integrity. The premise of this show is in fact anxiety and the 
destruction of human relationship in the economics and ethics of modern American 
healthcare. 
A health thinking as something that far transcends mere biological practice could 
be said frequently to involve questions of self-esteem, communication, and anxiety as 
Sullivan theorized about these (1953/1994). Sullivan made the distinction between fear, 
as a response to something actually occurring, and anxiety (responses to a more subtle, 
less conscious experience of an attack on the self-system [see Sullivan, 1953/1997, 1954, 
1956/1973]). Medical procedures may inspire fear. However, in the modern medical 
world and its concept of health, questions of control and issues around self-esteem, all 
carry Sullivan’s second type, incipient anxiety. A major drop in economic circumstances 
as well as damage to one’s appearance or functioning due to medical procedures are 
bound to transform the anxiety-influenced self-system as described by Sullivan.  




In Sullivan’s theory (1953/1997) relationships with caregivers from an early age 
help to develop aspects of personality, as the person adjusts to anxiety in the 
interpersonal field. Anxiety and the interpersonal realm then determines important 
aspects (interpersonal patterns) of the self from early on. Experiences that are marked by 
important figures early in life become part of the self-system or self-dynamism. Other 
experiences not so highly charged flow on, unnoticed.  
For Sullivan, anxiety, then, is a major force in determining who we are and how 
we experience the world and ourselves. In Sullivan’s description, anxiety is also a highly 
creative force. Stern (2003) diverged from Sullivan, maintaining that the interpersonal 
field is determined by more than just anxiety. However, for Stern a great amount of what 
is allowed to come into consciousness is determined by the management of anxiety, that 
is, through Sullivan’s selective inattention. A common response to anxiety is simply not 
to attend to its presence, to dissociate it. 
In Stern’s writings, the notion that we can control our attention, what comes into 
awareness, and therefore the limitations imposed on us by anxiety, is an empty hope. By 
necessity, attention must be selective, and anxiety often determines what will be 
dissociated. 
We take for granted our inability to force self-understanding. But we can depend 
more reliably on our capacity to grasp what is transpiring between ourselves and 
the other person in a relationship because we do not have the power to decide 
these things for ourselves. (Stern, 2003, p. 102) 
 
There is a kind of paradox in relationship. In being with the other, one has the 
hope of finding a shift in one’s knowing. One requires the surprise of interactions with 
others to push selective attention out of certain habitual places. 




In this sense, Stern’s thinking appears to offer one response, at least in its ideals, 
to the anxiety production found in Crawford’s (2006) delineation of an accelerating cycle 
of control>anxiety>control under the American episteme of health. Stern’s ideas and way 
of practicing offer an alternative to the operationalized hope of medical informationalism 
and procedure. Rather than presenting herself as a source of knowledge, the 
psychoanalyst aims to become a partner in not-knowing, in order to bring to light or 
relationship something new. For Stern, unbidden responses held the great potential to 
provide authentic responses that can bring about significant changes in experiencing. 
Stern warned that the unbidden could bring formulations moved by ideological power 
with all of its ramifications of genderism, racism, oppression, and so on. “Unbidden 
perceptions . . . are not only the most authentic experiences we have, they also express 
the unconscious workings of power” (Stern, 2003, p. 81). 
Despite the search for access to a way of being that might be somehow liberated 
from the social forces that have locked the struggle for health into a position that may be 
as damaging socially as it is helpful, psychoanalysis remains a site, if a playful one, of 
serious conflict. Stern’s theory involves maintaining the skepticism that was also to be 
found in Freud’s original method. 
Therefore, the curiosity or freedom of thought I am proposing as the guiding 
value for psychoanalysis—the kind of curiosity that expects obstructions at every 
step of the way and is commodious enough to encompass even the things we do 
not want to know—is an ideal. It is well worth aiming at, but it should not be 
mistaken for a goal that is really achievable. . . . Effective surprise in 
psychoanalysis must be tempered with consciously directed, highly informed 
reflection about psychoanalytic participation in power operations. The analysis of 
what comes naturally must be supplemented by the analysis of what does not. 
(Stern, 2003, p. 81) 
 




Stern’s writings do not offer a direct response to the kind of anxiety that is 
engendered in the health care debate or in the plethora of mass media with its  
ever-increasing rules and surveillance of behavior in the name of health preservation. 
However, he has emphasized holding uncertainty, maintaining skepticism for potential 
forces of ideology, and attending in relationship to what our anxiety allows us and will 
not permit us to see (2003, 2010). All this suggests alternatives both in and out of 
psychotherapy to problems posed by American anxieties under the aegis of health. The 
subject bears further examination.  
Findings-Discussion Chapter 2: Donnel Stern’s Unmapped Self 
Approach 
The focus of this study, Stern’s two books published in the first decade of this 
Century, present his theory woven into practical understanding. From the perspective of 
the Interpretive Turn, it may be impossible to comprehend philosophical or psychological 
theory as apart from phronesis, the practical wisdom gained from experience first 
described by Aristotle (Rorty, 1980). Thinkers of the Interpretive Turn, and philosophers 
since Nietzsche (Hiley et al., 1991), have questioned that any human discipline can 
adhere to a suprahuman level of rationality. They have also rejected the notion that a 
discipline can uphold claims of superior argumentation at a level above the linguistic and 
beyond all context or subjectivity.  
 From this point of view, social activities are both made and known by human 
beings and through language. In psychology among other disciplines, the separation 
between theory and practice may be useful but it may also be somewhat artificially, as 
well as arbitrarily, drawn. While Freud’s project, for example, may have been more 




clearly targeted at developing a coherent theoretical model, Freud’s language is if 
anything rhetorical. Humans cannot grasp any text if we are not also in some way 
cognizant of the activities of its rhetoric such as Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida [see, 
for e.g., Grenz, 1996; Rabinow, 1984; Sarup, 1988/1993). In this view (Gadamer, 
1975/2004), we recognize the particular through context and vice versa, and we 
necessarily bring what we have already apprehended to that which we seek to understand 
anew.  
In Stern’s writings (2003, 2010), some aspects of theory appear in unusual places. 
Looking, for example, for a codified explanation of the self or psyche in Stern’s work 
involves a process that could resemble Cortázar’s suggested methodology in his famous 
novel Hopscotch (Cortázar, 1963/2007). In this process, the text can be read as if each 
reading were a child’s game of hopscotch, skipping from passage to passage, chapter to 
chapter, back and forth. 
The reader must also figuratively jump around different texts in Stern’s works, for 
concepts that are would be given definition early in the volumes of traditional 
psychological textbooks or manuals, such as mind, enactment, and consciousness. 
Important assertions about technique (2003, 2010), both in so far as Stern’s writings 
occasionally approach a technical suggestion or alternately argue against across-the-
board deployment of techniques (2013c) are often interspersed within discussions of 
unformulated experience or nested in case vignettes. The same is true of definitions of the 
mind or the self, most of which have been located in footnotes (2003, 2010, 2012c). 
Stern’s notion of intersubjectivity requires an even more thorough reading of his works, 
perhaps because it is fundamental and built in to his concepts of the field and 




interpersonal relationship within this theory. In these writings, we find ourselves far from 
the influence of the hydrodynamic model or the military/defense-related terminology 
(Gay, 1993) that early on shaped Freud’s psychodynamic writing. Stern has described a 
self of multiple states that could be envisioned graphically and as two-dimensional. 
“Mind here is not a vertical organization of conscious and unconscious, but horizontally 
organized collection of self-states, each in dynamic relation to the others” (2010, p. 139). 
Elsewhere (2003), he adopted the metaphor for the act of formulating experience as 
perceiving images of varying complexity within a cloud. While these concepts may not 
be contradictory, they certainly offer challenging new ways of thinking about 
fundamental psychology. Both procedure and the unit of study seem to have undergone 
Derrida’s elision here (symbolized as “elision”), that is, they have been struck out in 
order to signal their previous significance plus the message that these terms in and of 
themselves no longer serve (Sarup, 1988/1993). 
In his writings, Stern (2003, 2010) has made appeals to the jazz of Fats Waller 
and to modernist painters such as Ben Shahn and Jackson Pollock, as well as to Christo 
and Cindy Sherman. The first two of these are artists who lived during the rise of abstract 
and playful movements on the American Art scene. Indeed it would be hard to imagine 
Stern’s concept of the unformulated without a precursory experience, however far in the 
background, of Abstract Expressionism, of Jazz, and the Symbolist poetry of Paul Valéry 
and Stéphane Mallarmé. The others (Christo and Sherman) could be respectively termed 
postmodernist in their challenging notions of geography and identity. 
Essential to Stern’s work is the “unformulated” that which awaits our 
interpretation, the unelaborated with a potential for elaboration. Stern’s strongly scientific 




training as a psychologist, and his publication in the 1990s included a rigorous analysis 
and survey of interpersonal theories of cognition (Lionells et al., 1995). His more recent 
writings (e.g., 2012a, 2013a) are far from uncharted wanderings between psychotherapy 
and art in general. There is a scientific rigor underlying Stern’s works, while, more than 
theoretically, they also speak particularly to understanding artistic and literary creation. 
Likewise, despite the psychoanalytic grounding of this theory, the concepts themselves 
include an emphasis on the acceptance of moments of confusion and the unpredictability 
of the psychoanalytic session, Stern’s concept of the “unbidden.” One of the most 
important themes in Stern’s RA is the need to accept and to seek to understand that which 
is chaotic, misunderstood, or strange in a session, and perhaps in life in general.  
In sum, there appears at times to be a hesitation on Stern’s part to present theory 
in anything vaguely resembling a textbook format and even an opposition to much of the 
way manualized formats have configured in psychotherapy (2013c). Stern’s own methods 
of theorizing are frequently offered, if indirectly, through reflections on the creative act 
of writing itself, supported by passages from novelists and poets, such as Lewis Carroll, 
early modern poets such as Rainier Marie Rilke, and later American writers including 
Flannery O’Connor and Tim O’Brien. He has drawn on philosophers Jacques Maritain, 
Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty, as well as 
Aristotle, Socrates, and early psychologists such as William James, F.C. Bartlett, and 
from the subsequent generation of thinkers, including George Herbert Mead and Harry 
Stack Sullivan. 
For Stern the act of writing and the practice of psychotherapy appear to be very 
proximal acts. His sense of language led to an attention to the importance of concrete 




metaphor even in the spelling out of difficult theories. For Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980/2003), “our concepts govern our thought” (p. 3), not just intellectually but all the 
way to the details of everyday functioning. Furthermore, our concepts consist of concrete 
metaphors, arising from lived, physical experience. Lakoff and Johnson have indicated 
the way concepts are clustered around certain types of metaphors, so, for example, 
arguments are define in terms of battle (they are “defended” “lost” or “demolished” 
pursued with a “strategy” and so on; pp. 4-5), while affection is expressed in metaphors 
of warmth. Likewise, rhetorical conventions such as metonymy are often used to 
personify objects (e.g., this computer can handle the necessary operations). 
 In Partners in Thought (2010), Stern introduced Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980/2003) concept that metaphors arise from (and continue to invoke) concrete aspects 
of living in the world. For Johnson, for example, our understanding is necessarily 
embodied due the fact that our concepts continuously rely on language related to human 
physical activity. “The propositional content [of an utterance] is possible only by virtue 
of a complex web of nonpropositional schematic structures that emerge from our bodily 
experience” (Johnson, 1987, p. 5).  
In RA, language speaks to the somatic, and it arises, perhaps mysteriously, from 
the nonverbal. This connection between the verbal and physical fits well with Stern’s idea 
of experience, as something that is both worded and not-worded. For Stern, the 
interaction between a sensual, nonverbal world and our speech is essential to 
experiencing:  
[Language] divvies up the wholeness of everything into meaningful pieces that 
humans can use in the creation of experience. Language defines what can be 
meaningful, and how. And that is just as true for nonverbal experience as it is for 
what we typically think of as verbally mediated experience. We can enjoy dance 




because we have a verbal category that differentiates it from other kinds of 
movement. (Stern, 2012d, p. 5) 
 
 Stern’s interest in this embodiment of language makes sense in light of his 
commitment to understanding the liminal side of conscious experience, his concept of the 
unformulated. Psychoanalytic interpretation, then, involves understanding our experience 
both within and outside of words. “The state, the conscious aim of clinical 
psychoanalysis—what analysts actually set out to do—nevertheless remains the grasp of 
the nonverbal in words, or the retelling in new words of previously worded experience” 
(Stern, 2003, p. 24) 
Stern’s RA is essentially a process of verbal language, interpretation, brought into 
the interpersonal field. That said, it attends to the physical and unconscious connections 
to what is ultimately said in words, and to the very physical bases of the language we use. 
 Because of the attention to contextualization, my approach to examining Stern’s 
concept of the self begins with looking at the parameters of selfhood in the 
psychoanalytic situation. Stern’s theory pulls from many different traditions. However, 
they revolve around psychoanalysis as a skill and practice. His publications to date focus 
largely on the dyad of the patient and psychoanalyst. Within psychoanalytic work, then, 
what presumptions concerning the two persons in the room are made in a nearly 
automatic manner at the commencement of a treatment? What are the psychoanalytic 
limits to a self? Where does psychoanalysis, an activity that traditionally permits the 
introduction of anything into the therapeutic relationship, also draw the line around its 
own understanding, and what can be enacted or prohibited in its realization? In Stern’s 
works, language and dialogue are essential. How, then, does a hermeneutic sense of 




dialogue, in which each party is open to relational and personal change, meet with a 
Western, scientifically informed process of personal agency and change? 
Context I: The Outskirts of Experience  
Psychotherapists are faced daily with a couple of tasks. They must understand 
who they have with them, and they must ask themselves who they are as they sit with the 
patient. Stern’s writings are based on interlocking ideas such as dissociation, the 
unconscious, the interpersonal field, mutuality, language, and unformulated experience, 
transference and countertransference, all concepts that intersect these other two questions 
that concern the identity of the therapist and the identity of the patient.  
Because Stern’s theory is located as a psychological system of ideas within the 
Western tradition, its basic assumption is that of personhood in the form of a self.18 
Unless specified otherwise, psychotherapists assume two separate people talking 
together, with a focus on one person’s life struggles, or “problems of living” (Sullivan, 
1953/1997). On at least one side of the room, there is generally the recognition of a self, 
states of the self (2003, 2010), or possibly even a plurality of selves (Bromberg, 1996) 
involved in dialogue with another person.  
 The positing of a process of dialogue, such as Gadamer (1975/2004) or Buber 
(1970) have defined it introduce a fundamental, most important factor. Dialogue occurs 
in relationship, and relationship is constituted within the social context of language in its 
most general sense. If we are transformed through interpersonal dialogue, then we are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Even this notion was challenged by Sullivan, whose concept of the “self-system rest[s] 
on the irrational character of culture or more specifically, society” (1953/1997, p. 168). 
Stern generally adhered to a highly interpersonal point-of-view. However, he also 
maintained (despite his focus on the interpersonal field) the importance of 
conceptualizing about individual minds, as discussed above in the present study,  
pp. 115-118. 




also constantly under the effects of historical change. Language makes us, and we use 
language through time.  
 Dialogue, by this definition, means engaging with another in the openness of the 
possibility of being altered by the opinions of the other (Gadamer, 1975/2004). 
Furthermore, Paulo Freire (1970/2012) reinterpreted Russian Formalist definitions of 
dialogue, to conceive of it as the basis of social freedom, not a technique but an 
existential necessity for significance, requiring qualities of humility, hope, love, and 
courage. Just as for Stern dialogue is an essential of therapeutic change (2003, 2010), for 
Freire the obstruction of dialogue is the equivalent of oppression, and a populist dialogue 
is necessary to any humanizing, social transformation.  
 From the vantage point of the Interpretive Turn (Heidegger et al., 1927/2010; 
Hiley et al., 1991), social context and interpersonal activity are given, and there is a 
presumption that the human is a being-in-time, a non-reified self that emerges more as 
process than concrete entity, but one that understands through languaging. I here examine 
how this line of thinking affects Stern’s own conception of the self, one that appears 
categorically different from traditional Western psychological conceptualizations which 
involve the masterful, bounded self (Bellah, Madson, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; 
Cushman, 1990, 2013a; Sampson, 1988; Taylor, 1988, 1989).  
In Western psychotherapy, selves are generally identified and categorically set off 
as individuals by a presumption of physically separate bodies. The limits of the self and 
perhaps its binary compliment, the boundaries of mutuality, have a long history in 
psychology. Patient and psychoanalyst have traditionally been seen as being categorically 
and necessarily separate in theory and thought.  




Though there appears to have been some ambiguity, the early psychoanalytic 
office (Gay, 1993) essentially provided a couch and chairs. Early practice involved little 
more physical involvement than talking and the exceptional stroll out of doors. 
Psychoanalysis has prohibited any physical connections of selves, that is, most any 
activity beyond the verbal limits of the therapeutic frame. Talk psychotherapy of the 20th 
Century, originating from the Northern European tradition, has generally proscribed 
intervention beyond the verbal, and the psychology field has largely rejected applications 
of physicality. Boundaries around spoken language, at least as far as all intentional action 
is concerned, are strict enough that their exceptions now seem remarkable to us. One 
thinks, for example, of Minuchin’s unusual use of seating arrangements and the spaces 
between participants in the room (1974), or his family intervention (2007), offering an 
ash tray for the husband to hold while he, the psychotherapist and the wife smoked on 
either side. Even these acts, still very amenable to an explanatory narrative, are 
considered unusual in the modern tradition of talk psychotherapy.  
In Western psychological practices, erotic thoughts, feelings, as well as religious 
types of joining (such as dance, prayer, or chant)19 are also universally understood as 
topics of discussion or reflection (if they are given any expression at all), rather than 
being activities practiced in situ. Interventions that do not involve technocratically 
sanctioned machines such as biofeedback are likely targets for supervisory scrutiny in 
American psychological practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In societies outside the cultural West, healing practices do not adhere to the Cartesian 
mind-body split have no disconnect from spirituality. Native American healing (Duran & 
Duran, 1995), for example, assumes a unity of the person’s connection to the earth and 
the earth, in turn, is identified with divinity itself. 




Within and outside of the psychoanalytic canon, supervisors may often avoid even 
the discussion of erotic transferences (Gabbard, 2009; Gabbard & Lester, 2002). The 
fundamental physical separation of persons from each other has numerous complex 
ramifications in session.  
Freud identified numerous cases of sexual abuse and developed a seduction 
theory in the late 19th Century. Subsequently, Freud banished sexual abuse to the realm 
of desire and fantasy (Masson, 1998; Rush, 1980, 1996), until the huge significance of 
sexual transgression re-emerged culturally in the literature and psychoanalytic thought in 
the 1970s, influenced by concerns of Social Workers and the Second Wave Feminism. 
Freud’s breach with Jung involved, among other things, Freud’s opprobrium of Jung’s 
affair with his patient, Sabina Spielrein (Kerr, 1993), despite Freud’s later relegating 
most reports of sexual abuse to fantasy. In short, the frame of psychotherapy in the 
Western tradition is essentially verbal, implying bounds around the physical selves in the 
office.  
In Stern’s writings the oedipal structure within psychoanalysis is discussed in 
passing. However, the psychoanalytic self is often framed by notions coming from the 
oedipal myth. Feelings of aggression and desire are welcomed into the Freudian space as 
anticipated characteristics of the tragedy and achievements ubiquitous in human 
relationship. Social boundaries are important topics in psychotherapy and can be decoded 
via the oedipal theme of incest. Talk therapy could be interpreted as being embodied, or 
possibly disembodied theatre, delivering both the safety and the riskiness of story and 
stage. In both psychotherapy and theatre, speech or language avails the exposure of the 
new or unseen. Furthermore, the playful quality of the interaction (e.g., Winnicott, 




1971/2005), the quality of psychoanalysis as a separate space, has offered both a safety 
and danger that could allow new experience to emerge, conceptualized as essential for 
development from earliest childhood onwards. The freedom and safety necessary to 
enable new experiencing appears to be another essential of Stern’s clinical thought 
(Bowlby, 1973; Stern 2003, 2006, 2012b). 
In psychology, the concept of the physical self continues to be a conundrum, 
located somewhere along a frontier between psychological and medical practices. In 
some circles, the individual self is also seen as a social construction (e.g., Hiley et al., 
1991; Foucault, 1975/1995). The self, when identified as a brain, has been presented in 
psychology as both a certainty (Cozolino, 2010) and also a fiction (Vidal, 2005) The 
boundary line between the self and mutuality is continually redrawn as psychology 
continues to reconfigure itself and its conceptions of intersubjectivity and psychotherapy 
(e.g., Cushman, 2013a; Layton, 2008; Stolorow et al., 2002), and conceptions of the 
social emerge in new ways.  
Freud framed his talk therapy as a verbal practice, reflecting a Cartesian notion of 
the self or psyche as something cut off from the divisions of anatomy and physiology and 
something that was subject to understanding via reasonable or scientific discourse (see 
Johnson, 1987, for an in-depth discussion of this objectivist view of meaning and 
Descartes’ splitting of understanding and physical existence). Freud’s conceptualization 
of a psychic self that is to be treated solely through the spoken word was also influenced 
by Victorian mores about the mind-body split. It was also a probable reaction to the 
growing violence in Freud’s world, just prior to, and during the Nazi occupation of 
Vienna (Bettelheim, 1990; Gay, 1993). Living in such a social surround, it is likely that 




Freud had a strong reaction against any potential of physical harm that could be 
perpetrated by the newly practicing psychoanalysts.  
Psychoanalysis continues to be structured, then, as two individuals speaking 
privately, whatever voices may figuratively or experientially enter the room and whatever 
they may invoke (Modell, 1989). In Stern’s theory, the psychoanalyst seeks to join with 
the other as a “partner in thought” (2010), so that both sides may have a chance to 
understand what is unconsciously occurring between them, that which either side is 
frequently unable to know.  
  In Freud’s psychoanalysis, two selves are provided a place of safety in regular 
sessions in which to use language and awareness of nonverbal representation, to reflect 
on that which is less easily brought forward or even that which has been dissociated. To 
safely explore forbidden or intolerable material, one of the few given objectives in the 
psychoanalytic tradition, requires in Freud’s thought doing no harm to the body. As 
Freud would remark on fears aroused by the possibility of too much freedom in the word 
associations technique of psychoanalysis: “When all is said and done, it is impossible to 
destroy anyone in absentia or in effigy” (Freud, 1912, p. 108).  
Stern has written fairly little about the delineation of psychotherapy as a strictly 
verbal practice. He has, however, mentioned Basescu’s comment that persistent demands 
for sexual engagement from a patient are a sign that the patient is not being understood 
by the psychoanalyst (Stern, 2009b). 
The language of psychotherapy, like the languages of artistic expression, permits 
aspects of the desire or the taboo to emerge while still remaining within a protective 
space of representation (Freud, 1913/1950). For Freud, transference occurring within the 




safety of the psychoanalytic session would become the hallmark of a psychoanalysis, a 
necessary condition to define the practice. 
 Among other things, Freud’s declaration suggests one of the enormous moral 
gains of Freudian psychoanalysis: through unrestrained speech, patients are able to 
discover, reformulate, or unmake emotional pain of even physical wrongs of the past. 
Freud would therefore invoke a freedom similar to the self-freedom and relational 
freedom that Stern would emphasize about a century later (2003, 2010). In effect, the 
goal of Stern’s theory of enactment appears to be a releasing that allows a greater 
freedom in relationship. “Through our openness to affective discomfort—a kind of 
feelingful chafing—we find ways to allow our curiosity freer play” (Stern, 2005a, p. 92).  
Elsewhere, Stern has written of the need to relax certain relational constrictions 
“if relational freedom is to expand” (Stern, 2012b, p. 30). I examine how this notion of a 
greater freedom of meaning suggests that psychotherapy is a practice of moral 
understandings, in the third chapter of this Findings-Discussion Section.  
In maintaining physical dividedness as separate bodies, psychotherapy treats even 
some intractable somatic complaints via symbolic representation. Embodiment remains a 
given. In the article in which he most clearly distinguished RA from medical practices, 
Stern commented on effects of improved health he that he has seen in the majority of the 
patients in his own clinical work. The majority of his patients, he wrote: 
‘profit’ from their work with me in a way that is perfectly reasonable to call 
‘getting better.’ By getting better, I mean that their lives improve in discernible 
ways. Sometimes of course, even their health improves. And so, while I firmly 
believe that what I practice is not a medical or scientific procedure, it does 
frequently have salutary effects of the sort that those who think in terms of the 
medical model would happily describe as healthcare successes. (Stern, 2013c,  
p. 103) 
 




If the exploration of psychoanalysis travels, then, beyond the line between the 
spoken and the somatic, the move remains at the level of speech, and momentary 
entrances of physicality are consistently given over to the possibilities of verbal 
symbolization. Imagination is offered as free a rein as possible. That, for Stern, is part of 
the work of psychoanalysis, to help create the conditions for greater relational freedom 
and to be free to examine what hinders these possibilities (e.g., see Stern, 2012b). 
Intentional activity occurs largely on the level of the verbal. 
Stern offered a nearly slapstick illustration of the surprise caused when the 
physical does enter into the spoken sphere of psychoanalysis. In this scenario, the 
psychoanalyst is escorting the patient out the door and the door knob falls off, an 
intrusion of the physical at a sensitive moment of the decidedly spoken world (2010, 
p.104), a linguistic event that falls speechless and which is therefore ripe with potential 
meaning for reflection, that is, formulation.  
In this context, physicality is all reference. Stern’s door knob tale is a poignant 
example: the psychoanalyst would likely have just called time, set the frame in which the 
narrative must change chapters, and in which physical distance and the external world 
must intrude upon any perceptions of timelessness and experience of intimacy provided 
in the analytic session. Then, as with death or in a libidinous slip, the material world 
“bites back.” At perhaps its most punctuated moment (the close of the session), the 
formulated is thrown back into the unformulated, and there is little or no time for 
reflection.  
In such moments, the object permanence of the session (the sameness of the 
office, the ritualistic regularity of meeting times, the reliable presence of the 




psychoanalyst, and so on) allow for life’s unpredictability to appear in the foreground 
(Hoffman, 2001). If psychoanalysis generates a powerful familiarity, for Stern, new 
meaning is always to be found in the breaches of familiarity. Rather than invoking a 
Magical Realism per se, Stern’s work resembles more the works of more certain modern 
novelists. These novels include works such as Thomas Pynchon (in his earlier novels), 
Kazuo Ishiguoro’s The Unconsoled (1995), Haruki Murakami’s 1Q84, (2011), Jorge Luis 
Borges’ El Aleph (1944), Ricardo Silva Romero’s Tic (2003), or Adolfo Camilo Dias’ 
Advenimiento (Epiphany), (2011). In each of these, surprise appears to grow right out of 
the soil of routine experience. In Heidegger’s terms, “everyday familiarity collapses” 
(1927/2010, p. 233).  
We might say that there is a deeply rooted contextualism to all of these writers, a 
vision of life as so plain that something impossible necessarily emerges from it. If these 
novels have something akin to Science Fiction, science appears is seen hermeneutically. 
For Stern, likewise, the unbidden emerges through the familiar, the nearly transparent. In 
all of these writers, Heidegger’s statement would seem to apply almost as a recurrent 
theme: “Anxiety can arise in the most harmless situations” (Heidegger et al., 1927/2010,  
p. 183). In Stern’s theory, what is new enough to shake us from our most ingrained, 
interpersonal habits is most likely to appear, then, in the repetitive and long time-frame, 
that is, out of the nearly labored intimacy of psychoanalysis.  
Learning, in the form of an unbidden perception, is what happens when a space 
appears between experience and expectation . . . . New experience does not arise 
de novo—it emerges from what has come before, it becomes visible as a contrast 
to what is already known against the background of the familiar. (Stern, 2003,  
p. 243).  
 




 In Stern’s psychoanalysis, then, the language of speech fills (or we could say, 
empties) the session, offering both an oedipal dream (full-ranging emotional freedom) 
and the inevitable oedipal nightmare (the necessary fixing of the immense possibilities of 
experience in interpretations and desires never to be realized, an imprisonment of reality 
in language). Stern has occasionally referred to the psychoanalyst and patient groping, 
seemingly blind, through language selected from the immense variety of meanings that 
may be suggested by unformulated experience (2003, 2010, 2013c). Note, for example, 
Stern’s paraphrase of the workings of the hermeneutic circle:  
In Gadamer’s frame of reference, misunderstanding becomes the baseline 
condition, because understanding is always a creation, and requires the fusion of 
horizons. Prior to the fusion, we are liable to be puzzled, or to understand poorly 
or superficially—with or without knowing it, and with or without a genuine 
conversation with the other. (2013c, p. 111). 
 
 For Stern, “interaction between patient and analyst is a sequence of successes and 
failures, like any human relationship” (2010, p.189). As with hermeneutics, triumphs of 
meaning in Stern’s theory lead to further struggles for understanding. Understandings 
(2003) then have the possibility of being blocked through further enactments. Stern’s talk 
therapy means a mutual presence, an embodiment. There exists a certain irony at the base 
of this process: talk therapy is both limited and liberated by being indentured to words.   
 We are back to a dialogue in which two selves are talking, and either side (Stern, 
2012c, 2012d) must be at least occasionally open to change if never fully in control of it. 
At times, circumstance will allow the narrow confines of traumatic remembrances to be 
breached or at least to be rendered more flexible, viable, or near.  
The private language of the session permits what has been frozen due to traumatic 
dissociation, to be reformulated in ways that enable alternative understandings, 




experiences, and relationships. Such a rendering of experience which has been left 
unsymbolized or guarded from full formulation is of more than aesthetic curiosity here. 
Likewise, this process surpasses a merely experimental interest. Far from providing 
material for treatment planning, this activity is at the heart of Stern’s RA. If dissociated, 
traumatic experience “does remain a source of trouble, because, as we have become all 
too aware, the price for defensive control over consciousness is that the dissociated 
experience is enacted” (Stern, 2010, p. 92). By seeking to engage the dissociated, the 
psychotherapist is working towards a future in which enactments lose some of their grip 
on the patient’s experience and life. Stern’s two persons locked in language and 
simultaneously restricted by it appear to be the hope of overcoming or at least better 
managing some of the deepest human suffering. In a hermeneutic twist, in the inevitably 
repetitive experience of psychoanalysis, patient and psychoanalyst seek to overcome the 
repetition compulsion of traumatically stuck interpersonal patterns.  
 It is therefore through a recognition of being two separate persons who have 
intentionally entered into the secure and regular intimacy of psychoanalysis (with its 
physical limitations and its attention to verbal interpretation), that representation of the 
previously unthinkable sometimes emerges in treatment. The psychoanalyst tenders the 
safety of a session (Stern, 2003) steeped in process through the medium of language 
(language in its general sense). Something, however, lies beyond the words spoken in 
session, which changes mysteriously through the language and temporality of the 
psychoanalytic discussion: “The expansion of the self takes place in the present, in small 
increments” (Stern, 2010, p. 124). This present includes the unconscious experience of 




both parties. Given the necessity of safety, the intimacy, and the temporality of 
psychoanalysis, this is not so much a process of epiphany as one of ongoing commentary.  
 Stern wrote that “all experience is interpretive and perspectivist” (2003,  
pp. 23-24). In this theory experience and interpretation are similar or perhaps even 
identical. The therapeutic frame is a verbal agreement about how two separate selves 
engage with language in a special mutuality (Mitchell, 1988). Within the relational 
psychoanalytic frame, then, we find first of all, persons (Benjamin, 2009) in a process 
that flows between the banks of verbal rules or laws. Language gives us a means of 
understanding located in historicity. In Heidegger’s conceptualization (1927/2010), we 
are, by our mere being, embodied and located in the course of time, and we engage in 
dialogue. In the psychoanalytic description, patient and psychoanalyst meet regularly in 
order to talk20 and then to challenge the limitations of that talk. The psychoanalyst 
“minds the store” (Benjamin, 2013a). We have then, two persons in a room talking and 
striving to approach what is not clearly known, with a constructive, asymmetrical 
(Hoffman, 1998) focus on the one who has come to psychotherapy for care.   
Context II: After the Turn: Psychotherapy and Relational Selves 
Psychoanalysis, then, is a verbal, reflective practice in which two selves in 
particular explore unconscious or unspoken meanings, attending largely to the problems 
of one of the participants. For Aron (1991), Hoffman (1996), and Ogden (1996), 
psychotherapy is mutually constructed, therefore holding a certain egalitarian quality, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Even this simple and fundamental embodiment being is challenged by technology. 
What happens to the embodiment of participants of sessions that are transmitted across 
the Internet? Deficiencies in audio and visual resolution come into play (Tufte, 2003), 
and Freud’s emphasis on the olfactory as a fundamental part of unconscious experience 
disappears. Further questions are provoked, such as, What does it mean about our social 
beings when we can no longer physically coincide in the same place? 




also asymmetrical. It is a given that the focus of understanding is on the problems of the 
patient. Following in the Heideggerian (1927/2010), and Gadamerian traditions 
(1975/2004), and in the direction of the interpretative turn (Hiley et al., 199121), Stern’s 
theory involves language and how we structure or experience through it. For Stern 
(2003), clinical psychoanalysis is in essence a process of such reflection through writing 
and speech. We interpret language with language. Stern, however, has signaled that in 
attending to the mental life of the individual patient, psychoanalytic theory, especially in 
the United States, has generally eclipsed the examination of its own basic material.   
“Psychoanalysts have always understood that we can reflect on experience only when it 
exists in verbal form. What we have not adequately considered in American 
psychoanalysis is the nature of language itself” (Stern, 2003, p. xi).  
In this sense, Stern’s theory moves into post-structural philosophy, with its 
insistence that an understanding of language is the avenue to understanding knowledge 
(Foucault, 1963/1994, 1966/1994, 1988; Messer, Sass, & Woolfolk, 1988; Sarup, 
1988/1993) that has for centuries been the sole province of other academic disciplines, 
such as literary criticism, politics, religion, the natural sciences, and so on. It should be 
noted that Stern’s theory remains also radically relational, because in Stern’s thought 
reflective thinking does not surrender to the Cartesian elements still found in Freud’s 
psychoanalysis. Stern is staunch in asserting that the psychoanalyst cannot adhere to the 
hope of access to purely reasoned thought about the patient. For Stern, even if there were 
a possibility for the psychoanalyst to hold to facets of objective reality, the resultant 
knowledge would be useless in practice: “Even if there were objective meaning, there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For a concise overview of the hermeneutic perspective, see also, Orange’s “What is 
Hermeneutics?” (2011, pp. 1-35), and Richardson et al., (1999). 




no impersonal way to decide how to use it in what cases” (2012b, p. 204) Stern’s RA 
does not hold the offer of ultimately arriving at a supremely healthy base. It aims, rather, 
towards ever-increasing degrees of freedom in relating.  
Reflection occurs within language, but reflection does not exist simply as a 
province to be governed rationality. Given Stern’s hermeneutic and constructivist roots, 
this would be impossible. In other words, reflection here appears to be a metaphorical 
process of meaning-making but it is likely not a methodology in which reason and 
prediction could ever take over. Stern followed Gadamer’s (1975/2004) hermeneutic 
thought about scientific understanding and hyperrationality. There is a loss inherent in the 
claim to scientific methodology (Warnke, 1987) as applied to the psychotherapeutic 
context. Despite experimental claims to objectivity or cultural neutrality, empirical 
necessity requires putting method, data, and results into a linguistic context that is per 
force culturally and historically bound. Scientific productions do not and never have 
existed outside a certain culture and langauge. For Gadamer, the historicity of any 
knowledge was a given. His study of history led him to further understandings of 
knowledge, including the natural sciences. According to Warnke,  
All forms of knowledge adhere to a set of historically produced norms and 
conventions and hence the naivety of the claim that the natural sciences provide 
an unconditioned ‘objective’ view of their subject-matter which it is the task of 
the social science to emulate. Moreover, these insights indicate an important 
difference between the natural and the social sciences in so far as they reveal the 
‘double hermeneutic’ characteristic of the latter, which Gadamer described as an 
encounter or dialogue, and therefore between two sets of prejudice or historical 
horizons. The successful conclusion of such dialogue is a mutual understanding of 
the subject-matter at issue that goes beyond both the views of one’s text or text 
analogue and one’s own initial assumptions, prejudices and aims. In stressing this 
new understanding, Gadamer’s hermeneutics attempts to move beyond both the 
conservatism of simply adopting the views of the ‘text’ and the subjectivism of 
interpreting it as a verification of one’s own prejudices. Hermeneutic 
understanding rather participates in the self-formation of an interpretive tradition 




in which each new effort to understand reflects a new education and new form of 
the tradition itself. (Warnke, 1987, p. 139) 
 
Stern’s work, on both his theories about knowledge and the practice of 
psychotherapy, involves an awareness of the double hermeneutic. This theory of 
knowledge puts the knower in an enigmatic temporality, a potentially conflicted space 
between the reconstruction of past experience and the shifting of horizons that comes 
through dialogue, between subjectivism and the views of the other. At the heart of this is 
an interpersonal concept of change through experience that moves concepts such as the 
individual or the psyche into ambiguous positions. The self is no longer clearly bounded 
or delineated, nor, as I discuss below, does the self appear simply to dissolve into an 
oceanic space of relationship. There is a hidden tension in Stern’s adoption of 
hermeneutic thought into the psychoanalytic.      
In Stern’s understanding of RA there is an expressed suspicion of the translation 
of natural scientific methodology into psychological procedure. Behavioral prediction, 
according to Stern’s theory, at best would be a general series of actions, subject to as 
much uncertainty as any other activity:  
It is possible to predict no more than certain broad trends in life, and even on that 
level of abstraction, behavioral prognosticators, like meteorologists, have reason 
to maintain a good deal of skepticism about their powers, although they 
sometimes advertise otherwise. (Stern, 2003, p. 227) 
 
Moreover, Stern paraphrased Foucault’s assertion (1975/1995) that because 
power is fluid, it is not a fixed thing. “Conceptions of power do not have to preexist 
hermeneutic analysis to participate in shaping it” (Stern, 2003, p. 227). Interpreting, in 
Foucault’s terms, would, as well as any other generation of knowledge, necessarily be a 
productive act. In the hermeneutic view, interpretation also involves an attempt at a 




particularly moral understanding. Assertions about history necessitate a fairly fluid 
conceptualization of knowledge as an ongoing process. The psychoanalyst is not 
somehow miraculously outside of power relations. In Stern’s theory, on the contrary, this 
is important material for the psychotherapist’s understanding of the patient, the 
interaction, and of herself.  Enactments are at the heart of Stern’s theory. For Stern, “The 
very intensity of the happenings and the fact that they do so often end up being expressed 
through the operations of power mean that enactments probably carry even more 
expressly political and moral meanings than other clinical events” (Stern, 2010, p. 41). 
The workings of power shape or create knowledge and relationship. These 
workings occur on conscious and unconscious levels, all of which call for constant 
questioning. 
If the self is to a large degree determined by the interpersonal and is likely 
unfixed, more process and change than a concretized object of study, then predictions we 
make daily about our own and the selves of others are extremely fluid. Stern made the 
assertion, both poetic and psychoanalytic, that “we live as if life were much more stable 
and predictable than it is” (2010, p. 54). This is a psychotherapy created with a claim to 
treating the self of the patient—but treating the patient by a participant psychotherapist 
means also treating the self of the psychotherapist. For Aron (1991), and Tauber and 
Green (1959), before one can consider the termination of a case, the patient will need to 
have entered into the relationship in a different way, a way that requires coming into a 
greater engagement with the psychoanalyst. “It is essential that the patient penetrate the 
personality of the therapist” (p. 117). Racker (1968) took this further, to write that a 




neurotic countertransference was essential to psychotherapy. For a psychoanalysis to 
have any success, the psychoanalyst has to work her way out of this iatrogenic malaise.  
Racker warned against temptations to avoid the resultant unpleasant experience, 
that is, the dilemma of the psychoanalyst either “drowning” in the internal processes of 
countertransference or repressing them” (Racker, 1968). These points are quite close to, 
and they likely influenced Stern’s central theory of enactment (see especially Stern, 
2010). This is a psychotherapy of interacting selves, and one could say that as such no 
manual could ever save them from the results of such a relationship.  
Furthermore, even in these earlier theories, uncertainty holds an almost ironic 
valence, a force that necessarily destabilizes the self of the psychotherapist. Both 
experience and roles gain an accepted freedom or movement over time in the RA 
approach (e.g., Hoffman, 2001; Stern, 2003) that is little seen in other disciplines or 
forms of psychotherapy. Stern’s theory is well within the hermeneutic and RA cannon in 
its adherence to a context framed by reflections on certainty, uncertainty, curiosity and 
safety.  
The poststructuralist shift (Sarup, 1988/1993) follows a similar line of thought by 
questioning all essentialism as moves of power, language, or truth claims. As Foucault 
has written (1975/1995), power is not a fixed thing, but rather it has a productive, mobile, 
decentralized quality. For Stern, for Gadamer, and for Sullivan, as we understand through 
past positions, prejudices, or even awareness, we must also necessarily leave other 
potential forms that meaning could hold. This is Sullivan’s (1953/1997) selective 
inattention in action. For Stern, selective attention serves not merely to create and 
maintain a self-system, it lies behind his concept of unformulated experience. Selective 




inattention is at the heart of momentary experience. There is an enormous range to what 
might be unformulated. “Unformulated feeling may range from what would become if 
articulated, subtle affective nuance all the way to most thunderous passion” (2003,  
p. 126). Far from a passive dropping away from awareness, Stern’s dissociation therefore 
plays an active part in what can be experienced and what can be known.   
Understanding must be selective, otherwise we would somehow be speaking of 
the All. Even a partial understanding that somehow lacked our selectiveness, our inability 
to keep the background from the foreground, would lead to bizarre kinds of confusion, as 
in the Borges story of a man in a park in London who takes on all of Shakespeare’s 
memories (Borges, 2004), at first enthusiastically, eventually to overwhelmed by them. A 
perhaps poetic post-structuralist explanation of Nietzsche’s late-life schizophrenia and 
subsequent mutism is that he suddenly took on all the languages of the world (personal 
communication, Steven Harris, ca 1978).   
In our requisite ignorance, then, in order to understand how it is to be in the world 
at a particular time, we need to question in particular that which hides within the familiar 
(Foucault, 1975/1995, Gadamer, 1975/2004), and this would include the veiled workings 
of power. In Stern’s paraphrase of Foucault, psychoanalysts need to imagine “What 
sinister, unwitting purposes might even self-reflection serve?” (2003, p. 28).  
Uncertainty, then, permits a questioning of covert power relations in session. 
Moreover, in the hermeneutic search for the new, “uncertainty is good because it allows 
multiple traditions to contribute in unexpected ways to the formulation of the 
unformulated” (2003, p. 28.) For Stern, if there is a tragic loss in our tenuous grip on 
certainty, there is also unimagined potential in being open to unconscious meanings. This 




too suggests, among other things, that in this loss of a certain grounding we become open, 
even if momentarily, to the greater possibilities of our being thrown into the world 
(Heidegger, 1927/2010), that is, of the possibilities of our freedom in our given 
historicity. Not every language can speak in us at once and receive an answer. However, 
language can become increasingly articulate, even in the etymological sense.  
The relational psychoanalyst, then, works to hold a stance similar to the 
purposeful assumption of ignorance of the Socratic philosophers. For Gadamer, a lifelong 
student of Plato, this was a necessary line of attack:  
Gadamer emphasizes the Socratic docta ignorantia: crucial to the possibility of 
understanding others or the tradition to which we belong is a consciousness of our 
own ignorance, a recognition that we do not have all the answers and can learn 
from others and the past. (Warnke, 1987, p. 155) 
 
Such an apprenticeship to curiosity demands a ceaseless struggle for the freedom 
to question not only the psychoanalyst’s own personal structuring of experience that 
affect countertransference (as developed from relational patterns with early caregivers), 
but to question cultural assumptions regarding race, socioeconomic status, genders, 
sexual orientation, and Foucault’s moving target of productive power and its relation to 
truth. 
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in 
power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, 
truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the 
privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of 
this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. (Foucault, 1984b, pp. 72-73) 
 
For Foucault, we are producing power even when we are generating knowledge to 
oppose the status quo. The relational psychoanalyst, who will inevitably become 
enmeshed in mutual enactment, must accept a dual role of producing power (and starting 




from the an already sanctioned, “expert” position) while also encouraging a high level of 
relational freedom in the session. The psychoanalyst is the one in the relationship who 
assumedly enters from a position of relative strength and knowledge (indeed, the one 
hired to generate knowledge on the patient’s case). This to kind of participation, the 
psychoanalyst is assumed in RA to be in a paradoxical situation. For Stern, important 
change appears to occur just at the point the psychoanalyst is persuaded to take this 
knowledge at face value. Often, Just as she is duped into knowing something about the 
patient the analyst is challenged by an enactment, and is subsequently forced to think in a 
new way about the field, including her own relationship to it. 
Contrary to the status of authority traditionally awarded to the psychoanalyst or 
psychologist, Stern’s writings (2003, 2013c) provide a theoretical backing to observations 
often made by clinicians in practice: the patient may not be the only one to occupy a 
vulnerable position in psychotherapy. In 1968, Racker made the assertion, still surprising 
today, that “the myth of the analytic situation is that the analysis is an interaction between 
a sick person and a healthy one” (1968, Racker, p. 132). Not only does Racker’s 
statement challenge the hold of objectivity in the psychotherapeutic relationship, it also 
suggests that subjectivity has vulnerability to affect. Levenson has indicated that both the 
psychoanalyst and the patient are transformed by the field (see Stern, 2005b, 2013a). As 
in Gadamer’s heremeneutics (Gadamer, 1975/2004), all of us are subject to change in 
dialogue.  
Likewise, for Stern (2003), mutual enactment means experiencing that something 
is wrong for the psychoanalyst as well as the patient, and a narrowness to each side’s 
ability to relate and cognitively work their ways out of their mutual, emotional jam. At 




various times, each side is in some important way dissociating. Recognizing this, Stern 
(2003, 2010) argued that the psychoanalyst then comes into the relationship as one who is 
in some sense vulnerable, and who has experience and courage to confront her own 
vulnerability. 
Enactment takes place between two separate subjectivities, each acting on some 
kind of combination of her own interests and what she understands to be the 
interests of the other. The patient cannot provoke such a dissociation if the analyst 
is not vulnerable to it. The analyst’s dissociation is therefore as much a product of 
her own life as is the patient’s; and so the creation of conflict and the negotiation 
of an enactment requires growth from the analyst in just the way it requires 
growth from the patient. The analyst’s role is not defined by invulnerability, in 
other words but by a special (though inconsistent) willingness, and a practiced 
(though imperfect) capacity to accept and deal forthrightly with her vulnerability. 
(Stern, 2010, p. 89) 
 
Far from a blank screen on which psychic material will be projected, and 
examined from a state of objectivity, in enactment each side has blind spots and 
difficulties tolerating certain frames of mind. In Stern’s terms (2010), we are on a search 
for that which we cannot know. We see here, then, the glimmerings of Stern’s relational 
goal for psychotherapy. “The ideal analyst and patient are curious about everything, and 
to be curious requires toleration of uncertainty” (2010, p. 77). For Stern, this is an attitude 
that is both experiential (uncertainty is to be undergone) and a teleological endeavor (an 
attitude to strive for). If not a method per se, the search offers something of a working 
principle: “Curiosity preserves the uncertainty in unformulated experience; it is the 
attitude by which unformulated experience is maintained as creative disorder. In these 
terms, psychoanalysis is the progressive awakening of curiosity, a movement from 
familiar chaos to creative disorder” (Stern, 2010, p. 77).  
For Stern this attitude towards innocence is an openness that is based on training 
and experience. This appears to be core to Stern’s thought, an attitude that is both 




spontaneous and purposeful. Again, such a position could only arise as practice in an 
epistemological background in which knowing and ignorance (Gadamer, 1975/2004) 
occur simultaneously. In some of Stern’s work (2010), the psychoanalyst may come to 
depend upon the patient to know better about the psychoanalyst’s own experience than 
the psychoanalyst herself. It is significant that such openness in the face of both one’s 
understanding and lack of it is formed in a connection between the practice of 
psychoanalysis and ethics: Innocence here is not a child’s-eye view, nor is it a 
romanticisation of the naive. Rather, it is the result of learning. “The ‘capacity for 
innocence’ is an accomplishment. To psychoanalysts, whose work and commitment 
require constant exposure to the difficulty of self-knowledge, this way of understanding 
openness is not only fitting but just” (Stern, 2003, p. 254). 
Behind such an availability are both compassion and an ethical awareness, a 
searching. Within the RA dialogue we see an attempt to explore opinions about how to 
approach what Gadamer called “the good.” Such a conscious introduction of ethics into 
clinical practice is at odds with a scientific ideology of mental health. From the 
hermeneutic and RA perspectives, we cannot posit notions of mental health without also 
invoking assumptions of the good. I will explore how Stern’s notion of the self in 
psychoanalysis is linked to an ethical understanding in the concluding part of this 
Findings-Discussion Chapter. 
Hence, Stern’s theory suggests a discipline based on certain goals that can be 
found interlaced in his theory (for example, safety and increased relational and personal 
freedom [2012b]). At the same time, it is a theory that suspects operationalism and claims 




to objectivity, for the unconscious obstruction of meaning, inadvertent ideology, or 
possible harm (Cushman, 1990, 1991).  
 Enactments are inevitable in psychotherapy, and Stern (2003) has indicated that 
they frequently involve an unconsciously sadistic element. A mutual enactment will mask 
elements of the power dynamic in the relationship. Trust and the containment of the 
frame of psychoanalysis is paramount here, again, allowing for difficult emotions to be 
experienced in the interpersonal field.  
 Stern’s concepts of trust and empathy, however, hold important nuance and 
diverge from the mainstream psychological use of the term. Stern raised questions 
(2003), for example, about the commonly held notion that a psychotherapist is able to 
demonstrate trust and then switch on empathy, in order to generate the requisite sense of 
collaboration or harmony in the psychotherapeutic dyad, in the manner of a power plant 
engineer. Psychodynamics involve participant human beings. In questioning the concept 
of trust, Stern has offered an important critique of empathy a fundamental notion in 
American psychology, as well. 
In numerous ways in psychological literature, empathy is conceived as something 
that can be trained, measured, and perfected. It is upheld as a skill that can be learned in 
order to confront issues such as bullying (Sahin, 2012), improve medical outcomes for 
physician-patient relationships (Riess, Kelley, Bailey, Dunn, & Phillips,	  2012), and to 
support nonviolent coping and better communication for male parolees (Marlow et al., 
2012). Empathy is seen as an activity that leads to positive outcomes with varying and 
measurable effects. In Stern’s reading of hermeneutics, however, this theoretical 
construct is suspect: “Because of our embeddedness in tradition and our consequent 




reliance on prejudice, we cannot, says Gadamer, depend on being able to produce an 
empathic communion just because such a connection is desired” (2003, p. 212). 
 Stern’s discussion of trust in psychotherapy is a radical challenge to empathy as it 
is commonly conceived in psychology. For Stern, making trust a quality that is to be 
immediately generated for the advantage of the patient involves a defensive denial of the 
psychotherapist’s own participation in the intersubjective field. Recall that 
psychoanalytic thought assumes an unconscious, defensive activity, transference and 
counter-transference, and feelings of even aggression and hatred (e.g., Racker, 1968; 
Winnicott, 1971/2005). Stern wrote: 
I certainly do not mean to suggest what has so often been implied in 
nonpsychoanalytic accounts of therapeutic practice: that the therapist is somehow 
to persuade the patient or provide some convincing demonstration that she is 
worthy of trust, so that the patient will ‘open up.’ No transference worthy of the 
name could possibly be breached by this kind of frontal attack, which is more 
accurately described as a reaction formation against the therapist’s aggression 
than a genuine attempt to establish trustworthiness. (Stern, 2003, p. 173) 
 
One could further elaborate that the so-called demonstrations of trust are easily at 
risk of being perceived by the patient as a kind of con game, in particular when the 
psychotherapist is in a greatly more socioeconomically comfortable situation than, for 
example, an indigent and marginalized patient. RA holds that transference and 
countertransference are not merely personal matters but social events (see, e.g., Altman, 
2009). 
Cushman (2009) cited Gadamer, and in ways in which Stern would likely agree, 
has argued that to conceive of empathy as an automatic, non-contextual mental process, 
is to psychologize what is in fact a moral activity. For Cushman, the psychological notion 
of empathy is bound up with a self-contained individualism and a noninteractive 




objectivism. What psychotherapists may imagine to be among the most caring tools in 
their therapeutic armamentarium, for Cushman, are tied to a particular ideological 
configuration of the self and it is inherently Cartesian. 
 Furthermore, the use of empathy or the building of trust as a tool suggests an 
inadvertent furthering of alienation on the psychologist’s part. Such a displacement of 
categories, a mechanization of interpersonal processes, leads to a disguising of the 
political activities inherent in psychotherapy. Stern likewise has argued against empathy 
being seen as a mythical “direct conduit” (1994) into the patient’s mind. For Stern, the 
idea of the direct access to the other’s experience assumes an “objective firmament of 
empathy” (p. 467). Therefore, on the one hand, empathy can be seen as a technique. On 
the other hand, it carries the illusion of a psychotherapist’s special access to both the 
patient’s uncharted interior and a divine personal mental space of pristine compassion 
within the self of the therapist. In Stern’s RA, compassion appears to be more a practice 
than a simple attitude (2010) as the common notion of empathy would suggest. Stern’s 
trust appears to involve more struggle than automaticity.  
For Stern empathy as it is customarily used assumes that there is some type of 
objective link between what the observer or psychoanalyst is calling “empathy” and the 
observer’s interpretations about the patient’s mind. Again, this is the assertion of a 
supralinguistic way to make statements about each other, and hence the great appeal of 
theories about mirror neurons. A cultural notion we can trace back to Titchener’s  
turn-of-the 19th Century laboratory experiments (Cushman, 2009) continues to have a 
strong hold in American psychology. The theory of mirror neurons that can somehow 




read into another person’s intentions has also been strongly challenged (Churchland, 
2011, p.142). 
 Extending Stern’s and Cushman’s critiques suggests that the deployment of 
empathy holds a quality of condescension by the psychotherapist. The way psychologists 
conceive of empathy therefore may reflect a historical element of tolerance that Christian 
sects historically held for other denominations which they considered heterodox, or for 
the infidel. There is the possibility that, as with the history of religious tolerance in the 
New World, the way American psychology commonly defines empathy for the other 
involves an attempt to approximate oneself to that which is not understood or that which 
evokes the speaker’s anxiety or not-me experience (Sullivan, 1953/1997). With this kind 
of tolerant understanding, the other is understood as being inevitably different but worthy 
of our attention.  
 An example is to be found in English settlers who reacted to earlier massacres of 
Native Americans by colonials (Beneke & Grenda, 2011) and responded by attempting to 
better appreciate these tribes. According to hermeneutics, new understandings come to 
us, however, not through decisions about understanding but through our engagement in 
context and dialogue. In this case, tolerance involved the determination by the English 
settlers that the Indians must have been members of the twelfth tribe of Israel, Jews who 
had simply forgotten the faith. “Indians were ‘children of god’ who had lapsed” (Beneke 
& Grenda, 2011, p. 67), making their conversion all-the-more imperative. The move was 
an important one, because it meant that the First Nations had souls and were therefore 
worthy of saving (and hence no longer deserving of massacre). There is to be seen here a 
replacement of the Other for a slightly more familiar Other.  




 There is something similar in a psychotherapeutic stance that permits instant 
penetration of the patient’s affective or cognitive states. In each case, the status of mutual 
participation and mutual observation in the act of understanding is denied. In either case 
there is also an assumption of knowing which seeks to stay with or to understand those 
who do not yet possess access to certain kinds of knowledge. Empathy implies an 
adherence to the expertise of Foucault’s clinical gaze (1963/1994), a supposed power of 
observation that both names and transforms.  
Alternatively, in RA thought, the psychoanalyst is encouraged to look for 
ignorance on either side. A universalist concept of empathy seems a likely production of 
a society with a history of immense debates over religious tolerance, from Voltaire to 
Jefferson to the present (Beneke & Grenda, 2011). In other words, by enacting a certain 
mysterious skill of being empathetic, the psychotherapist is seen as being capable of an 
objective flight from the effects of the interpersonal relationship. Empathy can appear 
like a spiritual power, and therefore being empathetic appears as an act of covertly 
condescending to the level of the patient. There appears to be a priestly quality implicit in 
such therapeutic claims of detached comprehension and care. The psychotherapist is able 
miraculously to cast aside the self for the sake of superior knowledge and clinical 
treatment.  
For Stern, on the other hand, although trust is essential to psychotherapy, it is 
created by the recognition that the psychoanalyst participates in the interpersonal field. 
“Acceptance that the analyst intends for its own sake is useless. Unconditional positive 
regard is ultimately ingenuine. Real acceptance does not preclude the analyst’s rejecting 




internal reactions; it only precludes making the patient responsible for alleviating them” 
(Stern, 2003, p.173). 
 From a clinical perspective, for Stern trust involves a presence that includes 
constant work on self-understanding on the part of the psychotherapist. Relevant here is 
Freud’s requirement that a psychoanalyst undergo psychoanalysis. Trust in Stern’s 
thought would include ability to examine and accept one’s own role and disowned 
material in the relationship. The not-me of each side composes an important part of the 
psychoanalytic third.  
Curiosity is the never satisfied insistence on knowing the doppelganger, the 
unknown psychoanalyst who is there in the room, too, and who will always be 
just beyond acquaintance, forever moving and forever still, occupying the same 
shadows on the far side of every new understanding. No writer knows deeply 
what he has written. (Stern, 2003, p. 251) 
 
Likewise, the type of attention that Stern has proposed for RA psychotherapy 
appears less a medical procedure and more like an artistic pursuit than many mainstream 
psychological practices would allow. Aside from his strongly philosophical stance, 
Stern’s rare statements suggestive of technique support, rather than scientific procedure, a 
creative writer’s unfocused awareness of detail, structure, the unfolding of character, and 
the possibilities that language will bring up. Stern’s description of the kind of attention 
necessary for compassionate curiosity is not so much a focus. Instead, it is an awareness 
that even permits a certain relinquishing: 
It means that rather than employ a focused beam of attention, a searchlight to look 
for things in experience, which in one way or another usually seems to result in 
conventionalizing, one allows the possibilities implicit in experience to impress 
themselves on one’s consciousness. One takes one’s hand off the tiller and lets 
what Schachtel (1959) calls “global attention and perception” drift as it will. 
When an interesting construction begins to form itself out of this pre-attentive 
material, one may stop and perform a more focused search on and around this 




construction to fill the detail and give it the convincing quality that Freud (1937) 
knew it had to have to be useful. (Stern, 2003, p. 78) 
 
This statement presupposes some intriguing possibilities. For Stern, freedom is 
clearly an objective (2006a). In Stern’s thinking, however, the Existential call for 
freedom is overly simplistic. Rather, freedom here involves the ability (not always 
attained) to be open to experience and present with it. If, for Stern, “dissociation is the 
deletion of imagination” (2003, p. 97), then a certain availability to what is new in the 
interpersonal field and in personal experience are essential to Stern’s goals in 
psychotherapy. “Therapeutic action is greater curiosity and freedom of thought rather 
than increased access to preformulated memories” (Stern, 2003, p. 46).  
The ability to associate, that is, to verbalize and then integrate a complexity of 
experience, appears to be implicit here. Association using language is tradition being  
re-formulated in its richest sense. The process suggests an activity that would run counter 
to the effects of trauma as Stern has understood it. In free association, experience can 
gain possibility. A psychotherapeutic goal for Stern is a “freedom to feel, relate, see, and 
say differently than before” (2010, p. 116). We work towards experience and reflection 
that can at least temporarily seize the moment as well as the possible. The analyst works 
with the patient to help formulate what was formerly impossible. As Stern has made 
clear, these are ideals. They are, however, realized if not procedurally then at least 
pragmatically, as a matter of practical experience. Practicing with such ideals in mind 
leads, potentially, to what Gadamer (1975/2004) has called practical wisdom. This is one 
of the ways that psychoanalysis differs from other psychotherapies with more operational 
approaches: with its attention to the unknown, RA in particular suggests an 
apprenticeship both for the psychoanalyst and the patient. It makes sense, then, that 




psychoanalyst’s themselves also place enormous professional value in spending a great 
deal of time as patients. In the words of Aron and Starr: “Patients want and need people 
who will listen to them in depth. That is what psychoanalysts do. We listen to people in 
depth over an extended period of time with great intensity” (2013, p. 24). 
Stern’s (2003, 2010) theoretical construct of unformulated experience, then, 
involves a return to Freud’s technique of free association as an objective for practice, 
whether any truly free association can ever be achieved: “Of course, it is no accident that 
this description of ‘allowing’ is essentially a description of free association: but it is the 
ideal of free association” (2003, p. 78). Freedom as a potential, as opposed to a 
dichotomous object that may be attained or not, indicates another point where Stern has 
been able to weave psychoanalysis with Gadamerian philosophy (1975/2004). In 
hermeneutic thinking, meaning has both a newness22 and a necessary rigidity, due to its 
functioning in time and its constant debts to various traditions, to external constraints, 
and to what has come before. “The meanings that can be validly created from any 
unformulated experience are a joint outcome of pre-existing structural meanings and the 
emergent influence of the present moment” (Stern, 2010, p. 2). It follows that meaning 
can never be utterly free, nor, given the unpredictability of the present, can any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Gadamer (1966/1976) has paraphrased Nietzsche’s understanding of the creative side 
of this interplay between tradition and the generation of the new, as “the life powers of 
the present” (p. 6). Psychoanalysts often find this generative facet in the unconscious or 
in the imagination. There may be anxiety but there is also a certain comfort in knowing 
that we cannot know ourselves completely. A subject for future research would be the 
temporality implied for the unconscious in Stern’s use of hermeneutics (2003, 2010). If 
interpretation is required to reconstruct memory into each present moment, and there are 
no actual psychic “contents” in the mind, is all past material constructed out of only 
language and tradition? What happens to the sources of very personal experience? From 
the opposite perspective, how are traditions and language embodied? Do these concepts, 
language and traditions in the broadest sense, suffice for all of experience? 




interpretation be a perfect reproduction of what meanings came before it. Language both 
constricts experience and limits it. “The formulation of experience is a mystery that 
combines both agency and unbiddennes—crucial is the creative use of language” (Stern, 
2003, p. 21).  
Free association in Stern’s work appears to involve an encouragement or an 
“allowing” and it contains and element of interest and hope, in the compassion and 
curiosity of the psychoanalyst. Against freedom is dissociation, “the unwillingness to 
allow one’s imagination free play. It is the unwillingness to allow one’s freedom of 
thought” (Stern, 2003, p.121).  
Combining two concepts found in Stern’s Partners in Thought (2010), free 
association involves the cultivation of trust through relationship, and an element of what 
Stern’s has called “courageous curiosity.” Given the confines of unformulated experience 
as it is created in the interpersonal field, such freedom may occur but intermittently in 
practice. Safety and trust in an interpersonal context are not necessarily an uninterrupted 
process. 
To claim the presence of collaboration is to claim, as a matter of fact, just 
another way of saying the patient has accepted the analyst’s curiosity about 
her and has developed the capacity to be curious about herself (or relatively  
so), free of reflexive self-hatred. (Stern, 2003, p. 174) 
 
This is a curiosity that moves towards an awareness of the not-me. Stern has 
also called it (2003) “compassionate curiosity.” This is a curiosity that holds to what 
is uncertain and, one might add, it requires a constant searching for the glimmerings 
of unformulated experience, the preverbal, or semiotic, nonverbal meaning. For Stern, 
this kind of inquiry is essential to psychoanalysis. “Curiosity preserves the 
uncertainty in unformulated experience; it is the attitude by which unformulated 




experience is maintained as creative disorder. In these terms, psychoanalysis is the 
progressive awakening of curiosity, a movement from familiar chaos to creative 
disorder” (Stern, 2003, p. 77). Because its object is unbidden, curiosity would not be 
amenable to being operationalized. Stern has stressed, however, that this is an active 
and disciplined process, if nonlinear.  
The fallacy here is the suggestion that unbidden learning is passive learning, 
that there is no way to influence what arrives in one’s mind without conscious 
intention. Put this way, controversy again evaporates: though one cannot 
orchestrate one’s own dreams, no one else is responsible for them. To accept 
the centrality of unbidden observations takes nothing away from the 
significance of precision, rigor, and curiosity in psychoanalytic inquiry. As a 
matter of fact . . . holding the conviction that learning occurs in this way 
requires giving these attributes of our work even more emphasis than they 
already receive. (Stern, 2003, p. 238) 
 
Such devotion to the uncertain helps to guarantee the recognition of conflict 
that is inherent in psychoanalytic process, while it also opens space for enactment and 
release from enactment. For Stern, through the atmosphere of safety maintained by 
the psychoanalyst, enactments are regularly broken and brought into reflection: 
Curiosity is not just conscious application of inquisitiveness, the asking of 
questions. Curiosity is the sensitivity to the possibility of a question. It is the 
means by which the analyst gains self-reflective access to experience, the 
means by which she disembeds herself from the immediate circumstance and 
unconscious assumptions, especially those that structure the interpersonal 
field of the analytic situation. (Stern, 2003, p.174) 
 
A similar sensitivity to potential questions can be found in Gadamer’s 
philosophy. “Questionableness” (1975/2004) occurs in a reader’s engagement with a 
text. Gadamer thought that much of what can be understood in reading a text could 
also be applied to dialogue. For Gadamer, any assertion actually holds a question 
behind it. This concept is rich with un-mined meaning. In this philosophy, 




questioning, with at least a hope of disembedding oneself from the present context, is 
at the heart of both dialogue, and, in Gadamer’s thought, of all social science: 
Thus a person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what 
is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go back behind 
what is said, then we inevitably ask questions beyond what is said. We 
understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the 
question—a horizon that, as such, necessarily includes other possible answers. 
Thus the meaning of a sentence is relative to the question to which it is a 
reply, but that implies that its meaning necessarily exceeds what is said in it. 
As these considerations show, then, the logic of the human sciences is a logic 
of the question. (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 363) 
The act of bringing the discussion beyond what has been clearly stated is of 
course native to the psychoanalytic concern for unconscious process nearly to the point 
of cliché. Psychoanalysis can involve a lifelong questioning-beyond that fits with a 
concept of lifelong development (Erikson, 1963/1985, 1998). As above, in Stern’s 
theory, a given interpretation cannot exhaust the potentials of unformulated experience. 
Gadamer’s statement (1975/2004), that the question itself holds a certain type of 
reasoning, the very logic of the human sciences, offers a profound similarity to the 
enigma of accepting the presence of an unconscious, or a not-me, something that is 
present, more than simply an influence but also which by definition cannot be known. 
“There is a point beyond which analyst and patient cannot progress by directed inquiry” 
(Stern, 2003, p. 70). Practice then involves the project of making sense of questions as 
they arise in the interpersonal field, and of querying the questioner, the field, and 
oneself. One interpretation leads to another. The relationship between the question and 
its response (Gadamer’s “assertion”) is not a positivistic one, nor is it a linear 
correspondence. In both hermeneutics and Stern’s RA, a question is not simply requited 
when the sufficient or adequate answer is supplied. Unlike a user manual, in 
psychotherapy the process initiated by a statement or a query does not end with the 




response. Rather, it suggests a circularity from which we can never be free but which 
momentarily frees us. For Gadamer, a query asks for an assertion and behind every 
assertion lies another question. This appears a similar position to what in psychology is 
frequently referred to as process. In other words, a suspension of the primacy of the 
assertion over the question leads to a metapsychology, one that asks questions about the 
process and the very conditions of questioning itself.  
Stern has likewise maintained that his focus has largely attended process over 
content, not to imply a disparagement of the substance of our words, but because the 
way meaning emerges into consciousness is an ongoing, largely invisible activity. For 
Stern, cognition is not a piece of rationality set off in the mind from other forms of 
experience. Rather, thought is inseparable from feeling; Stern defined cognition as “an 
amalgam of the two . . . a psychic endeavor on the borderland of epistemology” (2003, 
p. 40).  
We are always in the process of formulating experience, and Stern’s clinical 
psychoanalysis is a phenomenology of “the way a memory melts into a thought about 
the present, or the way one thought or feeling verges into another” (2003, p. 41). To be 
concerned with unconscious activity, psychoanalysis is by necessity about change at the 
level of consciousness. It utilizes, therefore, the asking of questions beyond functional 
demands for content, and Stern’s RA in particular offers a way to bring to light the 
habitually dissociated.    
To illustrate this connection between questions and answers, the sense of a text 
and the horizon of the question (2003), Stern described the challenges he and a native 
Japanese speaker encountered when he attempted to teach English by explicating 




American cartoons from the New Yorker magazine. When the question posed by the 
cartoon was displaced, the riddle could never be answered or assumed. There was no 
background for the non-native speaker to experience as having been surpassed. Humor 
would be impossible in a world without the possibility of rules. With no horizon to be 
shifted, Stern’s Japanese friend had to supply his own background to the field, an 
activity that could not work. 
Stern wrote that his friend was often puzzled by these cartoons. However, 
through Stern’s own, often absurd attempts to explain the humor, his friend would 
occasionally come upon the point and burst into laughter at seemingly random moments. 
It was impossible for Stern and his friend either to predict or to reconstruct the arrival of 
such moments. Context requires language, at least in the general sense. With neither 
linguistic context nor tradition, there is no way to travel beyond the bounds of a given 
placement of meaning. Stern’s example is stark, given the differences in cultures. 
Difference of this sort must occur constantly in psychotherapy, despite the 
psychotherapist’s best and regular efforts to paint a realistic picture of the world of the 
patient. Gadamer’s linking the question to an assertion (1975/2004) has the feel of the 
type of questions for which psychoanalyst’s often strive. In Stern’s terms, such questions 
could be said to aim for a greater possibility of meaning while offering less control of 
the interaction. There is an interesting attention to moments before meaning is rendered 
into experience. For Gadamer, “this is the real and fundamental nature of a question: 
namely to make things indeterminate” (1975/2004, pp. 367-368). 
Gadamer’s description of questioning is remarkably similar to Stern’s 
description of what happens when we pass through enactments to reach moments of 




reflective understanding. In Gadamer, “to understand a question means to ask it. To 
understand meaning is to understand the answer to a question” (1975/2004, p. 368). This 
also points to the sense of continuous indeterminacy which requires the openness and 
curiosity that Stern held as essential in psychoanalytic work. In the case of both 
Gadamer’s philosophy and psychoanalysis, attention is offered where it habitually will 
not go (Aron & Starr, 2013), often towards signs of ambivalence, confusion, and 
ambiguity in the construction of meaning. There is therefore often a literary quality in 
RA work. In psychoanalysis, the most important observations may be about the familiar; 
additionally, they may often land among the bizarre.23  
Ehrenberg (2005) has also emphasized that uncertainty in psychoanalysis is not 
simply a not-yet-understanding. It involves “a tolerance for and respect for  
‘not-knowing’ not just cognitively, but also affectively” (Ehrenberg, 2005, p. 27). The 
invocation of a project that is not simply an intellectual challenge but an experience of 
not-knowing also gives a certain coherence to Stern’s interest in poets such as Valéry and 
Mallarmé discussed below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Stern’s concept of a preverbal level of experiencing may offer a way of regarding that 
which occurs before Gadamer’s question is posed. For Gadamer, however, the moment of 
encounter with the text already holds the question within it. “There can be no tentative or 
potential attitude to questioning, for questioning is not the positing but the testing of 
possibilities” (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 368). There is already in Gadamer a sense of the 
unbidden. One is further reminded of Stern’s use of James’ (1890/1981) felt tendencies. 
Stern along the same lines wrote of a sense of chafing as a sign that an enactment is 
happening. James, Gadamer, and Stern appear to be talking about the same intimations 
before meaning is formulated. Feelings of tendency or snags are likely signs that one has 
already entered into the act of Gadamer’s questioning. Gadamer had less say on the 
relative levels of awareness in this process. On the contrary, the activities of the 
unconscious are of major concern to the psychoanalyst, with a focus on not just what is 
said but on affect, on embodiment, and on continuing interpersonal experience. 




Attention to where attention is reluctant to go is of course part of the courage 
inherent in Freud’s psychoanalysis (Gay, 1988; Mitchell, 1988), given its conflictual 
model, the theory of repression, and the inevitability of the psychoanalyst experiencing 
strong counter-transference. That is, the psychoanalyst (e.g., Racker, 1968) attends to any 
signs of countertransference as potentially valuable experience of how the patient relates 
to others. There is a necessarily, frequent battle with oneself in the interpersonal 
relationship. Conflict is ubiquitously available to pose questions, and its unavailability 
may offer yet another question to the trained psychoanalyst, particularly if enactment is 
considered an important event in the psychotherapy.  
In Stern’s understanding the relational psychoanalyst attempts an ideal expertise 
in sensing or reading what is occurring for the psychoanalyst, what is occurring for the 
patient and what is occurring in the room, that is, with what Ogden (1994) has called the 
intersubjective, and Mitchell and Aron, and Stolorow and Atwood have called the 
relational (see Mitchel & Aron, 1999). The psychoanalyst finds questions in the 
intersubjective or interpersonal space (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992). The psychoanalyst 
examines background and foreground, context, meaning, questions, and answers from 
either party, for manifestations of unconscious activity all around. We are reminded of 
Levenson’s dictum that the psychoanalyst constantly ask, “What is going around here?” 
(Levenson, 1985, 1990). There is an irony to the statement. As a phrase, it suggests, 
again, a certain acceptance of the chaos of our understandings. That it needs to be 
repeated gives the implication that meaning needs to be queried constantly, the same idea 
in Gadamer’s (1975/2004) concept that any assertion is up for examination for that which 
lies behind it. The psychoanalyst offers indeterminacy as a way to invite the new. 




Psychoanalysis could then be redefined as a training in holding curiosity about the 
self or selves through the interpersonal field. This is Stern’s compassionate curiosity, 
which involves not only doing psychoanalysis but requires a psychoanalytic education as 
well. 
The analyst develops a ‘work ego’ in the course of psychotherapy and training, a 
capacity for self-containment and self-reflection, which may originally have been 
the training analyst’s, but is now the analyst’s own, and will become the patient’s. 
. . . [A]nalysts are at their bests in the office. There is a minimum of interruption 
in the capacity to disconfirm the preconceptions emerging from the interaction 
with the patient. (Stern, 2003, pp. 254-255) 
 
 This “freedom to disconfirm” is not a challenge to the patient’s presuppositions or 
problematic schemas, but rather a means of questioning everything about the interaction. 
In this interpersonal theory, curiosity about the other becomes curiosity about the self. 
Curiosity about the analytic third could be described as curiosity about one’s own 
experience, that of the other, of something outside, and perhaps of something in-between. 
Moreover, each of these aspects of the field exist only partially on the level of awareness.  
All of this presupposes the psychoanalyst will maintain a sense of safety, a secure 
frame for the analytic dyad. Changes to the patient’s self system (Sullivan, 1953/1997) 
would require a safe enough space to address anxiety, for a start. From a more recent, RA 
perspective, another reason why security is necessary is because it entails both sides 
experiencing transference/counter-transference in an ongoing process (Ehrenberg, 2005; 
Hoffman, 1983; Stern, 2003). Furthermore, this type of psychotherapy (Racker, 1968) 
involves complimentary and concordant transferences. Both psychotherapist and patient 
are undergoing assumedly intense experiences, regardless of the degree to which these 
come into awareness. Stern explained that 




dissociated experience does not disappear into some hidden corner of the mind. I 
play out the state of self I cannot tolerate experiencing directly, and unconsciously 
influence those with whom I relate to adopt a variation on the same dangerous 
response that led me to dissociate the self-state in the first place.  
(Stern, 2003, p. 84) 
 
In an environment where enactment is allowed to become the common currency 
of relationship, safety demands a certain acceptance. As discussed above, this acceptance 
includes an understanding of the psychoanalyst’s own vulnerability. 
The analyst’s accepting attitude toward her inevitable involvement in 
enactments with the patient, and the curiosity that this acceptance allows, not 
only the patient’s experience, but her own, is the only means at the analyst’s 
disposal to provoke this crucial process of disembedding. And each time she 
is successful in provoking it (though she never knows quite how it has been 
accomplished), she is able to refrain from the enactment in question and 
instead interpret the patient’s transference. Thus transference interpretation 
are the only evidence the patient can really depend on that the analyst is not 
“drowning in the countertransference” (Racker, 1968), the only authentic 
indication that the analyst is able to know and tolerate the countertransference 
and use it to help the patient. Of all the analyst’s interventions, therefore, 
transference interpretation (and the countertransference interpretation that so 
often precedes it, usually privately) plays the most significant role in 
establishing and maintaining the patient’s feeling of safety (Hoffman, 1983). 
(Stern, 2003, p. 174) 
 
For Hoffman (1983), it may be impossible for the psychoanalyst magically to 
protect the patient from all the effects of counter-transference (and, we can assume, from 
the type of enactment of which Stern would later conceive). Attention is reciprocal. The 
patient selectively attends to aspects of the psychoanalyst’s responses, and the patient can 
also be the interpreter of the psychoanalyst. Moreover, the psychoanalyst has less control 
over the experience of counter-transference than has long been maintained in 
psychoanalytic thought.   
It is interesting that Hoffman redefined objectivity to mean the psychoanalyst’s 
ability to avoid drowning (using Racker’s term) in the counter-transference, that is, so 




that “the patient comes to know that the analyst is not so consumed or threatened by the 
countertransference that he is no longer able to interpret the transference” (Hoffman, 
1983, p. 414). However, given the limits of control and awareness, for Hoffman, the 
psychoanalyst may not know whether she is being overcome by counter-transference 
until she has actually reflected out loud on it, that is, converted it into language and 
brought it into the interpersonal field:  
Whether the therapist’s response will be dominated by counter-transference or not 
is a question that is raised again and again throughout the course of the therapy, 
probably in each hour with varying degrees of urgency. Also, it is a question that 
in many instances cannot be resolved in a favorable direction unless or until a 
timely interpretation is offered by the therapist. (Hoffman, 1983, p. 415) 
 
Hoffman’s timeliness here offers two potential characteristics: either it offers the 
assurance that the psychoanalyst can continue to hear difficult aspects (difficult for the 
psychoanalyst as well) of the patient’s interpretation of him, or the assurance that the 
psychoanalyst can continue to “work to create another kind of interpersonal experience 
which diverges from the one towards which the transference-countertransference 
interaction pulls it” (1983, p. 414). It is likely that a fitting interpretation at these times of 
enactment would hold both of these attributes, that is, that it give both a sense of safety 
and a sense of newness, a disembedding in hermeneutic terms. An important if implicit 
point in Hoffman’s statement that resonates with Stern’s theory that it is through the 
interpretation and its acceptance or nonacceptance (Stern, 2003) by the patient that the 
psychoanalyst finds her bearings. These theories are relational to the highest degree, and 
they are likewise hermeneutic: understanding involves a being lost in the interpersonal. 
Being found is also constantly an experience that is located within dialogue and the 
interpersonal field. The psychoanalyst turns to her experience of the field, not simply for 




the confirmation of data (though that, too, occurs constantly), but for the understanding of 
herself and her own activities within it, that is, some awareness of her participation in the 
Analytic Third (Benjamin, 2004, 2009). There is simultaneously a courage to venture into 
what is not previously known, even about what we are about to say (Stern, 2003), and an 
ability to tolerate the uncertainty of the process itself. Furthermore, this is a process that 
is fraught at least unconsciously with the interactions of the best and the worst of either 
personality.  
Stern took Hoffman’s principal idea here, that the patient is the interpreter of the 
analyst (Hoffman, 1983), one step further by conceiving of a type of enactment that is 
mutual in the interpersonal field. In mutual enactment, each side struggles with aspects of 
their own previously dissociated not-me experience as it emerges the relationship. 
Bringing in the not-me, some aspect of the self which is intolerable, and then interpreting 
such problematic or dissociated experience in order to arrive at the level of reflection 
(that is, verbalization that has a chance of being at least partially heard) must be achieved 
within a relationship of strong collaboration, rapport, and even compassion for oneself. 
Recall that there is not only one not-me composing the analytic third (Benjamin, 2004; 
Ogden, 1994). Both members are involved in mutual enactment. Safety, containment, 
security are essential, not merely for ethical purposes but because the way out of an 
enactment is itself a sort of releasing, or an “opening what has been closed, relaxing what 
has been clenched” (Stern, 2010, p. 147).  
Such trust is also a necessary condition for the kind of change Stern describes 
because it supports a notion essential to Heidegger’s conception of Being. For Heidegger, 
Being involves recursively comprehending properties of the fact of our own being. Being 




human means not only being thrown into a particular place and time but having finitude 
(1927/2010), being mortal, and having awareness of this fact of life. The trust and 
security of Stern’s interpersonal approach to RA (2003) are therefore made necessary by 
the anxiety of the interpersonal field.  
Stern (2003) has described two types of dissociation. One is the Sullivanian 
(1953/1997), everyday dissociation, basic security operations that help us to relate to 
others and the world through selective inattention, and which help form our different 
selves in relationship. This involves the basics of perception. We need to select from the 
massive stimuli of every moment to decide what is to be brought into focus, or the 
foreground. We bring certain aspects of life into our different experiences in order to be 
able to carry on in the world, and these aspects involve attention to fragments of 
experience and not-experiencing other aspects of the world.  
A different type of dissociation is the more common psychological definition, 
dissociation that takes place when one is overwhelmed and experience cannot be had full-
on. This would be the dissociation caused by psychic trauma, and it occurs when we 
experience our near demise, a result of psychic trauma (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). It would proceed logically from certain types of experiences 
including Heidegger’s (1927/2010) concept of finitude.  
When working with trauma in particular, as the psychoanalyst engages in 
compassionate curiosity and that curiosity has a chance to be mutual, and then when the 
treatment finds eventual release from a mutual enactment, death enters the room. For 
aspects of not-me to emerge while associating to trauma would also likely mean facing 
one’s own vulnerability, and the necessary potential for death. In seeing where we are 




vulnerable we see our own incompleteness, our mortality. A mutual enactment would 
imply that both sides receive a taste of this. The anxiety suggested in this definition of 
dissociation and enactment implies at least some aspect of Heidegger’s understandings of 
Angst (Heidegger, 1927/2010). Stern’s concept of enactment is an ongoing lockdown on 
the potentials of meaning. “Enactment interrupts each’s capacity to serve as witness for 
the other” (2010, p. 122). Each side experiences a threat to the self-system.  
Coming through an enactment therefore might well include a temporary 
resolution of that anxiety, a momentary triumph of relationship, that is, of eros or desire 
(with feelings of love, friendship, connections, care, warmth, or intimacy) over a rigidity 
that may at least occasionally be related to dread and habitual fears of one’s demise. It is 
through relationship that we overcome the sufferings of being near to death. Stern has 
used a suggestive metaphor, comparing metaphorically the entry into enactment to a 
sense of risking a self-willed shipwreck for the psychoanalyst: “the freedom we are 
seeking requires us to plunge into the maelstrom” (2010, p. 181).  
During moments of release from enactment, both life and death may be held 
together through temporality. These are moments when understanding is reached but it 
need not be whole. This fits well with Stern’s theories of witnessing (Poland, 2000; Stern, 
2010, 2012c) a necessary ingredient to bringing banished (unformulated) traumatic 
experience to the foreground. To recast these thoughts in Sullivan’s terms (1953/1997), 
we could imagine a momentary releasing of security operations with the unclenching of 
some types of enactments.  
For Davies, and in Stern’s (2003) reading of her theory, the ability to love comes 
when the oedipal battle can be “both won and lost” (Davies, 2003, p. 10). It is likely that 




this dialectic between the oedipal and the post-oedipal affects enactment and then the 
experience of coming through an enactment. Again, there appears here to be a play 
between erotic feelings and feelings of loss or even the death of a certain aspect of 
relationship. The ability of the psychoanalyst to participate in these feelings while also 
witnessing the patient’s transference (Racker, 1968) at such times allows a practicing of 
the contradictory state of simultaneously losing and wining the oedipal battle. If there is a 
counter-transference, then the psychoanalyst will also likely experience mixed feelings of 
success and failure. 
 In coming through an enactment that entails traumatic material on at least one 
side of the psychoanalytic dyad, there may be a powerful if fragile balancing of 
contradictory meanings and mutual experience. The integration creates a basis for a 
temporarily new meaning, until, following Stern’ theory, more recent understanding joins 
the world of knowledge and prejudice, the given (2003), to offer the basis of further 
potential discovery. Overcoming enactments brings about a greater freedom for meaning 
that is new.  
This implies a relationship between both interpersonal and personal freedom. The 
self is involved in the process of the field: 
If the interpersonal field is the gateway into consciousness, facilitating some 
formulations of experience while preventing others, then whatever it is that allows 
the most freedom in the field is also what will allow each participant in the 
relationship to be take advantage of whatever personal freedom he or she brings 
to the encounter. And therefore, we can conclude that whatever we can do to 
make it possible for the analytic relationship to evolve freely, without constraint 
or constriction, is the best way we have to encourage the freedom of experience. 
Relational freedom makes the freedom to experience possible, and therefore 
underpins therapeutic action. (Stern, 2012b, p. 11) 
 




Gadamer’s question lurking behind every answer is found in the freedom to invite 
an answer, occasionally to allow Stern’s (2003) “unbidden experience.” At some point 
unknown, the enactment is transcended, in order to invite further questions about it. 
Questions call for answers that can then build towards further questions, and again the 
familiar sets in. For Stern, “interpretations we are emotionally and intellectually equipped 
to make are the raw materials of the next moment’s new experience” (2003, p. 69). On 
occasion, the safety of an interpretation makes the space for mortality to be experienced, 
if even partially, for the recursiveness of Being (Heidegger, 1927/2010) to be looked at, 
and for enactment to be, if only for the time being, surpassed. In Stern’s thought, in such 
a change of relationship, the understanding may fit so well with our experience that we 
imagine “it was there all the time” (2003, p. 69). This signals a shift in the field, in which 
experience is drawn from the background into the foreground.    
Context III: Stern’s Active Self: Reflection, Interpretation, and the Word 
Stern’s configuration of the self is unique. It draws in part from Bromberg’s 
concept of multiplicity (Bromberg, 1994, 1996/2000), and it adheres, but only partially, 
to Sullivan’s self system (1953/1997). 
Stern’s understanding of the self (2003) emerges from psychoanalytic practice. 
Integral to understanding this self is the concept of unformulated experience. Stern’s 
notion of subjectivity is phenomenological: It emerges from experiences in session. How, 
then, does this self-relate to essentials of understanding through psychoanalysis, such as 
reflection, interpretation, and language? To understand how Stern’s self emerges, I seek 
here to explain the role of language in Stern’s theory.    




Experience comes from the unformulated through interpretation. If the self cannot 
posit any key to pure reason, and therefore cannot offer to experience any overt or covert 
access to truth, what is the role of this reflection? Where does it originate? Certainly, 
psychoanalytic reflection must hold some aspect of an important activity for the self, and 
certainly it is part of a search for a better understanding of the meaning of experience.
 For Stern, psychotherapists do develop expertise in the interpretation, which 
involves “a capacity for self-containment and self-reflection” (2013, p. 254). However, 
reflection is a limited activity, leading to new experience. Rather, for Stern reflection 
seems to occur after the fact, after an experience, and in particular after an enactment, a 
period of relative blindness, has been overcome. In reflecting, we are forced to choose 
one meaning from numerous possibilities of the unformulated. “Interpersonal life . . . can 
be processed in parallel. But verbal reflection is linear, and therefore clumsy by 
comparison. “We can ‘act’ on many things at once, but we can ‘know’ only one at a 
time” (Stern, 2003, p. 153).  
Some of life remains beyond us, in so far as we rely on words alone (the material 
of reflective experience). These limits are inevitable in this theory and in Gadamer’s 
(1975/2004) hermeneutics, regardless of our greatest skills at interpreting or our hearing 
the greatest of interpretations. Self-control and the grounding of meaning in this theory 
become questionable concepts, offering a noteworthy disagreement with Enlightenment 
thinking, in which reason and cognition are givens. Clarity becomes a relative concept. 
There is a resistance, here too, to industrialized process, in which the right work or 
technique (Stern, 2012a, 2013c) and the correct application of force is thought to lead to 
an almost divine guarantee of certain results.  




Reflection in interpersonal psychoanalysis, too, requires work, but any 
understanding necessarily demands a limiting of what is allowed into consciousness. To 
reflect, we are inevitably confined to Sullivan’s selective inattention. Stern wrote that 
reflection itself is relational. It is subject to the interpersonal field, and hence in Stern’s 
terminology, to unbidden experience: “I believe we do not and cannot control reflection, 
not where it matters clinically. These things come upon us” (2010, p. 162). Therefore, 
even a Socratic questioning can promise but limited results. “There is a point” Stern 
wrote, “beyond which analyst and patient cannot progress by directed inquiry”  
(2003, p. 70).  
 For all its conscious limits, Stern’s re-definition of reflective thought involves a 
fundamental supplanting of Cartesian reason for something with much more possibility, 
that is, creative process. Reason loses its privileged position among mental activities. 
Even reflection of any significance may or may not necessarily meet the test of appearing 
to be reasonable. As above, reflection is itself not subject to our control—political, 
industrial, technological, or otherwise. Similarly, for Foucault, claims to reason are 
particularly suspect in their ability to render the operations of power into something 
covert (1963/1994, 1966/1994).  
In Stern’s theory, if we are less rational and predictable beings than we may like 
to imagine ourselves, we are also potentially more creative. Behind this theory there 
appears to be a constant message that life has great potential. While Stern held that a 
certain scientific rigor and commitment is essential to the psychoanalytic endeavor, we 
also see a regular implicit message of resistance to industrialized or codified conformity 
in this thought. If a significant way we make ourselves is through security operations 




(Stern, 2003; Sullivan, 1953/1997), then resistance to anxiety about the unpredictability 
of both experience and life would constitute an important path to self-change. 
Psychoanalysis emerges then, much more than a locus for mere symptom relief, as a 
place in which uncertainty is both held and queried.   
Curiosity preserves the uncertainty in unformulated experience; it is the attitude 
by which unformulated experience is maintained as creative disorder. In these 
terms, psychoanalysis is the progressive awakening of curiosity, a movement 
from familiar chaos [in which dissociation places strict limits on experience] 
[brackets added] to creative disorder. (Stern, 2003, p. 77) 
 
 For Stern, our reflective process, our efforts to bring meaning into consciousness, 
involves language. Human embodiment entails verbal activity, as does the parallel 
process mentioned earlier. This second region, this “some of life” (Stern, 2003, p. 153) of 
linguistic process that “remains beyond us” is a linguistic but nonverbal realm that Stern 
called the “semiotic.”  The nonverbal offers rich access to unconscious meanings.  
“By ‘nonverbal’” Stern referred to “experience coded in that other, unworded 
‘language’ of action and practice” (2003, p. 24). This would include greatly more 
nuanced organizing activity than solely what generally falls under the rubric of body 
language. The semiotic here forms a whole realm of experience in the linguistic, as it, 
too, holds meaning, but it is essentially beyond speech per se. Stern’s use of semiotic 
suggests that even gesture would be seen as structural. Rather than being defined as 
gestures that exist in parallel biological lexicons correlated to verbal gestures (as 
maintained by Ekman, for example [2003]), the nonverbal would exist instead in 
symbolic systems with their own structures. For Stern, the verbal and semiotic are merely 
different types of experience which he has at one time compared to the  





differences between a story (the verbal) and a dream (semiotic meaning) (2003).24 
 
Language, in this way of thinking, is a blanket term that lies invisibly over, or that 
somehow imbues the verbal and the nonverbal (semiotic).25 With this concern for the 
borders of speech and the possible ranges of linguistic experience beyond what is spoken 
or written, Stern sought to comprehend fundamental questions in some of the most basic 
areas of psychological inquiry, such as infant development and extra-linguistic 
perception. 
According to this theory, we have minimal direct access to that which lies beyond 
language (language, again, here in the most general sense). Stern emphasized the 
importance to psychodynamic thought of the “hermeneutic-postmodern insight that all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 It is not entirely clear here if Stern’s sense of the semiotic would be have to be 
prototaxic (that is, involving sentience, the basic and most common form of experience 
[Sullivan, 1953/1997]). It appears that semiotic meaning might include prototaxic, 
timeless experience but the semiotic could also have greater linguistic structure than that, 
as in the case of say a gestural abstract painting not depicting any denotative relationship 
to a linguistic narrative while at the same time holding a highly complex linguistic 
structure. See, for example, Artaud’s On Balinese Theatre. “The first Balinese theatre 
presentation derives from dance, singing, mime and music—but extraordinarily little 
from psychological theatre such as we understand it in Europe, re-establishing theatre, 
from a hallucinatory and fearful angle, on a purely independent, creative level” 
(1931/1974, p. 34).  For Artaud, such performance was ripe with meaning, affect, and a 
grammatical structure but absent any coherent connection to what would normally be 
taken as text or pragmatic forms of speech. Theatre of this type would provide another 
means of access to unformulated experience. 
 
25 Stern’s theory appears to hold that for experience to be “grasped” that is, reflected 
upon, it must be done so through words, even if those words are spoken silently to 
oneself (2003). The self is therefore essential for fixing experience linguistically. Stern 
has appeared to rule out the possibility of a semiotic, extra-verbal category of reflection. 
This may be due to psychoanalytic practice which is held to the verbal and linguistic, or it 
may be Stern’s epistemological stance holding an assumption that reflection must be 
somehow verbalized to qualify as such. For Stern, experience is always interpretive. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, we can conjecture that to see it differently would be 
to verge into the religious, the mystical, or other practices. 




experience is interpretive and perspectivist” (2003, p. 24). What lies beyond the linguistic 
offers little to awareness until it can somehow enter into something nearer to language, 
such as semiotic, preverbal, or unformulated experience. Stern noted that “languageless 
reality is what Lacan calls ‘the Real’ and it cannot be directly known” (p. 23). Therefore, 
“we cannot grasp reality in an unmediated way” (Stern, 2012a, p. 10). 
Stern has upheld the Gadamerian assumption that we are constituted by language. 
For Gadamer, this was essential: “Language is the fundamental mode of our being-in-the 
world and the all-embracing constitution of the world,” (1966/1976, p. 3). Likewise, for 
Gadamer, “understanding is language-bound” (p. 15). In Lacan’s thought, similarly 
“knowledge of the world, of others and of self is determined by language. Language is 
the precondition for the act of becoming aware of oneself as a distinct identity” (Sarup, 
1988/1993, p. 8). We could call Stern’s theory post-modern interpersonalist. “Knowing” 
for Stern, “is a function of the interpersonal field” (2003, p. 31). For thinkers following 
the Interpretive Turn, knowledge, experience, and selfhood inevitably take place in some 
manner through language (e.g., Frie & Coburn, 2010).  
According to Stern, both may be under language, but the semiotic and the verbal 
are fundamentally different levels of experiencing. Stern has cited various, quite different 
ideas of language, ideas native to French thought, such as Sarraute’s distinction between 
langue and parole (1967). Language here represents “the symbolic system within which 
we have existence” much of which remains invisible to us (Stern, 2003, p. 17). Speech, 
on the other hand is worded language.  
Levenson, likewise, wrote of other “extensively coded communications, as 
informational as speech, that take place in the intersubjective realm” (1979, p. 72).  




Levenson’s use of “informational” here seems pivotal. It suggests a deprivileging of 
speech and a curiosity about experience that lies outside of our reflective understandings 
but which would still have some kind of structure. We are back to Stern’s unformulated 
experience here, and the question of how one is to access the unconscious.  
It is interesting that when writing of unformulated experience on a 
phenomenological level (as a form of experience), for example, Stern described a certain 
“chafing.” That is, one first perceives that one might be in an enactment through an 
intimation, similar to what James (1890/1981) described as a “felt sense” that which 
occurs to us just before meaning becomes apparent or is rendered into language. Stern 
(2010) compared James’ felt sent to the feeling of being in an enactment which is sense 
like a snag on one’s sweater.  
Levenson’s (1979) thought about extensively coded nonverbal communications 
may then be our bridge to the most important of formulations in RA work. Furthermore, a 
felt sense suggests an important connection with an interior, or possibly internalized self. 
An informational, other category of communication poses important questions, which 
Stern’s theory would also raise: What kind of information can exist beyond the grasp of 
words? How do we know things? 
Stern’s theory here provides a surprising cohesion to basic problems of knowing 
and experience. Discussions, presentations, performances, of artworks, poetry, fiction, or 
film, are common in the psychoanalytic world of journals and institutes. This engagement 
has been so intense that there is a frequent exchange between psychoanalytic thinking 
and artistic pursuits, each influencing the other. There have also been occasionally 




contentious relationships between psychoanalysis and film.26  For Stern, cognition is 
more than intellectual process; it includes also affective life.  
If thought and feeling are an indivisible unity, cognition, which it is convenient to 
define as an amalgam of the two should be construed as a continuous process of 
worldmaking, a psychic endeavor on the borderland between psychology and 
epistemology. (Stern, 2003, p. 40) 
 
Psychoanalytic tradition has from Freud’s time held an openness to reflection on 
any aspect of phenomenological experience. Modell (2009) maintained that metaphor 
organizes memory and links it with the present. Metaphor involves a mapping process 
onto experience. For Stern, the ability to organize memory via metaphor is that which 
divides out what has traditionally been called the psychotic from “clinically useful” 
transference (Stern, 2010, p.134). In the latter, metaphor is created but it is not taken as 
having literal meaning. The ability to use metaphor therefore has a strong connection to 
well-being; it is essential to semantic, active meaning-making. Such a status given to 
meaning-making imputes artistic creation with a stronger purpose than it would have 
simply as a vehicle for psychotherapy. The arts become locations of meaning to which 
we can turn for new understandings of the creation of meaning and to find different 
possibilities for unformulated experience. Indeed, beyond even interpretation, artistic 
expression can itself hold numerous levels of abstraction. Art often functions in a way 
reminiscent of dream, as both the formulation of new meaning and the rejection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 While psychoanalysis has a history of influencing and offering material for cinema 
(e.g., Guario & Rinaldo 2010; Walsh, 2013) Stephen Heath (1999) has further questioned 
the Freudian and Lacanian domination of criticism as narrowing film theory. 




formulation into more conventional meanings. Both content and process, art and play 
make us better at symbolization and meaning making.27  
Stern also divided experience between what has already been constructed and 
what we subsequently interpret from it. Though Stern has not written extensively on the 
subject outside of the effects of trauma on experiencing time and memory (2012c), his 
work suggest some early thoughts on temporality and the self. If we know experience 
through subsequent reflection on unformulated experience, then what does this say about 
the phenomenology of time? If memory is a construction in the present, much less 
reliably connected to any ideal imprint of the past than we might imagine (Bartlett, 1932; 
Stern, 2003), then what happens to say, family history, a major concern in 
psychotherapeutic work? Should temporal assertions about what the self has experienced 
be treated much the as the stuff of dreams, as oneiric theory would support (see, for e.g., 
Ferro & Civitarese, 2013)? What kind of impact would such theory make outside of 
psychoanalytic thought, that is, into fields where the unconscious tends to be of much less 
concern? These questions remain in Stern’s and other psychoanalytic theories 
unanswered. 
By dividing experience in this way, Stern further offered a response to what may 
be one of the most important questions behind his theoretical assertions. Stern borrowed 
Winnicott’s (1971/2005) construct of the given and the made:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Alternatively, Loewald maintained that art is a type of “reconciliation” that offers a 
higher level organization but one that returns us, via more familiar matters such as 
symbolization and representation, to “the early magic of thought, gesture, word, image, 
emotion, fantasy, as they become united again . . . Could sublimation be both a mourning 
of loss of original onenness and a celebration of oneness regained?” Loewald, (1988, pp. 
80-81) In this sense, RA in practice can be said to have both developmental and spiritual 
dimensions. Along a similar vein, new meaning brings us to what Stern has called “the 
capacity for innocence” (Stern, 2003, p. 254). 




The great challenge of psychoanalysis has always been the problem of the given 
and the made. Somehow we must negotiate the dual claims that experience is 
discovered, that it is structural and preexists our knowing of it, and that it is 
entirely understandable in phenomenological terms, by means of grasping the 
process of understanding itself. At issue in psychoanalysis are nothing less than 
our conceptions of mind and experiencing, consciousness, the unconscious, the 
defenses, the nature of representation and interpretation and the kind of 
significance we attribute of language. (Stern, 2003, p. 3) 
 
For Stern, a central character entering this gap between already-made knowledge 
or experience and the mental construction of experience, would be “unformulated 
experience.” The unformulated offers a missing piece in the description of moment-to-
moment experience for a self that is under constant change. Unformulated experience 
offers a bridge, if a somewhat abstract one, between the process of how experience comes 
to consciousness within a necessarily limited set of structural possibilities, to be reflected 
upon and given form through language or interpretation. This is the constructivist edge of 
Stern’s thought. Experience is made from the given (2003, 2010). 
Following the Interpretive Turn, we require perspective in order to come to any 
understandings of anything. Perspective itself is a matter of interpretation, in a 
hermeneutic sense, something realized through tradition (Gadamer, 1975/2004) or 
traditions (Orange, 2011). Symbolic representation provides the necessary distance we 
need in order to interpret this less definite experience. Stern concurred with Gadamer that 
“reality exists” but is “inevitably understood from a social, historical, linguistic, and (we 
can add from our psychoanalytic vantage point) individual perspective” (Stern, 2003,  
p. 181). For Stern, “any interpretation, psychoanalytic or otherwise, is a perspective.” In 
other words, through interpretation we are able to know experience, and interpretation 
involves spoken language (Stern, 2003). 




Between these various dualities, the formulated and the unformulated, the verbal 
and the nonverbal, the given and the made, we have, then, the beginnings of a place for 
the self. As in Heideggerian philosophy (Gadamer, 1975/2004; Heidegger, 1927/2010), 
this self exists in a history, and it comes to light via traditions. For Cushman, “each of our 
lives is a point of intersecting traditions” (2011b, p. 34). In hermeneutic terms 
experience, and life itself, is constituted by language, an ongoing process that takes place 
in historical time. By its very definition, Stern’s concept of the self exists through time 
and via language. Its patterns are changed in relationship, and their less known sides 
emerge through dialogue. In psychoanalysis, attention to the unknown arranges for the 
possibility of new ways of being in relationship.  
The Problem of Self Understanding 
In Stern’s theory (2003, 2010), experience can be verbal or nonverbal but it needs 
to be structured linguistically in order to be experienced. Psychoanalysis then is a verbal 
practice that seeks understanding of linguistic practices. In this striving, it employs verbal 
thinking to examine semiotic experience and constantly to search understanding of that 
which is outside of linguistic structuring, such as Bion’s k element (1962), or Lacan’s the 
Real (Fink, 1997). Psychoanalysis also seeks to understand verbal practices themselves. 
On either the semiotic (nonverbal) or the verbal side of language, however, there can be 
different degrees of awareness. As experience is selected for formulation, partial 
meanings are brought to light, projected into greater levels of meaning.  
In this practice we are faced then with a paradox: the self is confronted with a 
conceivably impossible search for the unconscious, the unknown. Stern posed the 
question: How can we know what we do not know how to look for? (2003, p.11). In 




Stern’s work awareness of this seemingly impossible goal is a first step towards it. This is 
neither an idealism nor a Romanticism, but it does recognize the tragedy inherent in our 
hopes, as in the oedipal myth which involves both defeat and victory at once:  
In referring to ‘oedipal themes’ and struggle,’ I am thinking about a paper by 
Davies (2003) in which the successful outcome of the oedipal situation is 
conceived not just as the acceptance that one can never win, but as the acceptance 
that one will both lose and win. (Stern, 2010, p. 148) 
 
Relationship here mirrors the epistemological problem that understanding 
involves something out there while comprehension is also necessarily incomplete. Not 
only are certain, fundamental desires believed to be present from infancy onwards 
confronted by both failure and sublimated realization, but knowledge in Stern’s thought 
appears to be constructed this way, made of both wisdom and ignorance, experiencing 
and the unknown (2003).  
The hermeneutic, psychoanalytic process is likewise an attempt at self-knowledge 
that is based on an assumption of an unconscious and external reality, neither of which 
can be fully comprehended. If, as it is for Stern (2003, 2010), interpretation is needed for 
experiencing, then success and failure are givens for a hermeneutic point of view as well.  
For Gadamer, because the object of understanding is known only in light of the 
interpretation made of it, there is no independent comparison possible between 
interpretation and reality. We see what interpretations teach us to see; here we 
have a deep respect for the individual’s constructive activity. We also have the 
manifestation of Gadamer’s respect for the unimaginable richness of reality: it is 
so complex that it can accommodate multiple, even conflicting interpretations. 
(Stern, 2003, p. 183) 
 
In one way of looking at it, we are in a constant process of the destruction and 
reinvention of fictions, the creative interpretations, about ourselves and our worlds. 
Interpretation is an ongoing process. 




This is a self then, that is far from a fixed entity that exists complete and separate 
from the rest of the world. Drawing from Gadamer (1975/2004), Stern would later notice 
that this kind of knowing (2003, 2010) requires a completeness that is posited onto 
incomplete cognitions, in order to go on, in order for us to continue through time. Here 
again, this is self-in-co-creation, and Stern’s observations from clinical practice, intersect 
with a hermeneutics born of textual study. “The truth about the ‘patient’ is a mutual 
construction, the result of an interaction” (2010, p. 206). In hermeneutics, we can only 
know a text through our present relationship with it and our contextual understanding up 
to the point of engaging with the work. It seems as if we needed to know the text before 
encountering it (Palmer, 1969). Once again, the hermeneutic circle describes human 
experience. For Stern, the same process occurs phenomenologically. We require 
perspective, context, and language, in order to interpret experience. Taking this to the 
clinical setting, in Stern’s work we appear to know ourselves the same way we know 
experience, that is, interpersonally. That knowledge, furthermore, can be only partial in 
order to be sensed as complete. Stern explained the hermeneutic point-of-view in the 
following way:    
We comprehend by means of continuously projecting complete understandings 
into communications from the other, communications we actually understand only 
partially. We extrapolate complete understandings on the basis of these partial 
understandings we already have. (Stern, 2003, p. 213) 
 
These partial understandings arise from complete understandings we have already 
grasped, according to Gadamer’s (1975/2004) concept of prejudice. This way of knowing 
is contextual, and it fits well with field theory in which understanding is seen as 
perceiving a foreground and a background (Mead, 1934/1982).  




For Gadamer, this is a “hermeneutical rule: we must understand the whole in 
terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole” (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 291). 
Sullivan (1953/1997) would similarly develop a technique he called “detailed inquiry” 
that involved focusing on seeming minutiae of a particular experience which elicited 
anxiety, as a way to gain understanding of more general security operations of the self.  
In Stern’s thought, we often sense that experience has a completeness. These 
moments give way, often through interactions in the interpersonal field (or in Gadamer’s 
terms, in engagement with language), to a sense of incompleteness. Moments of 
incompleteness then lead, through dialogue with others (or their words), to shifts of the 
horizon of what we can know, and hence to a newly completed sense of knowing. Again, 
the self appears in Stern’s (1994, 2000, 2003, 2010) balancing of hermeneutic, 
constructivist, and psychoanalytic traditions, as something that is continuously made, as 
process. By necessity, this self can then only be known partially and as it is known it has 
already been shifted by the knowing. This leads to an almost rhetorical sense of knowing 
in psychoanalysis. Our interpretations of phenomenological experiences, experiences of 
the self, can be described as fitting, but they are never quite fixed for the future. They are 
always necessarily incomplete and uncertain (Richardson et al., 1999).  “One has no 
choice but to become part of something beyond one’s ken, to be inhabited by the 
unbidden, to surrender to the mystery by which we formulate what we know” (Stern, 
2003, p. 233). 
Once again, Stern’s words ring simultaneously as observations that are both 
psycho-developmental and epistemological. In Gadamer’s philosophy (1975/2004) our 
attempts to complete meanings take place as we engage with a text. This is basic 




hermeneutics. For Stern and others (e.g., Frie, 2011, Orange 2011), this activity is not 
different from human conversation. In Gadamer’s thought (1966/1976; 1975/2004), in 
effect we hold a conversation with a scripture, a text, or an artwork. The place of the 
conversation then becomes of major interest. If meaning is something we create 
determined by our location in a certain space at a certain moment, what is this certain 
space?   
An influence on Sullivan, George Herbert Mead (1934/1982) earlier indicated 
such a place with his presentation of field theory, thus making a major shift away from 
the orthodox, individualistic and private intra-personal psychology of the first half of the 
20th Century: 
Our contention is that mind can never find expression, and could never have come 
into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment; that an organized set 
or pattern of social relations and interactions (especially those of communication 
by means of gestures functioning as significant symbols and thus creating a 
universe of discourse) is necessarily pre-supposed by it and involved in its nature. 
(Mead, 1934/1982, p. 224) 
 
Mead therefore redirected the inquiry of social science away from the study of an 
indivisible, biologically determined, cellular self and towards the idea of a self of the 
social field. For Mead, “mind presupposes and is a product of, the social process” 
(1934/1982, p. 224). He called his an “entirely social theory or interpretation of mind—
this contention that mind develops and has its being only in and by virtue of the social 
process” (p. 224).  
Stern’s theory of self likewise requires social process. It connects a 
psychoanalytic idea of the self that is known through engagement in the interpersonal 
field to a Gadamerian concept of how we come to know things. In the hermeneutic sense, 
knowing is partial and it requires moments in which completeness is projected onto 




thought. Knowing involves our traditions as we are constantly constructing and 
reconstructing them. In Stern’s psychoanalysis (2003, 2010), strong, mutual enactments 
are moments or long periods in which both parties are locked into a narrowed or 
repetitive and stuck way of experiencing, due to unconscious events in the interpersonal 
field. We can also come to know things, in both field theory and in hermeneutic 
philosophy, through focusing on a detail or understanding at a greater distance. This 
knowing, too, is partial but gives way to at least temporary moments of wholeness. This 
suggests the need for future study on the temporality of experience and the self in RA. 
Furthermore, by definition the best efforts of those caught in enactments are, while it 
lasts, thwarted.  How is it that when locked into an enactment as Stern has defined it, the 
participants cannot simply take some emotional or intellectual distance, in order to 
extricate either side? There is a potential for further research in examining how patient 
and therapist focus on different aspects, and the background and foreground, of the field. 
Out of Our Skulls: Unmapping the Self 
Pinning down a clear topology of the individual in Stern’s writings is to engage in 
a procedure that the author has rejected. For Foucault (1963/1994, 1975/1995), mapping 
is an important function of the medical gaze. It is created through a junction of a certain 
kind of thinking, a physical examining that gives primacy to the visual, and a type of 
observation that is crowned by its own specialized language of power. For Foucault, the 
patient is constructed medically through a procedural language, and this language 
involves a mapping, whether it be of anatomical or of one’s home in proximity 
contaminated water pumps in 19th Century London (see also, Tufte, 2001).  




Stern joined with Foucault in questioning the universalism and authority awarded 
to the expert process of clinically mapping the subject. Turning to psychology, Stern 
went further, to offer a replacement of Freud’s topology of the psyche with a more 
abstract vision of the self.   
As Foucault would have it (1963/1994), remedying the problems of the individual 
self in post-Enlightenment society has generally meant increasing the categorization of 
the individual, a constant accretion of facts about the personal and the spaces in between 
selves or bodies. This has become a particularly invested activity as capitalism and 
technology have grown increasingly pervasive and complex in Western society. It is 
therefore an issue as to whether Stern’s rejection of the bounded individual entails a 
sufficient questioning of our ability to record the self. That is, does the notion of a 
changing, unfixed, fluid sort of self, embodied within a social field also produce or 
require an individual that comes to light via ever-increasing codification, as Foucault 
(1963/1994) described through his analysis of the birth of the clinic? 
Would treating a more fluid self-generated through relationship require an 
enormously accelerated production of factual, analytic, or even associative or artistic 
documentation of the individual, as a way to resolve emotional problems and pain? 
Previous discussion in the Methods chapter has pointed to Stern’s deep concern with 
language, that is, with the effects of exactly how we talk in session and how we discuss a 
patient. This involves both the practices and the language used in RA. Below, I examine 
Stern’s response to the question of how we constitute relationship through language and 
being heard by others. Relevant questions, in any case, remain: What does it mean to talk, 
to theorize, or to write about a single patient as fluid and changing? What kind of person 




is the therapist constituting here and what are the parameters that make a person, patient, 
character, client, or individual? And who is the therapist when she does so? What are the 
therapist’s and the patient’s claims in this process? Whose voice(s) come into such 
activities? 
Loosening the bounds of reification of the self means conceiving of a self that is 
indeed highly changeable and exists in process, as maintained Sullivan (1953/1997). 
Stern noted (2010) that the unconscious in such a conception is also suddenly free of its 
previous contents.  
The era of psychic geography is dead. Unformulated experience is possibility, the 
various potential meanings that might expand from the present moment. Only 
one, or some, of these potentials are ever realized. Unformulated experience is the 
source of what experience can become. And so, because it does not yet exist, it 
cannot really be said to be located anywhere, not even in the brain.  
(Stern, 2010, p. 3) 
 
This is clearly a self of the field. Mead’s field theory, an influence on Stern’s 
thinking, offers a similar challenge to our assumptions of individuality as defined by 
epidermal or calcified division. In a footnote (1934/1982, p. 223) Mead declared,  
We are opposing all intracranial or intra-epidermal views as to its character and 
locus. . . . The field of mind must be co-extensive and include all the components 
of the field of the social process of experience and behavior, i.e., the matrix of 
social relations and interactions among individuals, which is presupposed by it, 
and out of which it arises or come into being . . . . that field cannot be bounded by 
the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs. (Mead, 1934/1982,  
pp. 223-224) 
 
For Mead, the field of the self both covers and is covered by the field of all social 
relationship. Everything that constitutes social experience constitutes the personal as 
well. Similarly, Coburn (2007) described a contemporary psychoanalysis informed by 
complexity theory, holding strong opposition to the long-held notion of an isolated mind. 




For Coburn, such a theory includes questioning the internalization of the psyche. In 
critiquing assumptions behind much of traditional psychological thought, Coburn wrote: 
Some of these assumptions include the notions that intrapsychic life, and 
consequently the structuring of personality (or subjectivity), emanates from 
biological drives or from the internalization (and the resulting internal 
representations thereof) of self and object relations early in life; or that reality is 
objective, concrete, static, and verifiable, and that it is potentially distorted 
(hence, transference) via one’s subjectivity; or that “the mind” is relatively 
isolated and/or protected from that which physically resides outside the cranium. 
(Coburn, 2007, p. 2, footnote 5). 
 
For Coburn, on the other hand, “emotional experiences and their concomitant 
meanings [are] fluidly and dynamically patterned and exquisitely sensitive to the nuances 
of relational contexts” (2011, p. 585). For Coburn, then, emotional experiences are not 
absolutely free of constraint, nor are they rule-driven, nor are they “the product and 
property of individual, segregated minds” (p. 585)  As with  Stern’s theory, the 
interpersonal field as a locus of emotional cognitive events brings into question ideas of a 
separate individual acting on and reacting to an external environment. In a 
hermeneutically informed RA, our very knowledge of experience emerges from and 
within this field, and the interpersonal space is subsequently changed by it. “New 
reflection opens up other areas for consideration and change, and in that way the process 
of change proceeds outward, in ripples” (Stern, 2010, p. 173). 
However, Stern’s writings take different turns when they touch on the interiority-
exteriority question. Following Heidegger’s philosophy, Stern maintained that we are 
embodied. Heidegger’s embodiment puts into question the mind-body split. For 
Heidegger (1927/2010), we are physical beings existing in a particular place and time. 
That is one of Heidegger’s few givens. Being is also tied into language. Similarly, Lakoff 
and Johnson, according to Stern, “characterize metaphor . . . as a matter of the body . . . 




far from being a mere figure of speech, metaphor lies right at the heart of thought”  
(2003, p. 131). For Lakoff and Johnson (1999), then, metaphor connects subjective 
experience, such as feeling and even sensorimotor experience. Metaphor is essential to 
cognition. Hence, in Stern’s reading, metaphor is a “phenomenon of the body” (2010,  
p. 131).  
In a footnote (2010), Stern also made the surprising assertion that “it does not 
make sense to refer to the world ‘outside our mind,’ because mind and world are unity” 
(p. 133, footnote 1). Stern here linked the physical and mental, and they are connected 
through the very physical basis of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), that is, we can 
assume, by language. To this, Kristeva would add that humans are connected via 
language to psychic experience, and in effect to desire. For Kristeva, practices such as 
literature, psychoanalysis, and linguistics suggest the “missing link” in the social sciences 
to create a dialectic capable of moving beyond certain ideological limits (Kristeva, 1980).  
There is a nearly metaphysical quality to Stern’s adoption of Lakoff and 
Johnson’s physicality of language, invoking a certain wonder at existence. A person may 
be nothing outside of his or her experience, and this experience is in some sense just that 
world through the times of one’s experiencing. We are caught in a seemingly fallen world 
of incessant limitation, and also a world full of possibilities that are both anxiety-
provoking and bold with wonder, a sort of numinous tremens (Otto, 1924) of everyday 
practice. It seems no mistake that Mitchell titled one of his two major works, Hope and 
Dread in Psychoanalysis (1993). Bromberg has further pointed out that two poles of 
experience “find a voice” in dialogue, such as in psychoanalysis (Bromberg, 1996, p. 
278). Therefore, in a sense, Mitchell’s book title is an apt phrase for the Existential 




epistemology of RA, because the polar experiences of understanding and confusion often 
play out in the psychoanalytic relationship. Once the blank screen was removed, it is 
likely that many clinicians have felt both the hope and dread quite consciously, often 
within a single session.28  
Beyond any concomitant obligation under the acceptance of field theory to 
question the social or linguistic construction of the individual self, in more recent works 
Stern has put forward a self that is multiple, has various states, and carries on a rich 
internal life.  
Implications of more contained, private self appear to be a reversal of Stern’s self 
that is constituted in language and comes to experience via the interpersonal field. In 
recent writing (2013a, 2013b) Stern, with good reason I believe, has, not been anxious to 
jettison particularly recent object relational theory. Instead, he has engaged this theory, 
by entering into dialogue with writers on Bionian Field Theory.  
The interpersonal and the object relational set up a serious contradiction. How do 
we follow Sullivan’s notion of self as something that arises dynamically out of ongoing 
relationship (1953/1997) with an interiority that can in some way be recognized? Stern 
has struggled to find parallels of his own theory, however, in object relational writers 
such as Ferro and Civitarese (2013).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 It could be argued that one effect of the focus on evidence based treatments has been 
merely to move the blank screen from the mind of the psychotherapist to the manual that 
guides therapeutic practice. In either case, there is an assumption of an objectivity that is 
able both to reflect reality back to the individual with phenomenal and consistent 
accuracy, and to create internal change with the greatest possible curative power or 
efficiency, without any interpretation involved in the process. When participation is 
alienated, emotion struggle is illusorily removed or simply dissociated 




 In an earlier footnote (2012c), Stern objected to a notion of mind that is somehow 
all exterior, social, or interactive within the field. Stern wrote: 
This point has been taken by some (e.g., Busch, 2001) that Relational and 
Interpersonal theories do away with the individual mind. This contention 
represents a serious misunderstanding. Relational and Interpersonal theories do 
take account of the interaction of minds, and are based in the position that such 
interaction is continuous. But that is not at all the same things a suggesting that 
only interaction exists. No theory of psychoanalysis can do without the individual 
mind. (Stern, 2012c, p. 12, note 7) 
 
It is not clear if Stern’s contention was that the mind is in some way different 
from the self, the self being interpersonal in nature, while mind is something far more 
extensive. Questions remain: Is RA simply a very, very strong emphasis on relationship 
in psychology or does it go further, to offer a challenge to an ongoing social construction 
of self?  
Theoreticians will need to continue to grapple with questions about what 
conceptions of mind, self, and personhood best serve patients suffering from 
psychological problems in today’s social surround, how these conceptions mirror the 
historical setting, and if they offer help or a means of resistance to oppression and a 
chaotic society that contributes to such suffering. When we define a mind or a self that is 
experienced as separate from other, what facets of an American type of individualism are 
we also accepting in that definition? What does it mean for a self to be intersubjective 
(e.g., Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002) or interpersonal (e.g., Benjamin, 2004; Stern, 
1994)? To take a step beyond, what does it mean for a self to be empty (Cushman, 1990), 
and then to become flat and to have multiple self-states or we might say versions 
(Cushman & Gilford, 1999; Stern, 2003)? Stern has addressed this question (2000) by 
stating that there is a need to accept an aspect of the self that is somehow set off from 




social relations: “The problem is to maintain some kernel of psychic life that cannot be 
completely dissolved in social relations, and to accomplish this without having to posit 
essences” (Stern, 2000, p. 762). 
This is a solution as description. It is likely that in clinical work, even the most 
interpersonal, field-oriented, or even post-modern of psychotherapists regularly ask 
themselves, What can be going on in this patient’s mind? Therapists likely often work to 
construct for themselves what they take to be even the most private of the patient’s 
experiences.  
From a more philosophical or explanatory, theoretical perspective, however, 
questions remain. What kind of assumptions do therapists make about their own 
judgment or ability to perceive the other, when they do assume that they can freely switch 
from notions of the social to the very internal? What does it mean when therapists move 
from a deep sense of the patient’s private experience to interpersonal relating? The quote 
from Stern above seems to let in a residue of Cartesian separateness, while also denying 
universal claims to a psychological understanding of essences.  
When we move to the concept of a more internalized self, are we inadvertently 
taking on the metaphor of a self that is no longer flat but rather one that requires varying 
degrees of depth? In such a case, what happens to notions of multiplicity? If the self stays 
multiple but has a depth of experiencing and consciousness, would that structure not in 
some ways suggest a return Freud’s topographical self, with an ego that has multiple 
parts which are both conscious and unconscious?  
 
     




Metaphors of the Self 
Stern arrived at the closest thing to a visual metaphor for the mind by way of 
discussing trauma and dissociation. In Sullivan’s work (1953/1997) dissociation is a 
defensive process, and in Stern’s (2003, 2010) thought it takes on a primary role in daily 
life, to supplant “repression as the primary defensive operation” (2010, p. 139).  
In addition to the usual definition of a blocking from awareness in order to make 
other awareness possible, dissociation is for Stern and Sullivan an active process in which 
attention is averted from intolerable aspects of experience, and relevant meaning-making 
is thus prevented. For Sullivan (1953/1997), this was bound with the not-me, that is, 
intolerable aspects of self. Stern joined a number of other thinkers (e.g., Bucci 1985; 
Davies, 1996; Mitchell, 1993; Sullivan, 1950/1971, 1953/1997), and in particular 
Bromberg (1996, 2000) in positing that the single self is composed of multiple selves or 
self-states, which are called out by the interpersonal field. 
In Stern’s theory of multiplicity it is not just that we move in and out of self-
states, but “we also are moved in and out of self-states” (2003, p.154). According to 
Stern, we have some say, some responsibility in this, and we are as well to some degree 
transported by the interpersonal field. We relate (Stern 2010, 2012c), then, via patterns 
learned from relationships with caregivers early in life, and these patterns emerge in 
future relationships, to be refashioned by them. This dissociative mechanism offers both a 
developmental background to Stern’s theory and a lens for conceptualizing resistance and 
personality. It does so, however, by regularly referring the psychotherapist back to 
attending to the interpersonal field, a world that is in some sense paradoxically outside 
and within.  




The first type of dissociation that which is in process daily, helps to explain the 
development of “gross patterns” of relating (Sullivan, 1953/1997, p. 6). The second, 
trauma-related dissociation explains how patients become stuck when there emerge 
intolerable ways of relating, the not-me. For Stern (2010), the existence of interpersonal 
patterns and this second type of dissociation help explain what happens in a mutual 
enactment. This is a particularly important event to explain in psychotherapy, because by 
definition it is a period of mutual confusion.  
In an enactment, a person experiences what Racker (1968) called a 
complimentary transference. Enacting, we experience someone in a more recent 
relationship in a way that is similar to how a significant other felt to us in the past. On the 
contrary, in a concordant transference, we experience the other as acting just the way a 
disowned, unacceptable pattern of our own self must have felt to a significant person of 
the past.  
In the latter, in concordant transference, we experience the other as a fragment of 
our own not-me, that which must not be me. It is a more or less intolerable and hence 
dissociated from our own notion of our self. Dissociation of this type is problematic 
precisely because it occurs repeatedly. There is a developmental quality to it (Stern, 
2003), because such transference likely originated with aspects that an important 
caregiver in the past also disowned. Concordant transference of this sort indicates 
problematic behaviors that emerge but are buried within the transparency of the familiar, 
and such transference may be precisely what brought the patient in for psychotherapy. 
Stern has described the effects of the two types of transference in a relationship in which 
at least one person has experienced trauma: 




In one variety of enactment I embody the traumatized self, in a continuous and 
futile attempt to make everything happen differently, thereby healing myself; 
but instead I provoke the other person to experience and behave in ways that, 
tragically, simply keep retraumatizing me. In the reciprocal version of this 
enactment, in a similarly unconscious attempt to wrest control of the situation, 
I traumatize the other just as I have myself been traumatized, but I have little 
or no appreciation of my role in doing so. (Stern, 2011, pp. 84-85) 
 
There is a phenomenally creative and destructive power assigned to this interplay 
of transferences. It resembles Benjamin’s (2004) concept of doer and done-to in 
relationships. Furthermore, these descriptions could go a long way to explain acts of 
cruelty on the levels of whole societies or cultures, in which a cycle of traumatization 
seems inescapable, due, precisely, to the rigidity of a history of mutual enactment and, of 
course, the failure built into these interpersonal patterns. (We can surmise, however, that 
no particular transferential position can last, with any satisfaction, forever because it 
means being stuck in a relationship long past).  
 How, then, can one account for the frequently contradictory experiences salient in 
psychoanalysis? Stern wrote vignettes of a variety of experiences, his own and those of 
others, in which he encountered states that militated against the perceptions of the unity 
of a single mind. “The mind is therefore theorized not as a vertical organization of 
consciousness and unconsciousness, but as a horizontally organized collection of self-
states, states of being, or states of mind, each in dynamic relation to the others” (Stern, 
2010, pp. 139-140). 
These self-states fit well with Sullivan’s constructs (1953/1997) of a good-me, a 
bad-me, and a not-me. For Stern, some self-states are in harmony with each other and 
may be experienced simultaneously. On the other hand, some sets of self-states cannot 
tolerably co-exist within awareness. While he has accepted the usefulness of Sullivan’s 




conceptualizing of a critic (Stern, 2010), that is, a critical voice patterned from childhood 
after relational moments of censoring caregivers, Stern also maintained that there is no 
retreat from intersubjectivity. Therefore, no critic or other state of self holds any kind of 
verticality over the rest of the personality. Stern here rejected a single, unitary, watching 
self that would act to monitor what is allowed into awareness or to hold these states 
together. Instead, he suggested an intriguing alternative to how the self experiences the 
world.  
For experience to be grasped, reflection must take place, and metaphor must 
emerge. Anxiety or trauma can obstruct such joining or emergence of metaphor. 
The reason metaphor is rejected is that the two experiences in question invoke 
states of self that are dissociated from each other. To accept the metaphor would 
require simultaneously accepting me and not-me. I would have to accept that I am 
what I cannot be, what I refuse to be. What is rejected, then, when metaphor is 
blocked, is not memory but a certain experience of who I am.  
(Stern, 2010, p. 140) 
 
It follows that the self does not hold contents but rather takes on different 
structures or patterns of relating along its development. This way of thinking remains 
quintessentially post-modern, in its decentralization of knowledge and its rejection of 
reified individuality (Foucault, 1966/1994; Sarup, 1988/1993). 
Our knowing by this description is constructionist in that it comes through our 
ongoing, momentary creation of meaning. Our being is subject to linguistic interpretation, 
in that it requires metaphor for understanding. As in postmodernist critiques (Fairfield et 
al., 2002; Sarup, 1988/1993), content, and in clinical work our memories and any words 
we might use to invoke them, no longer provide even a covert route to the truth or the 
real; rather, they are constituted of our present experience through language and emerge 
from the interpersonal field (see, for e.g., Frederickson on Sullivan’s interpersonal 
relations, 2000). We might take this a step further and propose that content in this 




description is always a product of process. What we tell ourselves is a function of 
experience, and experience is the result of a constant and necessarily partial attempt to 
know (Gadamer, 1975/2004). This parallels Gadamer’s notion of engaging with a text, 
the hermeneutic conversation which: 
like real conversation, finds a common language, and that finding a common 
language is not, any more than in real conversation, preparing a tool for the 
purpose of reaching understanding but, rather, coincides with the very act of 
understanding and reaching agreement. Even between the partners of this 
‘conversation’ a communication like that between two people takes place that is 
more than mere accommodation. The text brings a subject matter into language, 
but that it does so is ultimately the achievement of the interpreter. Both have a 
share in it. (Gadamer, 1975/2004, pp. 389-90) 
 
The psychoanalytic session could be seen as analogous to Gadamer’s text. In 
psychoanalysis, two persons engage in an attempt at new understanding that is beyond a 
simple contract of convenience. Each side requires effort, and understanding is located by 
this theory within the historical moment, that is, at a unique intersection of persons, place, 
and time. Hence, language possesses an artistic quality. It is simultaneously material, 
convention, and it can be used in a way that appears to be made up, invented on the fly. 
For Stern, “psychoanalysts love the forms experience can take as critics love art” (Stern, 
2003, p. 90). Language is fraught with its own moment of enunciation (or reading), with 
characterization, unpredictability, and creative potential, Stern’s “unbidden experience.”  
Stern has emphasized (2010), however, that such processes are not necessarily 
limited to epiphanic moments of great artistry but occur for each of us daily. This, too, is 
similar to Gadamer’s description of dialogic conversation: 
[It] is a process of two people understanding each other. Thus it is a characteristic 
of every true conversation that each opens himself to the other person, truly 
accepts his point of view as worthy of consideration and gets inside the other to 
such an extent that he understands not a particular individual, but what he says. 
The thing that has to be grasped is the objective rightness or otherwise of his 




opinion, so that they can agree with each other on a subject. (Gadamer, 1979,  
p. 347) 
 
For Gadamer, such authentic discussion is neither achieved every time two people 
converse, nor is it the province of exceptional persons or circumstances. Psychoanalysis 
for Stern involves such dialogue, in the sense that it also requires the mutual openness of 
which Gadamer has written. For Stern, openness from the psychoanalyst’s side requires 
acceptance of the inevitability of enactments, uncomfortable moments (or possibly even 
months during treatment) in which the psychoanalyst is forced to experience herself as 
the counterpart to self-states the patient has habitually disowned, aspects of the patient’s 
not-me. Stern’s thought here is quintessentially relational in that it places the workload 
and the hope for understanding the interpersonal or intersubjective space onto neither an 
expert psychotherapist nor the patient, but onto the in-between. This thought is, again, 
reflective of the Interpretive Turn (Hiley et al., 1991) in that it accepts language as the 
system of generating meaning within a relationship in world of productive power, as with 
Foucault’s definition of knowledge itself (Foucault, 1963/1994, 1966/1994, 1975/1995). 
It is classically psychoanalytic in that it holds to an acceptance of the inevitability of 
transference and countertransference and the constant hope of creativity and 
understanding through interpersonal conflict. Stern’s concept of the self appears to be 
non-horizontal (two-dimensional), while its shape remains ambiguous, subject to each 
moment’s formulations in relation to others, and framed by the culture, language, and 
moral traditions of the therapist and patient.  
Further Implications of Different Selves: A Disappearing Interior   
While the self may be a process to some degree determined by the interpersonal 
field, throughout Stern’s writings (2003, 2010) is a quiet assumption of a psychological 




interior. The social self of the field in Mead’s (1934/1982) theory is modified within 
Stern’s work, to include some type of individual or internal experiencing. Throughout 
Stern’s writings, there is rare but occasional recourse to language suggesting an internal 
life of the self.  
As noted above, Stern would posit the existence of an individual mind only in 
more recent writings. Such a separate mind in theory, again, may be necessary in order to 
engage with significant aspects of Western culture (e.g., a legal system based on 
Individualism and Romanticism). For Stern, relationality therefore requires more than 
one being in relation. “Relational and Interpersonal theories do take account of the 
interaction of minds, and are based on the position that such interaction is continuous. 
But that is not at all the same thing as suggesting that only interaction exists” (Stern, 
2012a, p. 12, footnote 7). 
In addition to the interpersonal field, then, the psychoanalyst attends to what may 
be occurring within the patient’s mind. According to Stern’s earlier writings, this would 
never be out of the reach of the field (2003), nor would it have a privileged, hermetic 
mental space that might provide access to objective moments of insight. However, it is 
not clear in Stern’s theory how separate an individual mind might be from the effects of 
another person, say, another person talking in one’s presence. This ambiguity raises a 
number of questions.  
To what degree are we able to reify one another and remain unaffected by social 
contact? What determines proximity or distance within the interpersonal field? For 
example, are we in interpersonal relationship with the myriads of people we pass in a city 




street? How would we assess an interpersonal field via video feed, as in telemedicine? 
These questions are yet to be addressed.  
One effect of trauma could be seen as an attempt to withdraw from a situation, 
and hence from intolerable moments of relatedness. Similarly, torturers have been 
conceptualized as engaging in a failed attempt to transcend relationship with the victim.29 
If, on the other hand, unlike Stern, we reject the existence of completely separate minds, 
who or what does psychoanalysis treat? Are there limits to the interpersonal field, and if 
so, how does a self or self state move across them?  
For both Stern (2003, 2010) and Gadamer (1975/2004), the individual is not 
bound to a fixed, empirical state of being. The significance of psychoanalytic practice 
grows here, because of the hermeneutic supposition that we are constituted through 
culture and dialogue. Accepting Gadamer’s hermeneutics as Stern does means accepting 
the individual as something other than reified. For Gadamer, dialogue requires engaging 
in a process with a background of being open to what is expressed by the other: 
[It] is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true 
conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of 
view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he 
understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to be grasped 
is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one with each 
other on the subject. Thus we do not relate the other’s opinion to him but to our 
own opinions and views. (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 387) 
 
Even for Gadamer, the self appears to be something that we can try to 
comprehend but it also belies concretization or even the full knowledge of itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The rage frequently experienced by torturers when their victims transcend by passing 
out or passing away (Van Eenwyk, 2007) has been explained as a failed attempt at 
transcending the pain of being in relationship. The victim transcends by dissociating, 
losing consciousness or life itself, while the perpetrator must remain locked within the 
tension of the field. 




Understanding is not a matter of mystically entering the other’s mind but of striving 
together towards an understanding that seems right. Gadamer distinguished this kind of 
conversation from a tradeoff in which one is “concerned with the other as individuality” 
(p. 387), such as a criminal interrogation. For Gadamer, the latter did not constitute a true 
understanding. 
If we are created, co-created, and re-created through an open exchange with each 
other, and through our different traditions, then a type of relationship in which every 
aspect of the dialogue is open to each other’s interpretation (Fairfield, 2001; Hoffman, 
1983; Stern, 2010) suggests an ability to deconstruct in psychotherapy a kind of  
hyper-hermeneutics. In hermeneutics, this suggests a particular emphasis on the 
hermeneutic circle (Stern, 2003). Psychoanalysis proposes a way to up the ante in how 
we reflect on relationship because it is a rare form of language in which language 
frequently offers itself to be to subject of discussion. In psychoanalysis, the subject of the 
dialogue can be as elusive as the unconscious itself. In RA, what either side says or does 
is regularly opened up, unpacked, mused, or reflected upon.  
This acceptance of a dyadic fluidity is one of the defining characteristics of RA 
(e.g., see Mitchell, 1988; Ogden, 1994), and it involves a departure from most other 
social practice. Psychoanalysis appears to differ from mainstream psychological practice 
by its attention to nuance, symbolism, and other aspects of the narrative. For Stern, this 
functionality is possible because of the psychoanalytic acceptance of irrationality in 
process and, in Stern’s own theory, because of the psychoanalyst’s willingness to attend 
to signs of the unbidden and to accept the unexpected. Language’s ability to create and 
offer experience for reflection in Stern’s RA allows for the unseen to emerge from 




language, and therefore it permits the participants to discover the new and surprising out 
of the generally dull fog of the familiar (2003).  
Whenever we are trying to understand, we are working with part-whole relations. 
We try to comprehend something new by grasping it partially, just enough to 
identify it as an instance of something familiar, a meaning we already know. Then 
we project this ‘whole’ meaning onto the ‘partial’ one we have constructed, 
completing the partial meaning—and the [hermeneutic] [brackets added] circle. 
(Stern, 2010, p. 46) 
 
 Stern did not posit a theoretical concept of temporality, but one could be derived 
to some degree from Gadamer’s thought (1975/2004) in relation to Stern’s description. In 
our finitude, we are created out of the past, through reflection on it, which thrusts us 
towards the future. Stern wrote that “the formulation of experience is a mystery: it 
belongs to us more truly than anything we own, but we do not control it” (Stern, 2003,  
p. 79).  
 Therefore, reflection involves not just a seeing but includes an act of the 
imagination. For Stern, understanding appears to arrive somewhere between an act of will 
or desire, and variables beyond our grasp. Stern referred to the formulation of experience 
“as a mystery that combined both agency and unbiddenness, and …a crucial element—
the creative use of language—is missing from purely instrumental accounts”  
(2003, p. 121).  
There is an important implication about time here. Creativity, then, or 
imagination, makes the act that pulls the future into the present. The present, therefore, is 
the play between the two aspects of language and experience. It is composed of the 
relational play between the givenness of tradition and the ever-constant generation of 
meaning through the possibilities of traditions within themselves and played upon each 
other in ongoing human relationship. According to Heidegger (1927/2010), our historical 




thrownness and our language, our living through history or histories, formulate us in an 
ongoing way. Reflection in psychoanalysis, it could then be said, is a way to attend to 
what we attend to, or what we fail to notice. By Gadamer’s philosophy (1975/2004), it is 
the knower knowing about knowing.  
Such epistemological circularity may sound bizarrely close to Cartesian thought. 
However, this non-Cartesian, hermeneutic theory involves a much wider definition of 
knowing than the sole process of logical reasoning. Foucault questioned the effects of the 
Western empiricism which has centralized logic (1966/1994) as a solution to the 
problems of humankind. Along the same lines in Stern’s theory (2003), when the 
psychoanalyst maintains that something is positively known, it often signals an occasion 
for self-questioning. In practice, the psychotherapist will ask questions of herself, such 
as: Why did I need to claim to know something? How did I come to know something? 
Stern’s notion of cognition as an amalgam that includes both affect and thought opens 
great possibilities for mental process. 
Psychoanalysis, then, has had the startling effect of presenting knowing as a 
process. This, too, is highly congruent with hermeneutic thought. Gadamer (1975/2005) 
recognized that the knowledge of texts changes with who one is, the traditions one brings 
to it, and so on. Our historicity (our location in certain traditions; our being in a certain 
time and place) determines our experience and language, and hence our knowing at any 
given moment. Therefore, our experiences, interpretations, thoughts, and judgments of a 
text may seem familiar to us when they actually exist in a rare intersection of space, 
culture, and time, regardless of how thoroughly we may research or reconstruct a facade 
of the author’s past. In the first part of this Findings-Discussion (p.48 ff), I discussed 




Stern’s ideas of pathology as being unique to the self’s moment in place and time. 
Gadamer’s (1975/2004, 2006) work suggests a similar idea, that no reading of a text can 
be either a perfect reproduction nor can any reading of a text be perfectly reproduced. 
Again, this thought leads back to a Heraclitian sense of time. One could also say that it 
suggests an equally mysterious sense of character, in which each instance of identity is 
unique and in some way open to our grasp. Similarly, a historical or genealogical reading 
of knowledge (Foucault, 1966/1994) offers a challenge to notions of linear progress, the 
bourgeois notion that history, technology, and providence are carrying civilization in a 
state of constant improvement.  
Stern (2003) applied the same assumption of the uniqueness of each interpretation 
to psychology. We can always create an exacting case formulation. In Stern’s thought, it 
would be unlikely, given the necessity of our subjectivity, that such a formulation could 
ever be anything precise. Our own interpretations are the creations of a moment in 
relationship. As soon as we cling to them as fact, we are back to the concern of claiming 
to know too much of the patient and to the possibility of all our attendant ulterior 
motives. In such a case, we narrow our experience to fit the familiar, rather than 
challenging the familiar to shift the horizons of our knowledge. Case formulation is 
always a work in process. Stern wrote, “I mean to describe the interpersonal field, as a 
matter of fact, as a small-scale analogue of the [hermeneutic] horizon or the clearing” 
(2003, p. 158).  The interpersonal field may be the most important place where we are 
allowed to know about our own horizons. 
We are legion: Towards a geography of multiplicity. In this theory, the self 
may be process. However, for Stern it is a process of interpersonal patterns more like 




states of being (2003, 2010) that are usually separated from each other through 
dissociation. In general, we move between states through our involvement with another 
person in the interpersonal field. Relationship calls forth who we are and how we will be. 
The not-me, intolerable states, may also emerge. Such emergence brings about enactment 
(2003, 2010). That may frequently involve blaming the other, not merely a displacement 
operation but a deeply felt sense that one’s counterpart must be in the wrong and that the 
other is repeatedly thwarting all attempts at resolution.30 Mutual enactment is experienced 
as the other’s business and one’s own role is disowned, unseen. 
Dissociation means we do not know of the experience. Stern has further modified 
this definition (2003) to suggest that dissociated experience can be made accessible, that 
it can come into consciousness, but dissociation may also parch unformulated experience 
such that there are strong limits on its possibilities. We see here the transfer of a 
dichotomous word (in common usage, things are dissociated or they are not), to a term of 
degree (in this theory something may be somewhat dissociated). In Stern’s hermeneutic 
terms (2003), this means that dissociation limits what can be done with experience, how 
“useful” experience can be in constructing further experience. The explanation is helpful, 
because it allows for dissociation to be an activity, while it also accounts for the contrary, 
that is, for dissociation as an erasure of the viability of what has occurred in the past. The 
latter sort, those dissociations that bleed out experience, are defensively motivated. They 
are “unconsciously enforced disconnection between experience and its most fitting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Given its attention to conflict and mutual understanding, one can ask what this theory 
might tell us about war, pacifism, conflict resolution, and political activism. Stern pointed 
in this direction in Partners in Thought (2010) in discussing blocked labor disputes. 




context(s), a disconnection that prevents some of the understandings and new meaning 
that would otherwise be possible” (Stern, 2010, p. 50).  
As with any defense, breaching such disconnection would not be without its 
affective consequences. “At these times crossing to other selves are like chasms in a 
glacier” 31 (Stern, 2010, p. 51).  
Stern’s dissociation is hence both an experience and not an experience. When 
dissociation is allowed to be a term of degree, it contains an implicit hope. In this case, 
within the safety of treatment, aspects of the not-me have the potential of being brought 
over time into consciousness. Even in the strong sense, dissociation, for all its power, can 
be gently overcome, and aspects of the not-me can be brought into what is tolerable 
(2003). The role of humor here comes to mind, that is, the impossible coming to light, the 
doorknob coming off at the last moment of the session. It is as if the world and the 
imagination momentarily conspired, somehow to return with the unbidden. 
The self, then, involves various types of self-states, some of which can be 
experienced simultaneously, and all of which are called out by the interpersonal field. For 
Stern, the experience of crossing from one self-state to another is usually unconscious. 
He maintained that crossing self-states is similar to the act of driving and crossing into 
different townships (2010). With normal dissociation, “the boundaries between self-states 
present little or no obstacles to the mind, traffic across the lines proceeding with no more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Note that Stern (2003, 2010) has generally written of only “self-states” though he has 
occasionally joined with Bromberg (1996) in referring to self-states as actual “selves.” 
The point may appear trivial. However, if there are indeed multiple selves in each of us, 
that would put into question Sullivan’s self-as-process, offering instead a more 
concretized notion of personhood, even if it involves a personhood of multiple selves. 
These questions are proximal to Frederickson’s (2009) concern with multiplicity being 
limited to an ontic approach to Being. 




notice or effort than it takes to cross the demarcation of one municipality to another” 
(Stern, 2010, p. 50).  
In these moments, we may be unaware of what is happening. If made aware, we 
would possibly not tolerate the knowledge of these different states and their differences. 
They are part of the flexibility of daily living and are simply the transformations in the 
self that occur in being inter-related and involved with others. Questioning (as is 
frequently done in psychoanalysis) might elicit a response such as, “Yes, I felt different 
with him at that moment” and invite further exploration of experience.32 This is a theory 
in which psychotherapeutic practice cannot be separated from both a historical and 
ethical practices. 
Findings-Discussion Chapter 3: Moral Understandings and Experience 
The focus of Stern's writing (2003, 2010) is largely on the clinical practice of RA. 
For Stern, the interpersonal process of enactment involves patient and psychoanalyst 
being fixed or stuck in a relational impasse, and then feeling their way out of it. In the 
best of cases, they will eventually be able to reflect on what in the interpersonal field has 
held them in check, to arrive at at a new level of dialogue. A result may be not only relief 
but an increased understanding of the mutual struggle.  
However, given its intensity and mutality, working through and then reflecting on 
an enactment in itself here appears to be a moral and a political activity. The idea of a 
radical uncertainty that is confronted in dialogue, and Stern’s fundamental project of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 We see here the value of Sullivan’s detailed inquiry (1953/1997). The psychotherapist 
calls forth the experience of the interpersonal as a way to explore what is being missed in 
the story. Such exploration is then key to tougher moments of gaps, experience that is 
disowned, or the more defensive activities of selective inattention. One sense of the 
detailed inquiry could be a search for the conditions of Stern’s type of enactment, a 
foregrounded towards the chaos of the familiar. 




searching for that which either side in relationship has dissociated, from the outset 
assume a stance of extreme freedom that would imply a resistance to unconscious aspects 
of power (Stern, 2003). If we accept the hermeneutic stance, that we are constituted by 
language and through our different traditions, then a process of change that is relational 
in this way may involve each person’s interpersonal patterns, but it is also fundamentally 
a social experience as well as a personal experience.  
In other words, the search for what is not already known already assumes a 
resistance to the kind of power that puts patient, psychoanalyst, or both, into unconscious 
conformity to unwanted rules or strictures. A devotion to examining unknown or 
unconscious assumptions is a devotion to questioning familiar assumptions. To be rigid 
means to be unquestioning, whether deliberately or unconsciously so. The idea implies 
that, whether we like it or not, moral, political influences likely enter even the most 
private ways of being.  
 How, then, do we talk about politics while remaining aware of our own defensive 
motivations for doing so? If a patient’s safety is paramount, can open political discourse 
exist in a psychotherapy that consciously delves into a patient’s most shameful, fearsome, 
secret, or private experiences? 
Contrarily, could our concerns for safety, both nationally and in our most intimate 
moments in psychotherapy, pose some type of unconscious obstacle to anything 
resembling the political or moral, ranging from nuance to real social action? If, as 
Foucault has maintained (1966/1994, 1975/1995), power and politics are somehow in 
evidence everywhere where there is knowledge, then anyone in affective need of the type 
of a secure relationship Stern has described (2003) is in an extremely difficult position in 




the search for better self-understanding. The psychoanalyst building an alliance to allow 
for the exploration of new ways of relating is in an equally difficult position. To what 
degree, for example, are psychotherapists in a bourgeois practice of psychotherapy 
constantly defending against awareness of nuances of world environmental or local 
political realities, as they delve into, for example, problems of early childhood (Cushman, 
1990, 1995) and of intimacy (Layton, 2013)? Moreover, to what degree should these 
anxiety-provoking matters be compartmentalized or even consciously held at bay? 
Stern’s approach launches from his understanding of the practice of RA. The 
fundamental role of the psychotherapist within the asymmetrical frame makes possible 
an unusual kind of intimacy, but within this particular type of relationship attention is 
always to the psychic needs of the patient. With each appointment, the psychoanalyst 
offers a sensitive, trained, and even idiosyncratic sense of timing of interpretations to the 
patient “when the analyst deems them useful to add to the conversation” (Stern, 2003,  
p. 207).  
Usefulness in this context again implies a demand on the psychoanalyst to 
observe as much as possible about the interpersonal field, and the patient’s ongoing 
experience. To be useful in this meaning is to serve a broadening of possibility of the 
patient’s experience (Stern, 2003, 2011a). Compassionate curiosity and what Stern has 
called the “analyst’s ego” affect interpretation and moral understanding. How they are 
expressed in psychoanalysis becomes, then, a matter of phronesis, “practical wisdom” 
that is, a process of being informed by and informing the activity in question. It implies a 
sort of ongoing conversation with value-in-action. I return later to how the good is found 
hermeneutically through such practice and how this relates to moral understandings that 




may not be directly expressed in Stern's RA theory, and that are generally eschewed in 
language about psychotherapy as a practice. 
Hermeneutic Interpretation Contra Relativism 
It is easy, in such discussions, to lose the basic idea that these events are relational 
and, in hermeneutic terms, that they involve dialogue with others. I will return to this 
shortly, but it will be helpful to review Woolfolk’s (1998) objections, that a 
psychoanalysis combined with hermeneutics risks being ungrounded. Woolfolk’s 
argument appears similar to other objections to postmodernism, that by engaging in a 
critique of truth claims we easily fall into aimless deconstruction in which belief, value, 
and conduct become matters of either cynicism or caprice. Woolfolk warned of the 
potential that this kind of approach could dissolve into an unstructured moral relativism. 
“Constructivist psychotherapy is inevitably self-undermining. It requires the therapist 
either to misrepresent the basis of therapeutic pronouncements, in order that they be 
believed, or to disclose their basis and ensure that they will not be believed” (Woolfolk, 
1998, p. 135). 
 This appears to undermine one of Stern’s major tenets, that, given the 
contextuality of RA, we can know about the veracity of an interpretation only through the 
patient’s beliefs about it. For Stern, unconscious experience is that which remains for 
meaning to be made of it, and it can change momentarily. A given interpretation could 
conceivably contradict itself at a later moment in psychoanalysis or perhaps along the 
patient’s lifespan. The focus of treatment is always affect, language, and meaning (put 
reductively, experience), and therefore it may or may not be dictated by logic. “If 
unconscious experience does not have a single, predetermined meaning, but remains to be 




interpreted in reflective awareness, the effect of clinical interpretation does not depend on 
objective accuracy and cannot be judged on that basis” (Stern, 2003, p. 163).  
 For Woolfolk, however, there are problems in approaching psychology from a 
purely constructivist point-of-view. A moral relativism threatens to leave all potential 
conclusions ungrounded and to privilege the psychoanalyst as a pseudo-empirical 
rhetoritician: “The constructivist therapies that call themselves hermeneutic but dispense 
with the truth criterion and embrace relativism are fundamentally unhermeneutic. . . . 
Neither in physics nor in psychotherapy does hermeneutic thought imply abandoning the 
attempt to establish the validity of our ideas,” (Woolfolk, 1998, p. 136). 
For Woolfolk (1998), there appears to be an abandonment of both rigor and 
direction in theories and psychotherapies in which meaning is in a state of constant 
change. Additionally, in hermeneutic thought (Stigliano, 1989), interpretations need to be 
open to public critique.  
For Stern, however, the questions of meaning and validity to the patient are 
intertwined and they are matters of continuous interpretation and dialogue, an ongong 
process of relational change. Stern’s response, again, has been to return to the 
intersubjective basis of RA, or, we could say, to the dialogic or linguistic basis of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1975/2004). Certainly, psychoanalyst’s are concerned with 
language, and certainly they are daily, even constantly, in search of “truth criteria.” The 
search, while it may lead to examinations of context, history, cultures, traditions, or even 
scientific theories, is always, at its heart, in the interpersonal field, the ongoing 
relationship between psychotherapist and the patient. Truth, as it were, is sought 
constantly through interpretation and its effects, through transference and counter-




transference. For Stern, the validity of an interpretation is a matter of the patient’s 
experience of it in the interpersonal field, and this may often be contrary to the 
psychoanalyst’s best predictions. For Stern, 
Psychoanalysis, no less than any other discipline, is limited by the culture at large 
in the possibilities its participants can envision, and in that sense tradition means 
the same thing between analyst and patient as it does between reader and text. 
However, the tradition that matters most in psychoanalysis is that miniscule 
(relatively speaking) subset of invisible prejudices that analyst and patient create 
between them, the interpersonal field, what we might call the ‘being/ of the 
analytic situation. (Stern, 1991, p. 65) 
 
 There is an immediacy to this checking for validity; it is not separate from 
process. For Stern, as well, despite its close relationship to interpretation, perception is 
not the equivalent of hallucination. Understanding of reality may require ongoing creative 
thinking, but in Stern’s RA none of this necessarily goes without reflection. One might 
add that these small subsets of interpersonal prejudices emerge over time in a context that 
is necessarily historical. Details have meaning, and meaning-making is inevitably 
influenced by values, unconscious or conscious, momentary or long-held. Our 
understanding comes through traditions, experiences, and the interpersonal field. 
There exist constraints on our perceptions and thoughts; beyond them, our 
understandings are simply wrong, or crazy. There is a reality, then, and we sense 
it as a set of constraints that we must respect if we are to remain truthful and sane. 
But the possibilities that reality constrains for our experience are manifold, which 
means that no single version of reality is possible to select as the correct one. 
(Stern, 2010, p. 199) 
 
Validity is a creation of language, and languages change, both personally and 
socially. Validity is not inseparable from context, and it is up for constant questioning. A 
truth claim such as Woolfolk required would be to deny the action of the present, of 
language, traditions, and the convictions on which all foreknowledge is based. Likewise, 
it would risk a reification of what is in fact an ongoing temporal activity, the interactions 




of the field. “No patient accepts or rejects an interpretation because it is ‘objectively’ true 
or false, but because it is or is not subjectively convincing” (Stern, 2003, p. 169). 
Psychoanalytic values may include the intellectual, but they are also, always experiential. 
In fact, the division between the two in RA  practice appears often arbitrary. Recall that 
for Stern, cognition is an “amalgam” of both affect and thought (Lionells et al., 1995; 
Stern, 2003). 
Stern’s theory suggests a moral understanding that demands constant effort and 
respect for a process that is seen outside of the knowledge of a single self. In this respect 
at least, it appears to reject a strictly ontic (Frederickson, 2009) or factual, historically 
dependent understanding of the self, instead adopting a more recursive sense of being, 
Heidegger’s concept of unfolding (1927/2010). For Stern, the so-called facts of 
experience arise through the interpersonal field (2003). They are necessary to 
understanding, so that what one holds as true may be subject to questioning; however, 
one can also make a stand for a given truth. In the psychoanalytic realm, patients 
frequently reject interpretations; psychotherapists often hold onto or discard hypotheses 
over time, despite all of the examination of suppositions and implications of different and 
differing life stories. Critique is not arbitrary criticism, and deconstruction when done 
properly is not simply an act of breaking apart systems but rather a way to unpack them, 
to test the rules—and the content—that a discourse has set up for itself (Sarup, 
1988/1993).  
Additionally, our ideas are subject to chronic change with different (interpersonal) 
interpretations and experiences (Stern, 2012c). In this way, Stern’s RA offers not only an 
unusual sort of interactive acceptance but also a profound sense of hope for change 




through the psychoanalytic process. Psychotherapy here involves a non-predictive 
approach to human change and human potential. Likewise, it holds a democratic quality 
that is relatively new to American psychotherapeutic practice. If anything, it is the 
patient’s present experience that is privileged. The psychoanalyst may continue to hold 
certain doubts, to challenge, to encourage, to witness suffering, and so on. The truth, 
however, is in the patient’s questions about living, and it is reconstituted in the way it is 
brought into the therapeutic interaction.   
The Flight Into a Quieter Reality  
As a profession, psychotherapy became increasingly popular in the post-World 
War II era. Cushman attributed the flight into the profession of psychotherapist to Baby-
boomers who had lost hope in the possibility of large-scale political change. Many began 
searching for an acceptable social niche within the middle class. These were students who 
wished to “do good and also do well” (Cushman, personal communication and published 
in 2009). The intimacy of working especially in a dyad suggests a vocation that is 
ironically separate from the conforming and difficult politics of the social realm. Given 
the demographics of students more recently entering the field, it is likely that Cushman’s 
(2013b) description is now applicable to many of the children of the Baby Boomers. 
Describing practitioners in the Bay Area during the late 20th Century, Cushman wrote: 
“the practice of psychotherapy became a way to justify middle-class affluence . . . for 
those still strongly committed to social justice” (2013b, p. 2).  
Stern delivered a similar message following the September 11 Attacks (2001) and 
just before the U.S. Invasion of Iraq. This was a time that could have been considered the 
commencement of a long national enactment over American political identity.  




It is by now a well known observation the Western societies turned inward after 
the 1960s. Many of those who had been activists began looking to their inner lives 
and to personal meanings. Many young people who had been activists went into 
psychotherapy at this time, and it was not uncommon for them to become 
psychotherapists or psychoanalysts . . . . Many of these, despite their conviction 
about the centrality of the inner life, lament the retreat from political involvement. 
(Stern, 2002a, p. 8) 
 
Stern's work, therefore, contains a sense of the political, along with an awareness 
of the very internal quality of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis in particular. There is an 
attention through his writings (2003, 2010) to workings of power and questions of 
understanding where it is covert. Additionally, in Stern's writings, despite the attention to 
nuances of the unconscious, occasionally direct moral understandings come to the 
forefront. It will be helpful to examine, in Stern's joining of hermeneutics with RA 
practice, how ideas about values appear. 
Targeting the Good 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be seen as a struggle to understand what he called 
“the good” from a late-modern point of view, that is, from a philosophy that accepts the 
limits of human knowing (1975/2005) and one that is clearly perspectivist. One of 
Gadamer’s projects was to return to a long historical discussion begun by Plato and 
Aristotle, as a way to renovate understandings of what makes up the good in life 
(1976/1986).  
For Gadamer, this involved Aristotle’s pragmatic approach, that is, towards a 
good that is not somehow divine or “beyond existence” (Smith, in Gadamer, 1986,  
p. xxiv), but one that involves a reality, the use of the “good in human practice” (p. xxvi). 
For Gadamer, this Classical argument continues to present a number of problems, among 
them, an important question, as expressed by his translator P. Christopher Smith: “How 




would this generalization of how what I am doing when I do what is right contribute to 
my doing what I do that is right? How is this awareness useful?” (p. xxvii). 
The question is at the heart of any presentation of theory, and particularly for 
social sciences which presumably hold some objective of a betterment of society and the 
human lot. How, then, do our understandings help our practice?  
Gadamer rejected the potential of a merely technical answer and came to the 
conclusion that even an extremely practical response held in it an understanding of the 
good. He was able to find an explanation to problems in the division between theory and 
practice through Aristotle’s metaphor of the archer, “who is able to hit the mark better 
precisely because he has chosen a more clearly defined spot on the target on which to 
aim” (Smith, in Gadamer, 1986, p. xxviii). There is a sense that hermeneutics here 
presents an analogy to Sartre’s (1946) Existential imperative. If for Sartre, we cannot 
choose not to choose (because by not choosing we simply choose not to act), in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics we might say that we cannot define a subject of inquiry without 
first posing a question. For Gadamer (1975/2004) we cannot pose a question without the 
contextual backing constituted by answers that we had arrived at in the past, or answers 
provided by historical traditions. This, of course, is Gadamer’s prejudice, and in 
poststructural terms it is language (Sarup, 1988/1993) in a broad sense of the term. 
It follows that even in any practice there is some sense of the good, even if part of 
that practice might be involuted by a denial of its connections to a moral understanding, 
or even if the good, and the thoughts used for defining it, are not well understood—even 
if, indeed, that sense of value is not formulated in consciousness. 




In Stern’s theory, it follows that there is some underlying concept of the good 
even in what a psychotherapist may hold as the most academic of techniques, all the way 
down to implicitly created, intuitive theories upon which the clinician acts on a daily 
level. One might call this an unformulated experience of value. In psychoanalytic 
practice, even a nuance can have long-reaching effects. There is a certain drive to 
excellence in the devotion and commitment that are given in the analytic frame. A slower 
sense of time provides freedom in meaning. In other words, despite any contentions 
otherwise, a practice that involves examination also involves a practicing about how to 
live. The two, practice and the meaning we make of it, cannot be separated regardless of 
any type of alienation. 
Theories about how to do psychoanalysis, . . . not only our implicit theories but 
our explicit ones as well, are not the idealized, rational products of detached, 
objective minds; they are, instead, the rather direct expressions of our values, 
many of which are both unarticulated and very close to our hearts. (Stern, 2012a, 
p. 42) 
 
For Stern, this includes how psychologists choose a target for intervention 
(indeed, for Stern, leaving some matters unformulated may sometimes be the best way to 
find interpersonal change). Moreover, in Stern’s work with hermeneutics, even clinical 
conceptualizations are necessarily determined by moral understandings. An idea about 
pathology must imply by implication ideas about what is missing, what it means to live 
well. “A fact, to repeat myself, is very seldom only a fact. It is a selected fact at the very 
least, a fact selected by values; and it is very possibly a fact shaped by values” (Stern, 
2012a, p. 47).  I would suggest that facts are not possibly but inevitably shaped by values, 
whether these are formulated or not. The pervasiveness of power’s relationship to the 




themes we see in the world, and to ideology, may be a disturbing event to witness; 
understanding it, however, implies the potential for new types of activity.  
This has been carried even further. It would follow that, even in creating and 
maintaining that which stays unformulated, there is some sense of the good. It may at 
first be an unconscious or even an intuitive process, but the archer still selects a particular 
form of a target, at a given place, in a given way, at a given time, and then she may move 
through what looks strikingly like a series of interpretations, to define that target with 
Aristotle’s increasing precision. All of these steps per force result in moral acts and they 
involve at least implicit interpretations about value-in-action. Where we place the target 
holds a great deal of meaning, as do the way we understand the very process of drawing 
the bow, its very construction, and on. Constantly, we aim at meaning. This suggests a 
new way of looking at the unconscious. Stern’s notion of the unformulated  
(2003, 2010) offers a potential for unknown meanings that are not necessarily primitive, 
simple, or blindly chaotic by virtue of their being unknown. If we do not categorically 
reject but we de-privilege reason, there is room for a great deal of potential in that which 
remains unspecified.  
Stern’s struggle with moral understandings in the necessarily free-form structure 
of psychoanalytic discourse appears frequently in his writings (2003, 2010). It is likely 
that one reason behind this is that both hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1975/2004; Warnke, 
1987) and Stern’s RA place high esteem on new experience and on freedom in 
understanding. To assign a reductively determined purpose to a patient’s conduct can 
appear authoritarian and ideological in light of such values of free relating, and a good 
psychoanalyst would then want to ask herself what in her own experience of the 




interpersonal field might have led her to become so aggressive, or possibly to look for 
impulses that are sadistic. Good pyschotherapy, that is, comes from psychotherapists 
constantly engaging this sort of practice, imagining the patient’s context, hypothesising 
about motivations, and then questioning themselves what on earth lead them to such 
hypotheses and assumptions—querying their own participation in the interpersonal field. 
Stern has offered a rare, perhaps unique theory of this process.   
Psychoanalysis has a strong historical current of militating against moral stricture 
(Gay, 1988). Stern also clearly steered away from maintaining certain ideals in his 
thought, at least in one footnote: 
I want to make sure not to be misunderstood about the question of ideals. What I 
am not proposing is that this list of characteristics (‘loving, authentic, courageous, 
generous’) comprises some kind of humanistic catalog of the characteristics of 
human nature, or some essentialist vision of morality. I am not suggesting that 
humans are ‘naturally good’ or anything else in such a vein. This is not the place 
for me to lay out in any detail what I do believe about the origin of human values. 
Suffice it to say, for the present purpose, that I take a hermeneutic view: We 
derive our values from the traditions that comprise our possibility of meaning. 
(Stern, 2010, p. 36, footnote 1) 
 
This brings out a value found throughout Stern’s writing through his perspectivist, 
hermeneutical stance. To posit the analyst’s ideals, again, seems risky, an interruption. To 
return to Aristotle’s archer, however, Stern’s writings do on occasion directly propose 
certain virtues and even goals for RA. As one of them is dialogue with a flexibility for 
personal and political change, it can be assumed that these are less ideals than values 
worthy of discussion, action, and struggle. For Stern, to advocate for basic virtues would 
be essentialist; moreover, it would conflict with the type of openness and spontaneity that 
he has located, for example, in the act of writing as well as in-session. Instead, Stern has 




stressed the need to attend to a certain kinds of openness and curiosity, and such curiosity 
can be put forth as among the virtues emerging from Stern’s theory. 
Curiosity and epistemological pluralism. Stern has agreed with hermeneutic 
ideas that we are constituted by differing traditions, not culture but cultures in the plural.  
For Stern, “persons, after all, are cultures” (2003, p. 259, note 1). In this sense, Stern and 
Cushman appear to have been early intersectionalists, objecting to the reification of the 
individual by racial, gendered, or other categories. Therefore, it part of the job of the RA 
clinician is to help patients understand the traditions that constitute their ongoing being in 
the social surround. Stern has used Froehl’s (2010) concept of “epistemological 
pluralism” in order to describe the need for differing points of view in psychoanalytic 
theory.  
Likewise, Stern has used the terms such as compassionate curiosity and 
courageous curiosity, and these appear as a particular kind of virtue. Stern resisted 
categorizing these as a value per se, but he has also posited it as an ideal of RA practice.  
To absorb potential meaning of interpersonal events is to be curious, to allow 
oneself, with a willingness that derives not from moral force but from desire, to 
imagine as freely as possible the ways of grasping and feeling one’s own and the 
other’s conduct and experience. Unfettered curiosity is an ideal, never actually 
created but worthy of our aspirations towards it. (Stern, 2010, p. 11) 
 
That this kind of valued inquiry should be driven by a desire to understand rather 
than pressures from the super ego places it immediately on an aesthetic grounding; it 
provides a significant place for the analyst’s imagination. Stern’s belief that it should not 
be motivated by morality appears to be a reflection of a concern to guard against 
impeding another value, that is, a goal of developing new understandings in the 
interpersonal field. We tend to think of moral obligation as something that is rule-bound. 




On the contrary, for Stern freedom allows for experience that is new. For Stern, an 
important step involves working to understand how freedom might appear. 
New understandings. For Stern, knowledge attained in psychoanalysis is not 
simply a way to liberate one’s affective life. Recall that, enactment, with all of its 
destructive powers, is frequently mutual (2003). It occurs and is understood through the 
interpersonal field. Reflection eventually brings the experience of change into 
consciousness. Stern wrote of a labor dispute in which the narratives told by both labor 
and management were utterly incompatible. Freeing up one’s own experience 
interpersonally is more than a matter of feeling better, though that, too, may come. 
Release from enactment in a public arena suggests change that involves power.  
When does a situation like [this dispute] begin to change? Only when someone 
sees the parts everyone is enacting in a new moral relation to one another. 
Someone tells a story that brings into the light of reflective awareness a new and 
convincing picture of the social context. (Stern, 2003, p. 130) 
 
For Stern, such new understanding, in both psychoanalytic practice and likely 
outside of it, must relate to “what is accessible to awareness, what can be experienced 
directly” (2003, p. 130).  In other words, new understandings for Stern are of value only 
in so far as they relate to experience, similar to the way that the good, for Gadamer, is 
defined by its usefulness in practice and by how it “contributes to…doing what is right” 
(Smith, in Gadamer, 1986, p. xxvii). Stern, likewise, has consistently modeled an interest 
in broadening his own understandings and those of interpersonal psychoanalysis, by 
exploring thought outside of this particular group and opening his own thought to active 
dialogue (e.g., 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e). Acceptance of that which is difficult to 
experience increasingly leads, in Stern’s theory, to a proactive approach to dialogue. 
There is a supposition, almost an ideal, of mutual benefit in this kind of discussion.  




Personal responsibility. In Stern’s writings appear reflections on where personal 
responsibility lies. In a perhaps relieving statement, and one that offers a resistance to an 
American historical residue of puritanical guilt, Stern has stated that our knowledge of 
the interpersonal field and our related dissociations are necessarily limited. While a 
constant striving for better understanding appears to be an important value throughout 
Stern’s works, he has also indicated that there are inevitable limits to our self-awareness, 
our ability to comprehend the interpersonal field, and therefore to our moral 
responsibility. There is a certain danger of harm in living. For Stern, we can only plan 
“what we desire the field to be” (2003, p. 154) and that is through unconscious influence. 
“We cannot be held fully responsible for the limits of what we are capable of formulating 
in any particular interpersonal field” (p. 154). The outcome of interpersonal relations 
includes only part of our influence. Responsibility is not measured by an appeal to 
unmoving principle or law but to a more process-oriented, and perhaps more artistic 
consistency in the attempt to understand ourselves and each other through dialogue and 
interaction. Psychology becomes a moral pragmatism, in addition to being a 
phenomenally creative process. 
Freedom in relating.  For Stern, a value that RA can clearly exercise, if in a 
generally nonlinear fashion, is through work in relationships to maximize interpersonal 
freedom. For Stern, the “interpersonal field is the gateway into consciousness” (2012b,  
p. 11). In Stern’s theory, one goal is to increase relational freedom in order to allow the 
unbidden. In reviewing a case by Rozmarin (2011), Stern (2011b) presented a detailed 
account of how such freedom interacts with our ability to confront difficult aspects of our 
own history, again, a courageous curiosity: 




The way that history lives in us is insidious, which guarantees that our efforts to 
contact freedom are routinely and necessarily compromised. Often our 
compromises are invisible to us, and sometimes they are so great that they 
overcome our intention to be of use. Even if we allow ourselves to face the 
magnitude of the task, though, we take from Rozmarin’s article the hope that, if 
we keep trying to open ourselves, however ambivalently, to the most personal, 
detailed, subtle—and yes, sometimes excrcutiating —resonances of history in us; 
and if, in opening ourselves in that way, we simultaneously recognize (and lose 
the recognition, and then recognize again) that our individual lives are not 
inherently set against the social world and the lives of others, but actually take 
their meaning from that embeddedness; and if we can at least sometimes reconcile 
guilt and love in a way that breaks the spell of the superego and leaves us able to 
‘wish and do for the other at will rather than as a guilty and resentful necessity’ 
(Rozmarin, this issue, p. 342)—that is, if the analyst continuously strives to 
renew, through the analysis of his unconscious involvement with the patient, his 
desire (to repeat that wonderful phrase) ‘to do for the other at will’—then perhaps 
we will persevere as a field and even deepen it as a discourse of liberation. (Stern, 
2011b, p. 352)  
 
In this comment, Stern has offered his RA theory of moral understandings as one 
that gives the strongest attention to affect. It takes from that a hope of intensely greater 
freedom. Value that is relational could only involve an attention to our own stories and 
those of others, the traditions that have constituted us. 
Moreover, this continual striving towards moral understanding could entail care, 
possibly even a certain kind of love. It is not simply that one acts correctly because of a 
categorical imperative to do so. There is an onerous conception of morality against which 
Americans often rebel, by either rejecting the belief that moral understanding applies to 
certain of our actions, or by turning away from conscious attempts to consider or 
understand moral philosophy at all. Hermeneutically, actions and struggles with theories 
about the good are entwined. In Stern’s quote above, the psychoanalyst, and presumably 
anyone else involved with similar acts of joining in dialogue and opening oneself to “the 
resonances of history in us” (Stern, 2011a, p. 352) does what one believes is right ⎯ “to 
do for the other at will.”   




For Cushman, this is for reasons found in Aristotle’s virtue ethics.  A virtuous 
person does not act according to moral understandings “because he or she is trapped in 
some sort of cultural prison, not because of superego guilt or shame or fear of punitive 
reprisal, nor out of some sort of strategic profit/loss calculus.” Instead, a virtuous person 
acts in this way “because he or she values the good and freely chooses to live it out ⎯ ‘to 
wish and do for the other at will,’” (P. Cushman, personal communication, May, 2014; 
see also, Fowers, 2005, 2012). In other words, working to understand the good and acting 
on that understanding is a process, and it involves an embodiment rather than, 
necessarily, conformity to a code of conduct. This suggests a harmony in this kind of 
Being, between the act of understanding and one’s conduct.  
The good is linked to desire, and the resultant knowledge may be inseparable 
from praxis. These ideas are at the marrow of relational work, and they suggest an 
activity that both deeply approaches the most remote personal experiences on either side 
of the dialogue, while also looking at context, to the social realm, and, from within the 
field, to the lives of others beyond ourselves. 






Summary and Directions for Future Research 
 In this study, I have examined in particular Stern’s two books (2003, 2010), as 
well as other of his publications. I have also put these into context, to see how they fit in 
with influences ranging from Enlightenment thinking to the most recent of RA theory.  
 This exploration has traveled in concentric circles, from the larger social sphere 
inwards towards values we might hide even from ourselves. The Findings-Discussion 
section began with a contextualization of Stern’s theory in the light of panoptic thinking, 
as described by Foucault, and its relation to the clinical gaze, diagnostic practice, and the 
ordering of speech in psychotherapy by scientized medical practices. In general, Stern’s 
theory of the unformulated and the unbidden, and his joining of interpersonal theory with 
hermeneutic ideas of prejudice, interpretation, and intersecting traditions, does indeed 
suggest a strong resistance to a psychotherapy with claims to empirical methods and a 
concomitant, reified version of the self. A parallel thread in Stern’s thought has been a 
questioning of power relations in the interpersonal field. Stern’s sense of temporality, 
through his concept of the unbidden (2003), for example, already presents an attack on 
ideas about the predictability of human behavior and its usefulness for therapeutic 
change.  
 Questions remain, however, about the resistance Stern’s critique of privileging 
empirical studies (2013c) can offer against the enormous financial control of the health 
system by insurance, managed care, and other corporate market systems. That is to say, it 
will be important to watch how Stern’s critique plays out, given the huge power 
differentials between private practitioners of psychotherapy in general, and financial 




institutions in particular. The political and economic arrangements of healthcare are 
translated into minutia of in-session practice, and there is a constant need for Stern’s type 
of exploration of how we can resist the pressures to disconnect from relationship in a 
population that is increasingly alienated. 
 The second chapter of the Findings-Discussion Section was an examination of 
Stern’s concept of self and multiplicity.  On the one hand, Stern’s use of interpersonal 
theory presents radical changes to previous conceptions of the self as an entity that can be 
studied as something separate from the social world. Furthermore, Stern’s hermeneutic 
stance offers a fundamentally different kind of knowing. In a time of increasingly fast 
communications, multiplicity is an alluring idea to many of us. It also bears further 
examination, particularly in what it says about our ideas about responsibility and the 
ability to know ourselves. 
 The third chapter explored ideas about moral understandings in Stern’s RA. 
Again, there is a struggle in these ideas, between the need to attend to the patient’s 
phenomenological experience and the importance of bringing values as they appear in the 
interpersonal field to the foreground.  
 The apparent impossibility of separating values and practices also suggests the 
need for further work in psychological theory about the relationship between activity 
towards the good and desire, and about what it means to be a psychotherapist in a world 
that is showing radical systemic flaws economically, politically, and environmentally. 
The philosophical and psychological understandings of psychotherapists appear to be 
needed badly in disciplines and areas of thought they have often avoided, such as in 
mainstream political and cultural discourse. One result of this study is the suggestion that, 




when it comes to moral understandings and ethical activity, the sheltered privacy of the 
psychotherapeutic office has been intensely challenged. To ignore the political even in 
our most private conversations is becoming the equivalent of acting in bad faith.  
 In the writing of this study, two themes have regularly emerged that appear 
worthy of further theoretical examination. One is the idea of the new that often can be 
found in RA theory. There seems to be an often implicit goal of bringing the patient to a 
new way of being, feeling, or experiencing. This push towards newness is also to be 
found in Gadamer’s writings (1975/2004). Dialogue with others is a way to new 
understandings. That is its intention and frequently its consequence. One can ask, 
however, if this newnessis not a  20th Century Western value worth questioning. Would 
an important change in treatment be to bring a patient back to something similar to a 
former kind of experience? In hermeneutic terms, this may be impossible. One can ask, 
however, if this is not an adherence to a particular historical stance that is always oriented 
to a better future, as opposed to preserving aspects of past lived experience. In other 
words, in RA thinking is a reversion to a former way of doing or being necessarily 
unprogressive or a sign of stricture by interpersonal patterns?  
 A second area that appears to call for questioning is how to perceive the line 
between the interior and exterior. This study began with the question of what kind of a 
self is conceived of in Stern’s theory. In fact, his writings occasionally appear as a 
struggle with the question of how to define the internal and the external worlds, and this 
is a question that psychoanalytic writers continue to examine.  
How is an interpersonal self internal? Are experiences that are understood to be 
deeply within, private, and even isolated from others merely more the constitution of 




language and the social surround? Contrarily, is there some interiority to us that is created 
during childhood and remains in most cases somehow separate from the rest of the world 
by definition? What are the effects of accepting that the world is made of ongoing 
interpretation? Stern has indicated some of these. However, these questions invoke 
further queries about how language is defined in Stern’s RA and what is its role in our 
understanding of the world. Is some type of nonverbal understanding possible, and if so, 
how in psychology do we talk about it? These and other questions remain unanswered. 
However, even in the asking we begin to look at new configurations of the self in the 21st 
Century.  
On a last note, while conducting this theoretical study I have had to describe RA 
and Stern’s hermeneutic approach to it many times, particularly to fellow 
psychotherapists. I often wondered why I could not be efficient enough to develop what 
is sometimes called a good elevator speech. Instead, oddly, my explanations have always 
greatly varied. Often, they seem to have been determined by my interlocutor, or possibly 
by where or when I was asked. At times, I have emphasized the democracy in the 
relationship. At yet other times, I have discussed the immediacy and the sense of a 
mutual interpretation of meaning, the interpersonal field. At even other times, I have 
spoken of enactments and the idea of partnering our ways out of being stuck in a 
relational bind. The list goes on.  
Stern’s theory is about a changing way of understanding and how the unknown 
can be found to emerge from mutual interactions. There are conflicts and struggle 
reported throughout this process. There is also a beauty and a mystery to be found 
throughout Stern’s works. One of the mysteries is how this theory involves often a sense 




of loss (of essentialism and universalisms, for a start), often moments of confusion and 
uncertainty, and then it leads to something we might call a deeper sense of embodiment. 
This theory is not so easily applied as it is understood and then experienced, one might 
even say enacted. There is a recognition among many people with whom I have spoken 
that RA practice and Stern’s description of it is very much the way psychoanalysts and 
psychotherapists from many different theoretical perspectives are in fact practicing today. 
It helps greatly, then, to have these theories which in their structure invite us not only to 
study them, but to use them and thereby engage, along our various and intersecting paths, 
in ongoing, creative critique. 
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Summary of the Major Works of Donnel Stern 
Stern, D. B. (1990). Courting Surprise: Unbidden Perceptions in Clinical Experience. 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 6(23), 452-478. 
In this seminal work, Stern presented descriptions of literary creation and 
scientific discovery, to introduce his concept of unbidden experience as the way change 
and new experiencing take place in psychoanalysis. With minor revisions, this article also 
formed the twelfth chapter of his book, Unformulated Experience (summarized below).  
Stern, Donnel. 1995. Lionells, Marylou. Fiscalini, John. Mann, Carola. Stern, Donnel, eds. 
Cognition and Language. Handbook of Interpersonal Psychoanalysis. New York: 
Routledge. pp. 79-138.  
This chapter, in an anthology co-edited by Stern, is a review of theories of 
cognition, broadly defined, in the history of the interpersonal school. Many of Stern’s 
important sources are found here, along with a summary of the relationship between 
cognition, the unconscious, and language in interpersonal thought. It highlights the 
thought of Sullivan, Schachtel, Barnette, Levenson, Greenberg, and Bromberg. 
Stern, D. b.. 2003. Unformulated Experience: From dissociation to imagination in 
psychoanalysis. New York, NY: Psychology Press.  
Chapter 1. The Given and the Made: A Constructivist View 
Stern introduced postmodernist thought, hermeneutics, and his theory of verbal 
and non-verbal semiotic experience.  
Hermeneutic perspectivism holds that truth is myriad. Even non-verbal experience 
in the interpersonal realm falls under the linguistic. Stern called this encoding of 




nonverbal action “semiotic.” This will prove to have been an important point in Stern’s 
more recent work that critiques both relativistic forms of postmodernism and scientistic 
forms of developmental research. 
Experience is interpretation. We constantly take consensually validated 
experience and reinterpret it. However, experience can be hidden from oneself. A goal of 
psychoanalysis is to grasp the nonverbal in words, widening self-knowledge and explicit 
choice. To take a perspective on experience is to engage it. Psychoanalysis involves 
purposeful and spontaneous reflection. Conscious reflective meaning arises from verbal 
language and pre-existing meaning. In psychoanalysis, that includes unforced 
consideration of what we most fear and desire. Reflective capacity is, however, limited 
by context. Uncertainty allows for the contribution of multiple traditions. Verbal 
reflective meaning is never pre-ordained. Unformulated experience is the ambiguity we 
experience moment-to-moment. Dissociation is the unconscious, defensive decision to 
leave experience unformulated. Knowing is a function of the interpersonal field. We are 
usually unaware of our participation in the interpersonal field. We have to break the grip 
of the field to see patterns we have within it. That is accomplished by understanding 
unconscious aspects of it. 
Chapter 2. Unformulated Experience: An Introduction  
Unformulated experience is here defined in cognitive terms. 
Years of experience give the psychoanalyst greater comfort in uncertainty. There 
does not appear to be a fully formed unconscious influencing conscious experience. 
Rather, unconscious experience that lacks clarity and differentiation has the possibility of 
being brought into consciousness through interpretation. Interpretation is therefore a 




ubiquitous process. Most of unformulated experience can be interpreted in various ways. 
In psychoanalysis, we emphasize experience because it turns inference into conviction.  
Thoughts flow into one another, and psychoanalysis is phenomenological because 
it accepts that unconscious experience is actually a continuous process. Structure, 
content, and representation signify the plethora of processes in psychic life that 
continuously reproduces experience in meaningfully similar forms, as organizing activity. 
We can stand back and observe reflective experience.  
There are two types of unformulated experience: molar experiences were never 
spelled out; molecular are short-term, momentary states of possibility from which the 
next moment’s experience emerges. Unlike Freud’s thinking, for Stern meaning can 
attain greater form with consciousness.  
Therapeutic action involves increased curiosity and greater freedom of thought. 
Citing George Klein, a unit of reality is any perceived unit of coherence not connected to 
a notion of accuracy. We construct our representations of the world through unconscious 
cognitive rules or algorithms. Unformulated experience is structured like a figure 
emerging from a dense fog. The phenomenon is akin to Gendlin’s “felt meaning.”  
Chapter 3. Familiar Chaos: Unformulated Experience as Defense 
This chapter is a discussion of the function of dissociation in unformulated 
experience, which is offered as an alternative to Freud’s theory of repression. 
When unformulated experience is defensively motivated, it is a lack of 
articulation, a retreat into the familiar, which precedes even traditional defenses.  
Freud’s view held that memory consist of contents that could be hidden and 
recalled. In Sullivan’s self-system may involve something like a repression of psychic 




elements (which Stern would likely reject); however, different degrees of formulation are 
also in Sullivan’s thought. Dangerous experience involves a refusal to formulate what is 
new, resulting in a camouflage of the familiar, a parataxic experience. For Schachtel, to 
avoid separation and individuation, people retreat into secondary autocentricity, a 
conventionalizing of experience based on previous knowledge. Sullivan’s selective 
inattention also holds a quality of a formulation theory. In this theory, implications of 
experience are not sufficiently developed for recall, thus preventing both anxiety and 
learning. Entire motivational systems may be dissociated. Parental reactions affect child 
development, as they become part of a child’s self-dynamism. The self is made of gaps, 
and to know a gap in oneself can be devastating. Psychotherapy involves increasing the 
patient’s curiosity while maintaining a bearable level of anxiety. Stern taken Sullivan’s 
thought further, assuming an even greater potential for language in bringing parataxic 
meaning to reflection, so unformulated experience is not fixed content and language is 
constitutive. There is more than one meaningful interpretation of experience, and 
certainty about just one interpretation may be the only evidence that potential questions 
are being refused. In extreme, certainty about a possible single interpretation for 
experience is psychosis. Content is not repressed from awareness; rather, it is never 
formulated. 
Chapter 4. Creative Disorder and Unbidden Perceptions: Unformulated Experience as 
Possibility 
This chapter further develops the concept of unformulated experience, not only as 
limitation but also as source of novelty. Stern included observations of the creative 
process by poets such as Valéry and Spender. Novelists and poets often describe an 




unconscious or not-knowing quality to writing. Stories are integral to the psychoanalytic 
process. 
Thought follows thought. Through interpretation, we understand what was 
previously part of familiar chaos and accept what was previously rejected as uncertainty. 
Unformulated experience can be either creative disorder or familiar chaos. It is 
paradoxical that we need to allow our desires to move us to understand them. Attempting 
to force the process results in intellectualization. We cannot know what we will think 
next. All thought is unbidden, and therefore includes unconscious thought. 
Psychoanalysis involves acceptance of unformulated experience as creative disorder. 
Resolving resistance leads to a more fitting, new understanding.  
Using prediction to study behavior applies only when examining broad life trends. 
Curiosity involves the toleration and preserves the uncertainty of unformulated 
experience. Psychoanalysis is a progressive awakening of an active curiosity that is not 
quite a focused search. Rather, this curiosity is a global attention to perception. It 
involves permitting oneself to make construction. This allowing is seen in the ideal of 
free association. Different from a search of hidden truths in a patient’s life, 
psychoanalytic curiosity can bring to light new constructions not previously thought. 
There is an element of surprise rising from the familiar in creative activity. 
Knowledge is an effect of power. Power relations do enter into psychoanalysis, to 
influence even unbidden experiences. Hence, the problem that accepting unbidden 
experience can mean accepting hidden power relations. This puts the psychoanalyst in a 
quandary, between accepting the status quo even in unbidden experience. Hence, 
psychoanalysts come to expect constant obstructions in their own thought, while also, 




ideally, encompassing experience that the psychoanalyst may not want to know. There is 
a need in the psychoanalyst’s education for learning how challenge the status quo. The 
relationship of psychoanalysis is a constructivist democracy, and egalitarianism is an 
ideal.  
Chapter 5. Imagination and Creative Speech: Thoughts on Dissociation and 
Formulation 
This chapter is an exploration of repression versus dissociation, selective 
inattention, the role of language in new experience, and the need for safety in 
psychoanalysis. 
Contrary to Freud’s theory that energy is required to repress material from 
consciousness (1933/1989), Stern suggested that consciousness is linguistically structured 
and involves an active process requiring effort. Dissociation is a broader concept than 
usually theorized and it precedes defenses. Its opposite is imagination. The field, 
meaning, and interpersonal relationships are held to shape meanings of which we can be 
aware.  
Stern borrowed philosopher Herbert Fingarette’s concept that we learn to spell-
out experience; that is, rather than resembling a mirror, consciousness may involve a 
learned skill of spelling-out features of the world. Basic defense would then be the 
prevention of interpretation from coming into reflective awareness. Dissociation is the 
inability to reflect on something, involving the prevention of interpretation rather than an 
exclusion from awareness. It is a constant process, necessary for survival, and part of 
organizing experience. Bromberg wrote of normal dissociation: As we attempt to live as a 
unitary self, we leave out painful parts of experience. Dissociation is a channel that 




permits or restricts experience of the present, even the experience of memories. It is a 
restriction of interpretation into reflective consciousness, of experiencing. Dissociation is 
the refusal to make verbal representations. 
Hermeneutic theory can then help us to understand what it means to spell-out new 
experiences. To be capable of new experience is to be capable of not knowing what will 
come next. A goal of psychoanalysis is for both psychoanalyst and patient to see 
language more flexibly and precisely than before. Language continuously structures 
reflective consciousness. There are moments beyond words, for example, in intimacy. 
We never really finish saying anything. We bring previous experience into words. 
Resistance then is affectively charged experience that we are ambivalent about 
formulating. With resistance, we fall into language that lacks implication. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, new language breaks up thought and rebuilds it. This is an ontic, intuitive 
vision of language. New language needs to feel right in the saying of it. We need to treat 
language like creative disorder, following its affective path. Stories bring pain into 
meaningful relation to experience we already identify as our own, ceasing the 
disembodiment of painful experiences, creating what Donald Spence called “a narrative 
home.” The contrary of dissociation is imagination, a vivid articulation of meaning.  
Because this refers to meaning, all reliability is subjective. Truth in narrative is 
impossible in psychoanalysis; rather, stories serve to make things present. Dissociation is 
then a limiting or destruction of imagination.  
There are two types of dissociation, one is frequent and it involves a refusal to 
allow pre-reflective experience to attain a full meaning, resulting in a generic anxiety. 
Another refuses imagination of memories encoded as action or practice. This second 




dissociation involves material that if recollected would bring about reactions ranging 
from specific anxiety to terror. 
Clinically, we can only maintain an atmosphere of safety and remain sensitive to 
evidence of dissociation, absence, contradiction, stereotypes, or dead spots. Instead of 
attempting to force language, we need to prevent our own interruptions and clear the 
field. The cause of bringing forth new experience cannot be unconscious organizing 
activity, because that would make it verbal; it cannot be consciousness, because that 
would make it predictable. The cause of all of these is a temporary, unifying voice.  
In Stern’s estimation, Sullivan was overly focused on language as a means of 
operational communication. For Stern, language generates experience. Dissociation is 
defeated through one’s talking one’s thoughts to oneself. In the therapeutic environment, 
certain thoughts can be thought and not others. Selective inattention is suave, it comes 
without warning. In seamless, familiar relationship, dissociation is at work. What seems 
natural and not worth remarking is relevant to the patient’s most pressing problems. We 
cannot force or will self-understanding. It emerges from situations.  
Enactment grips both the patient and the psychoanalyst when it opens up 
compelling parts of the each one’s personal history. Our relationships are ceaselessly 
redefined. As one person’s involvement changes, the possibilities of the other’s 
involvement are also changed. It is meaningless to expect or try to force oneself to see 
beyond an enactment. The field is the only context and makes what is possible in the 
relationship. The moment and the field shape the meanings of which we can be aware. 
Each relationship has multiple fields for us, both creating and constricting our use of 




language. We cannot simply choose to be empathetic. We can only remain as open as 
possible.  
Often that which initiates the opening from an enactment is on the patient’s side. 
Stern brought up Racker’s observation that the psychoanalysts do not only use their 
experience for the patient, but also continue their own psychoanalyses with the patient. In 
any case, beforehand neither side can know exactly how to destabilize a previous 
perception of an enactment. The only relevant context is the field. Meaning is 
interpersonal, and relationships involve multiple fields, and hence multiple selves.  
Chapter 6. Not-Spelling-Out: Dissociation in the Strong Sense 
This chapter explores the effects of strong dissociation on narrative, child 
development, and memory. 
Strong dissociation denies some verbal interpretation of experience of action or 
practice, that is, experience that already has some nonverbal structure to it. This is an 
active defense and it can apply to highly organized meaning, such as a memory that 
might be recovered later in specific form, or in the case of disavowed intentions. In weak 
dissociation, the meaning was simply never attended to. Dissociations can be mixes of 
the strong and the weak. For example, a story must not be told (strong dissociation), and 
as a result other stories are never thought of (weak dissociation). This occurs frequently 
in transference-countertransference over the course of a psychoanalysis. A story of the 
relationship has to be told, dominating attentional processes and preventing alternatives 
to these stories from being told (weak dissociation). One of these stories could not be 
told, being actively forbidden (strong association).   




Verbal interpretations of experience strongly dissociated (that which is organized 
as practice or action) cannot be made at will. It must occur through imagination and 
creative use of language. Its breach means greater interpretive freedom. There is a range 
from a subtle resonance of the experience to the entire experience that can be dissociated, 
and portions that remain dissociated remain unformulated. Who then choses what will be 
brought to understanding and what will remain dissociated in the case of self-deception? 
Freud medicalized what was essentially a moral problem, by locating the ego at both 
conscious and unconscious levels; in Sartre, the individual has the responsibility and self-
deception is simply bad faith. For Stern, culpability and responsibility are separate. 
Dissociation is an active process and consciousness means engaging in the world. 
Spelling-out is a rare process about which we are selective. It is not an instrumental skill; 
rather it involves both agency and unbiddenness. We seldom imagine ourselves fully. 
Spelling-out involves both consensual validation and creativity. Psychoanalysis is a rare 
place where we observe ourselves bringing experience into awareness. For the same 
reasons we do not spell out an engagement, we are also not aware of our not spelling it 
out. Only experiences consistent with our idea of self are spelled out. Some not-me 
experience, on the other hand, would necessitate our asking fundamental questions about 
ourselves and about the safety of the world to be brought to consciousness. Disavowal of 
child sexual abuse makes sense, because the experience is too disruptive to the self. Such 
dissociation can be all-the-more powerful if the child lacks the language to label what is 
occurring. In any case, such experience is not repressively ejected from consciousness; 
rather, it never enters consciousness. Victims of such dissociation from childhood remain 
with fragments of meaning outside of a narrative context.  




Memory involves telling a story, and traumatic memory can be bloodless, like 
prenarrative snapshots. Dissociation may not just drain experience, but it takes the feeling 
out of the story. Patients with traumatic childhoods may not even feel the need for 
compassion. Implicit or un-spelled-out engagements are a type of unformulated 
experience. They are unconscious and are nonverbally structured. This leads to the 
question, What can one recognize when unformulated experience is dissociated? Stern 
brought together concepts of William James and Sullivan, to answer that these are 
feelings of tendency, and anxiety. Feelings of tendency help us sense the direction of 
experience. We then decide what to formulate or not.  
Chapter 7. Narrative Rigidity: Dissociation in the Weak Sense 
This chapter raises questions about social power, and how psychoanalytic change relates 
to social rigidity and change.  
A new situation, such as an impasse between workers and factory management, 
requires an atmosphere of readiness to bring lasting change. Note that people are in a 
sense cultures, and the question of agency in the postmodern world is essential for 
psychoanalysis.  
Our location in a given place and time can determine the only ways we can see a 
given situation. A party to a social conflict may not have formulated its own story 
because of the involvement of its members. The storyline becomes familiar and 
comfortable. Narrative rigidity has an inverse relationship to interpretive freedom. We 
construct multiple self stories, making some categories of experience irrelevant and some 
salient. Unformulated experience is the shadowy part of the story and it includes narrative 
roads we could have but did not take. There is a dialectical relationship between stories 




we tell and those we do not tell, that is, between reflective consciousness and 
unformulated experience. The many potential meanings available for articulation at any 
moment are unique to that moment. Implicit Unformulated Experience is constantly re-
created by ongoing retellings of our most stable narratives. Psychoanalysis moves from 
stereotyped stories to those more specific to the patient’s context. Each new articulation 
of meaning can either prevent or bring finer levels of new meaning. Our embeddedness in 
overlapping cultures and subcultures leads to narrative rigidity, with repeated plots and 
characters. Cultures are vocabularies of narrative.   
For both Bartlett and Freud, memory was other than a copy of experience. Stories 
are told, rather, from our position in the present, with little restriction from the facts. We 
remember on the basis of a set or schema based on experience, with a tremendous amount 
of give. We conventionalize our stories usually in a social way. Memory is a 
reconstruction through our attitude about an event. For Foucault, this involves power as a 
constructive force, and power’s effects lie in it not being perceived. More than just 
repression, power is a positive force that produces discourse. We are all caught in its grip. 
Politics are local and nontotalizing. Similarly, the Interpersonal field is nontotalizing. 
Hence, contemporary psychoanalysts constantly observe their positions in the discourse 
of the psychoanalytic situation.  
For Schachtel, conventionalization of experience, “secondary autocentricity” is 
not just a problem, it is a necessity for survival. These are the paths of least resistance. 
Coming up with the original is difficult, requiring imagination. Decentered power, which 
is shaped generally by the culture itself, leads to the unreflected acceptance of 
convention, narrative rigidity.  




Psychoanalysis is a moral endeavor. It involves a commitment to stories that fit 
the lives of patients and increase flexibility in thought, which is inevitably in conflict 
with narrative rigidity and unconsciously adopted convention. The psychoanalyst then 
becomes a social critic of any directives or strictures that are unconsciously adopted. 
Stern presented a vignette in which a bottom up interpretation offered by the patient, and 
well within the psychoanalytic canon, was challenged by the psychoanalyst, to suggest an 
alternative interpretation contrary to conventional psychoanalytic thinking. 
We can only tell a story by excluding other, conflicting ways of seeing. As 
explained by Bartlett, stories seem to us accurate and inescapable. We force narrative to 
conform to our standards. According to the historian Wedgwood, we know the end of a 
story before the beginning, and once told we cannot recapture the experience of knowing 
only the beginning. Life in some ways moves backwards for us. It is a constant retelling 
of stories.  
Chapter 8. The Problem of the Private Self: Unformulated Experience, the Interpersonal 
Field, and Multiplicity 
In this chapter, Stern built on Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal theory of the 
self, in order to examine how the field involves transference, personal agency, and self-
deception.  
For Sullivan the smallest unit of human experience is the interpersonal field, and 
the idea of the continuous, unchanging self or individual is illusory. Rather, the subject of 
observation involves our communication with one another, and the self is just the total of 
our interpersonal relations, in addition to our protective self system. Stern modified 
Sullivan’s thought, positing instead that we have multiple selves or self-states and we do 




indeed have an internal world. Self-states are traversed via dissociation. In Sullivan’s 
thought, other people call out repertoires of security operations that determine the 
moments of consciousness. The field also determines what we articulate and that to 
which we do not attend. For Stern, it is more than just anxiety that determines what is 
called out in relationship. The participants call out other, especially unconscious aims. 
We cast about for interpersonal relations that play roles reciprocal to the interpersonal 
events we want to recreate. Stern then connected this casting about to Racker’s two types 
of transference. The casting about involves a complimentary transference, in the hopes of 
our arriving at a concordant transference (in which the other is experienced as feeling that 
which we feel). We are not responsible for the limits of the interpersonal field. 
In Stern’s theory, many selves can be represented at once. Interpersonal life 
involves parallel processing. Despite our desires for the interpersonal field, it is 
unpredictable. We move in and out of self-states, and the field moves us in and out of 
self-states. Therefore, we are not responsible for our limits of the field: the field involves 
both our choices (as understood by Sartre), and our limits. Responsibility lies somewhere 
in between complete personal agency and total predestination. Psychoanalysis is a 
stretching of those limits, through the safety of the frame and the freedom it offers. The 
field is defined by both imagination and dissociation and is only partially our own 
creation. It is further shaped by the material conditions and power arrangements of our 
time. It is affected by our embeddedness in different traditions or cultures.  
Stern here tied in important currents of postmodern critiques of the Western self. 
Stern cited Geertz and others to emphasize that our conceptualization of the self is a 
Western construction, one that involves centrism and an individualistic notion of agency 




and destiny. Hence, consciousness is a much more social phenomenon than previously 
thought in psychoanalysis. Such embeddedness leads to various assumptions: 1. That 
psychoanalysis is more of a social event than previously maintained. 2. That cultures 
create ground rules by which meaning is understood; and, 3. The broader discourse of 
cultures have their effects in relationships. By corollary, as products of culture, we are all 
embedded in relationship.  
We then create the patterns of our experience on interpersonal fields. Our outer 
worlds and inner worlds determine which parts of each are relevant to us at any time. 
Stern again used the metaphor of lifting submerged stones (of meaning) from under water 
(as opposed to submerging problematic meaning like a beach ball, as with Classical 
theories of repression). Again, experience or consciousness is determined by that to 
which we give attention, and that which is not blocked by selective inattention. In fact, 
we are usually unaware of the field until we are given a reason to examine it. There is no 
such thing as a pure intrapsychic state. We participate in the construction of the field but 
we are also partially strangers to ourselves. Self-deception, then, is the relinquishing of 
curiosity about the field, the simple acceptance of the field. At these times, we need the 
help of others, their calls to curiosity. 
Chapter 9. Interpretation and Subjectivity: A Phenomenology of Resistance 
Dismissing objective measures for understanding unconscious experience, Stern 
delved into how interpretations are made, what function they serve, and how they are 
qualified through the phenomenological experience of the patient. 
Meaning of unconscious experience comes through interpretation in reflective 
experience. There is no way to judge the objective accuracy of interpretations. 




Psychoanalysts usually know when an interpretation is adequate but cannot know its 
accuracy. Unlike the traditional view, interpretation no longer corresponds to material. 
Language has constitutive properties, it co-creates thought, and experience can suddenly 
intrude.  
We need to understand that locating psychoanalysis in terms outside of the 
scientific is not a cause for despair. Postmodernism is about uncertainty. Directing our 
attention to the unknown does not mean relinquishing thoughtfully considered clinical 
constructions. We are still responsible for selecting the most complete and satisfying 
account of phenomena. Radical constructionism holds that both the world and person 
create experience. Hence, psychoanalytic interpretation touches the patient in a way the 
patient can identify in his or her own experience. Therefore, even if objective accuracy 
were possible, third-person, scientific objectivity would be futile. Instead of trying to be 
right, psychoanalysts can only try to account for the patient’s experience from within the 
patient’s perspective. The patient will know what fits. According to Loewald, 
interpretation has an organizing function at a higher level than the patient has reached 
alone. When this occurs, the patient experiences that something has been pulled together, 
or a sense of always having known what was just said. Words seem to fit a pre-existing 
meaning or absence. The important thing is not the patient’s reaction but that the 
interpretation speak to the patient. The patient uses the same criteria to judge what fits as 
we do when we judge the fit of our own words to what we intended to say. 
Psychoanalysis is characterized by using the intensity of resistance to overcome 
resistances.  




Psychoanalysis is unique as a collaboration between the psychoanalyst’s 
provision of an atmosphere of safety and a patient’s trust. The patient needs to care about 
interpretations. This is not brought through the psychoanalyst demonstrating 
worthiness—that would be a reaction formation against the psychoanalyst’s own 
aggressiveness. Unconditional positive regard is ultimately inauthentic. Rather, trust is 
accepting, uncritical, and non-retaliative, a compassionate curiosity. Curiosity involves 
being sensitive to the possibility of a question. It is the means for the psychoanalyst to 
obtain self-reflective access to questions. In this way, the psychoanalyst disembodies 
herself form unconscious assumptions, especially those forming the interpersonal field.  
In this disembedding, the psychoanalyst refrains from enactment but interprets the 
patient’s transference. As Racker maintained, transference interpretations are the only 
way the patient has to know that the psychoanalyst is not submerged in 
countertransference. The psychoanalyst disembeds herself by transforming the limits of 
her own understanding, through constantly putting the limits of her own understanding 
into thought. The patient senses the interpretation like an empty mold in the same shape 
of the interpretation; it is as if at its appearance, there was a space previously available 
for the interpretation to fill in. More than the acceptance of a new meaning, there is a 
sense of a pre-existing shape, and there is generally more room for further shaping at this 
point. The psychoanalyst is then able to use the new interpretation to reconstruct how that 
interpretation came to the psychoanalyst herself.  
This is not done for democratic principles, even though it works democratically; 
rather the goal is for the patient to see the interpretation from the patient’s own frame of 
reference. This reconstruction of the psychoanalyst’s train of thought leading to the 




interpretation is used for both the patient’s conscious and unconscious dissociated 
material. 
The patient listens to the psychoanalyst only in context, and context determines 
the horizon of the patient’s experience. Uncritical acceptance, a positive transference, can 
be a sign that the patient is merely eager to please. The psychoanalyst’s devotion and 
curiosity add incrementally to the safety of the relationship. The hidden goal is to help the 
patient to make meaning that would otherwise remain outside his or her conscious 
horizon. In better circumstances, that leads to a breaching of the patient’s defenses. For 
Stern, defenses are not an intrapsychic process but an interpersonal one. Nothing in the 
inner world is isolated from the social. In Fairbairn’s terms, resistance is not to the 
process but to the psychotherapist himself.  When collaboration allows disallowed 
meaning, psychotherapy moves from unformulated experience as familiar chaos to being 
creative disorder, from denial of curiosity to its affirmation, from feelings of tendency to 
openness to experience.  
Even the psychoanalyst’s private observations are participation in the relationship. 
Unconscious factors also help form participation and the relationship. Anything that is 
said can be giving voice to unformulated experience and can only be judged by how 
satisfying or disappointing it is to the patient. There is no such thing as a unitary, unsocial 
unconscious. For Gadamer, reality exists but it can only be understood through historical, 
linguistic, and individual perspectives, and any interpretation is a perspective. There are 
sums of perspectives or facets, like a Cubist object. The goal is not to maximize 
perspectives, nor is it to find a supposedly correct angle; rather the important question is 
how to formulate experience when it comes unbidden. Interpretations teach us what to 




see. In psychoanalysis there is continued respect for the individual’s constructive activity, 
and for the unimaginable richness of reality that can accommodate multiple and 
conflicting perspectives. Understanding is conversation, and disagreement is not an 
obstacle. We continue in dialogue until we reach agreement in understanding about 
something. Agreement then is a new understanding, not harmony. When feeling safe, the 
patient can grasp the truth in what the psychoanalyst says about the patient’s 
unconscious.  
Chapter 10. The Analyst’s Unformulated Experience of the Patient 
This chapter presents a description of the influences of the patient’s unformulated 
experience on the psychoanalyst and the grip of the field.  
The deepest interpersonal influences are mutually unknown. Countertransference, 
what the psychoanalyst does not know of the patient, is of primary clinical significance, 
because, once articulated, unformulated experience must lose its indeterminacy. It is 
therefore hard to know that there is important experience to be interpreted or what to 
interpret. By first verbalizing, even to oneself, preverbal or pre-logical experience, the 
psychoanalyst’s new experiences of the patient, the psychoanalyst can later attempt to 
imagine what had been left out of that articulation.  
Whatever is spoken is also played out between the patient and the psychoanalyst. 
The patient and the psychoanalyst repeatedly create a field, maintaining states of 
relatedness such as those that brought the patient into psychoanalysis. Either side may 
break the grip of the field. When broken on the psychoanalyst’s side, it may not be 
spoken of, but this demands new inquiry. Breaking the grip requires reflection and 
imagining alternatives. Stern uses Schachtel’s terms of allocentricity and autocentricity. 




To be autocentric is to pass over things, while being allocentric is to be profoundly 
curious about things. In the allocentric attitude in psychoanalysis, we look for the silent 
power struggle we experience. The process continues. Curiosity does not offer a 
permanent solution, but an articulation of next problems.  
Chapter 11: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the Embedded Analyst 
This chapter joins psychoanalytic thought with Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Stern 
examined here different ideas of transference, in order to challenge traditional 
epistemological assumptions and psychotherapist-patient roles. He introduced the 
hermeneutic circle as a further challenge scientific assumptions of knowing and the 
deployment of technique in psychotherapy. The psychoanalytic commitment to 
understanding and time is seen as essential if new understandings are to emerge from the 
interpersonal field. The psychoanalyst, then, both grasps meanings familiar to the field 
and applies theory to that which emerges. By remaining open to the effects of tradition on 
our knowledge, psychoanalysts and patients can arrive at new understandings.  
Though challenges to the blank screen are frequent in recent psychoanalytic 
literature, notions of objectivity often reappear in contemporary theory. Conservative 
critiques in recent psychoanalysis continue to maintain that psychoanalysts determine 
whether or not patient responses are distorted or inaccurate. From a radical perspective, 
the psychoanalyst can make no such claim. All the psychoanalyst can do is to disembed 
himself by taking on new understandings of himself and his participation. In this theory, 
all knowledge of the patient is mutual and interpretive, and in this relationship, 
psychoanalysts vacillate between concordant and complimentary identifications with the 
patient. Stern then entered into an alternative definition of what services the RA 




psychoanalyst provides. The patient “purchases” from the psychoanalyst interpretations 
and the psychoanalyst’s sense of timing. This may sound authoritarian; however, the 
patient can always dispute any understanding on the psychoanalyst’s side. Hence, this 
relational psychoanalysis is egalitarian if asymmetrical.  No ideal distribution of roles is 
possible, because both sides are embedded in the interpersonal field.  
Reflective meaning comes through language. In Gadamer’s philosophy, prejudice 
both obstructs and originates new experience. We arrive at understanding, then, by 
disembedding ourselves from prejudgment (what we have known previously) through 
dialogue. Prejudice is no longer seen as not error; rather, in this philosophy it resembles 
the radical critic’s sense of countertransference, both blocking and allowing for new 
experience. For Gadamer, insight involves a freeing from expectations of our own that 
previously captivated us. Rather than an attempt to influence practice, hermeneutics 
involves an attempt to describe understanding, which comes through a dialogue in the 
present, between two people who are living embodiments of various traditions or 
histories. In this sense, there is no hidden truth that can be uncovered by the 
psychoanalyst’s observational powers. Reflective meaning is an event, and both sides’ 
experiences are always up for examination.  
In order to understand experience, we must put it into context, an appropriate 
configuration of tradition. In order to understand things, we then project complete 
understandings onto communications that we understand only partially. For Gadamer, we 
have put some unexamined part of tradition into language. Meaning is always surrounded 
by an infinity of the unsaid. Science supposes that the one who learns can be separate 
from that which is learned. Gadamerian understanding is through dialogue, and is hence 




beyond awareness and control. Technique makes psychoanalysis different from other 
types of conversations, but it would be lifeless without emotion and would lose 
spontaneity, precluding the hermeneutic circle.  
To understand, we project partial understandings into the dialogue to see if these 
expectations are confirmed. The psychoanalyst and patient create between them 
minuscule prejudices over time. The field, a reciprocal transference, needs to be created 
over time in order to be taken apart. Once a relationship is established, then the invisible 
in it has a chance to be seen. With open questions, one must be genuinely uncertain about 
the alternatives, and we are not aware when we are creating them. Scientific integrity 
about the commitment involved in open questions requires similar commitment to the 
patient in psychoanalysis. In the fusion of horizons, we see our own preconceptions and 
then grasp the concept of the other’s meaning. This is no empathetic knowing, only 
mediation. In Gadamer’s thought, we allow ourselves to be questioned by the text. For 
Stern, new understanding involves a crystallization of some aspect of the interpersonal 
field. The pursuit of inquiry, no matter the content, involves some expansion of the 
possibilities of the therapeutic relationship. Even the patient’s past does not exist outside 
of the interpersonal field. Even our prejudices about freedom require examination. Flax 
has called the resultant uncertainty “radical incompleteness.”  
Just as resistance needs to brought into awareness, so too the shapes of power 
need to be made clear. The psychoanalyst’s experience has a greater impact on 
understanding the patient than theory. We start treatment with global assertions of whom 
the patient is. Only when the psychoanalyst is deeply involved, and incapable of 
emotionally detached application of theory, can the prejudice that constitutes the field, 




the transference-counter-transference, be analyzed. Eventually, theory and prejudice 
become productive of one another. More than understanding, it is important to see how 
dialogue shapes understanding.  
According to hermeneutic and thinking of the Interpretive Turn, all of science 
involves what Wittgenstein called language games. As RA involves social sciences, both 
the subject matter (meanings of human life) and the study itself constitute language 
games. All social science is then at the convergence of two languages, and what Foucault 
callled an institutionalization of values. This is what Giddens called the double 
hermeneutic. Stern then cited Protter, for whom the examination of another type of 
language, the prejudices of the interpersonal field, constituted a triple hermeneutic for 
relational psychoanalysis. 
The task of the psychoanalyst then is to grasp the familiar, the transparent in the 
field, and apply theory to it. Understanding comes through consensus in dialogue. To 
disconfirm a prejudice, then, comes not through any fixed method and not through any 
technique, but through a Gadamerian consciousness of the effects of tradition. Using 
tradition, we question ourselves about what we take for granted. Psychoanalytic training 
involves, then, a consistency of self-reflection through training and supervision. These 
achieve innocence and openness, which entails a surrender to the unbidden, to be carried 
along by the patient’s process in Kahn’s terms. 
Chapter 12. Courting Surprise: Unbidden Perceptions in Clinical Practice 
This is a description of new perceptions being experienced as both familiar and 
new.  Focusing on what is already known through detailed questioning brings out 




unbidden experience. In this process there arrive important gaps between expectation and 
actual experience.  
Experience is constructed on history and current interpersonal circumstances. The 
deepest experience feels as if it came from somewhere else, from nowhere. We often pick 
up emotions from patients in an implicit way, as an indirect representation to which we 
search for meaning. How do we search for what surprises us? Unbidden learning is not 
simply passive. It is similar to a dream, for which we are responsible but which we 
cannot orchestrate. Describing such learning, we often say in supervision, “it struck me 
that . . . .” It can be useful to retrace our thoughts leading up to such observations. 
Schachtel’s allocentricity requires a certain courage. In psychotherapy, affect is always to 
be experienced and when possible understood. We do not look for the unknown but 
presume that it is already present in the patient. As opposed to being defined as a 
container, the unconscious is something so much present that we seem to live it out 
without it being seen. It is outside the range of explicit reflection. The idea is to direct 
interest to what is already known, in order to state implicit assumptions explicitly. 
Awareness of absence is realized through focusing most detailed attention on what is 
present. This is similar to Levenson’s description of looking for lacunae in the patient’s 
story.  
When experience is not known it disappears as quickly as it appears. We often 
miss experience when it is indistinguishable from our expectations.  At these times the 
space between experience and expectation is unconsciously anticipated, to preserve the 
status quo. Transference provokes anticipated experience form the psychoanalyst. The 
most important task of the psychoanalyst then is to discover her own expectations for the 




interaction. Learning is unbidden perception arising from the space between expectation 
and experience, a contrast against the background of the known. By both sides speaking 
of the familiar, gaps are described, and experience is described with greater precision and 
subtlety. This is, however, a routinely difficult process.  
Psychoanalysts are particularly interested in the pathology of understanding, on 
occasions when neither side can see their expectations of one another. While we may try 
not to respond reciprocally to one another, this is not always possible. We react to one 
another in a kind of participation. These are enactments, and they are continuous. Hence 
the importance of supervision. Curiosity is a determination to know what one is already 
aware of in the most detailed way possible. Highly detailed questioning brings forth the 
unbidden. Psychoanalysts then constantly suspect their own capacity for thought. This 
brings out clarity, which then produces more curiosity, and hence further clarity. The 
curiosity also focuses on the psychoanalyst herself, her unconscious being on the other 
side of the analyst’s understanding. This is both exciting, because of the unknown, and 
sad, because every new truth brings on further prejudice. 
Openness is an achievement, resulting from knowledge and effort. Beyond merely 
being receptive, it is the result of experience and intellectual effort, an accepting wisdom 
of our knowledge and ignorance. Such a capacity for innocence is an accomplishment. 
The analyst develops a work ego through psychotherapy and training, a capacity for self-
containment and self-reflection, passed through one’s own psychoanalyst and to be 
passed on to the patient.  
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Chapter 1. The Embodiment of Meaning in Relatedness 
This chapter introduces a way of hermeneutic understanding in psychoanalysis 
that is contextual.  
Experience is given structure within a limitless reality by the constraints of 
tradition, history, and culture. Stern here rejected the idea of a topographical psyche and 
even a literal existence to memory. The therapist’s role as someone holding up a standard 
for what is real is challenged. Rather, meaning is constructed through interpretation. This 
puts much greater importance in psychoanalysis on process. Stern introduced curiosity 
and degrees of freedom in acceptance of alternate meanings. 
Chapter 2. Conversation and Its Interruptions 
This chapter joins Gadamer’s theory of understanding with thoughts on work with 
the unconscious.  
Understanding is not monadic, nor does it involve a restructuring of each other’s 
minds. Noninstrumental understanding comes through the kind of dialogue in which each 
side strives to remove the differences between the different views. We create meaning is 
jointly. This carries to psychoanalysis, in which we are looking not only for conscious but 
unconscious meanings. Psychoanalysts work to interpret meanings they think the patient 
does not know. From this view, even empathy is an interpretive process, and 
understanding, as an attempt to unite with the other, is love. However, such 
comprehension necessitates questioning, the bringing of indeterminacy into the 
relationship. Questioning serves to break apart the subject of conversation. We can know 
an authentic conversation when we forget ourselves and the play takes over. 
Psychoanalysis is rooted in morality. To prescribe a moral program would, on the other 




hand, deny the ongoing clinical relatedness and introduce an aspect of political power. 
The psychoanalyst is in a constant process of trying to imagine the unexpressed that 
contextualizes the subject. Enactment involves an interruption of true conversation, an 
effort to act upon each other which often possesses a sadomasochistic element. 
Chapter 3. Fusion of Horizons: Dissociation, Enactment, and Understanding 
This chapter identifies context and discusses how change involves a changing of 
self-states in dialogue. 
Understanding in psychoanalysis comes through locating a patient’s speech and 
action in a fitting context. In Stern’s theory, context includes the whole mood, as well as 
the contents of what is said. In some cases, a fusion of horizons may occur within the 
psychoanalyst’s experience, between the me and not-me, the alien part of the 
psychoanalyst’s self, offering the psychotherapist wider access to conscious and 
preconscoius parts of one’s own mind. This would be a successful analysis of the 
psychoanalyst’s countertransference, and it affects the entire psychoanalytic relationship, 
as well as the analysand. 
Conduct and context modify each other until, in the fusion of horizons, one 
arrives at a fitting understanding. Meaning is allowed to emerge, and meaning constitutes 
the union of conduct and context. Uncertainty temporarily disappears. Context is Stern’s 
equivalent of Gadamer’s concept of prejudice, that which we know already, what we 
need in order to begin to understand something. New understanding also requires an 
absence of understanding. Hence, two people may be in self-states that do not allow a 
fusion of their horizons at first. The psychoanalyst may be able to notice these in details 
that challenge the familiar thesis that he projects and then hypothesize alternate 




explanations. In general, we can only vaguely perceive our own self-states or their 
transformations. We are able to understand the other only through the effects of the 
context on us, the changes in our ongoing conscious experience. We need the 
collaboration of the other in order to achieve understanding. Change in psychoanalysis 
arrives frequently as unnoticed reciprocity. As psychoanalysts become involved with 
patients, they adhere to a storyline which brings about a narrative rigidity or weak 
dissociation. Weak dissociation involves what is unnoticed, while strong dissociation is 
what must not be experienced. 
Here, Stern introduced the idea of self-states which are separated by varying 
levels of dissociation or defense. Self-states arise from early relationships with significant 
caregivers. Defensively motivated dissociation disconnects experience from its most 
fitting contexts, so that internal self-states cannot be crossed. Transference-
countertransference enactments are examples of mutual dissociation. Dissociation 
functions contrarily to curiosity, feeling, and thought. These enactments are a type of 
deadlock, blocking one’s freedom to think about a problem that may require stubborn 
determination from the psychoanalyst. A change in the analysand’s self-state, in the 
interpersonal field, hints at a way to better acceptance and hence understanding of the 
analysand’s and actions.  
Arriving at an understanding does not magically guarantee understandings in the 
future. Each occurrence of transference-counter-transference must be addressed or 
ignored as it occurs. Hence, in this theory experience of what is occurring is greatly 
valuable than working principles. Coming out of an enactment can feel surprising 
because it entails an event in the relationship that is free of context.  




Dissociation, then, can be seen as a failure to allow one’s imagination free play, 
rather than as a failure of thought, memory, or affect. Contrarily, the absence of 
dissociation is not simply the presence of an experience that had been prevented. Rather, 
it is a curiosity that permits experience that is relatively free. Stern here posited a range 
between experience that is highly dissociated on the one hand, and highly imagined on 
the other. In treatment, however, enactments are not mere signals for failure. Enactments 
are a locking out of curiosity; but they are also important unconscious communications 
and may be the only way that some types of experience can come into psychoanalysis. 
Indeed, we can look at all experience in terms of how it may be formulated or 
unformulated, free or constricted.  
Crucial to understanding an enactment is the ability to value the other’s 
perspective, exactly what is restricted in these situations of trying to force one’s own 
perspective onto the other. Some expressions within the psychoanalytic field can change 
it, and the psychoanalyst avoiding assigning blame. Even the analysand’s expression of 
empathy may be important to helping the psychoanalyst to gain a better formulation of 
the analysand’s self-state. In an important footnote, Stern stressed that the 
psychoanalyst’s ability to have a complementary transference with the patient and to hold 
the patient’s feelings regardless of empathy are also essential.  
The way to such understanding cannot be codified, and even once understanding 
is achieved and dissociation resolved, the psychoanalyst can only continue to let history, 
tradition, the speech and the conduct to act within the psychoanalyst. With understanding, 
however, the circular movement of meaning may occur with less obstruction by 
unconscious motivation.   





Chapter 4. The Eye Sees Itself: Dissociation, Enactment, and the Achievement of 
Conflict 
Here, Stern applied ideas of enactment and ongoing 
transference/countertransference to clinical practice, to expand on ideas of multiple self-
states and enactment. 
Stern posed the question of how the psychoanalyst can know about the 
unconscious parts of his or her relatedness to the patient. Levenson referred to this as the 
fallacy of understanding. In Wollstein’s transference-countertransference interlock, both 
sides are affected. At such times, both sides become painfully aware of the need for a 
different kind of understanding. Alternately, they might not even know that an enactment 
is underway. Stern argued that there is no private and objective place of observation, such 
as Wollstein’s psychic center of the self. On the contrary, the self is a social construction 
that is subject to constant unconscious involvement with the interpersonal field. Beebe & 
Lachmann’s mutual interactive regulation is an example of how we unconsciously 
modulate each other’s self-states. For Stern, however, this is different from enactment 
which is by his definition dynamically unconscious.   
The psychoanalyst and the patient form an extremely complex, constantly 
changing, self-organizing system. Psychoanalysts often find after the fact that a very 
smooth treatment was due to each participant influencing the other to hold to the status 
quo. At times, an impasse will go unnoticed. At others, something very subtle will alert 
the psychoanalyst that an enactment is occurring, what Stern has called an “emotional 
chafing” or a snag.  In very smooth analyses, we later discover that each side was 




influencing the other to maintain the status quo. The fact that we have what Sullivan 
called an illusory critic suggests that we have conflicting parts of ourselves. These 
different self-states or personifications can be dissociated from each other. Ideally, we 
can be aware of the spaces between these self-states, what Bromberg called “standing in 
the spaces.” 
Stern argued that we are able to understand and move beyond enactments because 
we have multiple selves. These states are not simple descriptions or purposes, they are 
sensed as characters. They were developed through our relatedness to aspects of 
significant people in our lives.  
Stern then tied this to Sullivan’s internal critic and to the hermeneutic demand the 
understandings should be amenable to being spoken and hence brought into public 
discourse. The psychoanalyst therefore understands her own role in enactment due to 
conflicts between internal self-states. Negotiating interpersonal conflicts involves 
negotiating conflicts between multiple self-states. Here Stern presented an important 
aspect of his theory of trauma. Dissociated experience does not disappear. Rather, we 
unconsciously embody a traumatized self in interpersonal relationships, in a futile attempt 
to take control or to repair.  
Four rules for enactments are posited in this chapter:  
1. Enacted experience is unformulated experience.  
2. Dissociated states are unsymbolized and do not conflict with safer states that 
we identify as “me.”  




3. The state dissociated by the patient is explicitly experienced by the 
psychoanalyst, while the psychoanalyst dissociates the state that is experienced by the 
patient.  
4. Enactment is signaled by the absence of internal conflict.  
5. It ends in the achievement of internal conflict, when one of the two participants 
can consciously formulate the two dissociated states. 
The conflict described here does not encompass all conflictual experience. This 
conflict arising from enactment involves dissociated states. Conflict between good-me 
and bad-me comprises much of psychoanalytic treatment. Enactment, however, arises 
from the not-me, that which cannot be tolerated as being part of the self. Contrary to what 
we might think, not-me can be signaled by the absence of internal conflict. This position 
stands against the traditional notion of projective identification. The psychoanalyst’s 
reciprocal dissociations are not “implanted” by the patient; instead, they are part of the 
psychoanalyst’s mind brought out by the interpersonal field. With reference to Racker, 
this belies the notion of the patient being in some sense sick and suggests that rather than 
pathology, that difficulties are in Sullivan’s terms, “problems in living.”  Enactment is 
interpersonal in that it involves being locked into just one perception of the other. 
Dissociation precedes any kind of splitting, because it involves experience that cannot 
even be had. In enactment, then, we tend to blame the other, until we can return to a 
greater tolerance of ourselves. In treatment, this involves the psychoanalyst being able to 
value uncomfortable affective cues. It can require a certain surrender to irrational, affect-
laden aspects of the psychoanalyst’s experience, and over long durations. For this reason, 




psychoanalysts are not seen invulnerable; rather, they are willing and (if imperfectly) 
trained to accept and face their own vulnerability. 
Enactment can lock both participants into a single-mindedness. For Stern, behind 
all of subjectivity is conflict. In times of great emotional pain, internal conflict may be 
absent. However, absence of conflict can actually be the source of the emotional pain. 
Stern here redefined the repetition compulsion no longer to signify a conflict between 
unconscious and conscious purposes, but rather as the absence of the experience of 
internal conflict. Once one can experience internal conflict, there is desire that is different 
from the desire for conflict. In order to sense one state of mind, we need [awareness of] 
another state of mind. Either one of these can serve as background or foreground for the 
other. The achievement of meaning and the achievement of conflict in an enactment are 
the same things. Indeed, in order to negotiate an enactment, merely needs to be able to 
experience internal conflict again. With the achievement of internal conflict comes a 
sense of initiative. Desire without a conflicting alternative is compulsion. As in 
Benjamin’s theory, an enactment that is carried out on others is a sadomasochism that, 
despite dominating the other, constricts the freedom of both sides. The achievement of 
conflict, on the other hand, we create multiple consciousnesses. There is no generic or 
single idea or motivating force that can lead to opening up to greater clinical freedom. 
This theoretical technique is contextual. It comes in therapy unpredictably and unbidden, 
and carries with it a sense of the mystery of the world, like the doorknob falling off when 
we see the patient to the door.   
Chapter 5. Partners in Thought: A Clinical Process Theory of Narrative  




Through an examination of clinical work with trauma, this chapter introduces the 
concept of witnessing as partnership in thought. 
Witnessing is essential to the treatment of trauma because it addresses isolation. 
According to developmental and interpersonal theory, we develop and are constituted 
through others knowing our stories. The other cares for the continuity of our narrative. 
This other can even be ourselves, as in self narratives. In the clinical process, each new 
story brings on new curiosity. Narratives give structure to experience, which includes 
affect; and affect gives energy to narrative.  
The not-me originates from unbearable fear or shame. Its developmental impact is 
through the degree of trauma and the stability of personality.  Enactment interrupts both 
the patient’s and the psychotherapist's ability to witness each other. In a sense, a self-state 
is a narrative. We are able to change with circumstances by our ability to tell many self-
stories at once.  But not-me cannot be narrated, and this is prevalent in mutual 
enactments. In psychotherapy, when we can listen imaginatively, over time not-me 
becomes me. The self expands incrementally. Trauma, on the other hand, is a loss of 
inner dialogue. Not-me can threaten the rest of the personality. We often experience 
knowing more than the patient. In RA this is believed to be the effects of mutual 
unconscious influence. Clinical process is therefore the medium or event space of a 
nonlinear, systems theory. Practice can help but is in fact secondary to immersion in 
clinical process. 
Chapter 6. Shall the Twain Meet? Metaphor, Dissociation, and Co-occurrence 




This chapter involves an examination of language and how it relates to 
psychotherapy, in order to expand on ideas of mutual enactment. The concept of the mind 
in Stern’s theory is discussed. 
The chapter begins with an examination of metaphor as a phenomenon of the 
body. Meaning, then, is mapped onto experience. In Stern’s thought, mind and world are 
the same, and the process of mapping is like transference. Metaphor joins emotional 
memory with current perceptions. Categories are things that are collected together but are 
remarkable for their differences. In trauma, the metaphorical process is foreclosed; 
present experience cannot be enriched with aspects of the past. Frozen memory becomes 
isolated as singularities. Witnessing provides a safe listening that contextualizes through 
memories common to the experience. As a necessary condition, witnesses need to feel 
safe themselves, in order to think freely. Once trauma enters into metaphor, it can be seen 
as figure against ground; otherwise, we remain at a distance and menaced by the pain. In 
that case, the trauma can be stated factually but with little affect, that is, largely 
unformulated. The limitations of enactments make singularities.  
Often, new experience just seems to arrive. We need to stay out of the way of the 
creative process, so that nonconscious imagination can select from the unbidden in 
experience. In immersing ourselves in a field or practice, co-occurrences are more likely 
to come up in our mind. Metaphor then actualizes the potential of what can emerge. Mind 
here is a horizontally organized collection of self-states in dynamic relation to the others. 
A mutual enactment involves mutual dissociation. Each person has their own private 
motives under the unconscious influence of the other. A breach of enactment occurs 




when we can experience the other in more than one way. Afterwards, the relationship is 
altered.  
Chapter 7. Opening What Has Been Closed, Relaxing What Has Been Clenched: 
Dissociation and Enactment over Time in Committed Relationships 
Here, Stern examined conditions under which loving relationships endure, to look 
at how enactment functions over time. 
Duration in long-term sexual relationships means maintaining the relationship 
while also keeping loving sexual feelings alive. According to Davies, the oedipal conflict 
is never really lost or won; rather, the conflict itself offers lifelong, vitalizing themes of 
love and rejection. Due to fortunate childhoods, some people recall being loved even 
when it is not present. In rejection, they may be hurt but are not put into doubts about 
their future; they are not put into what Goldner called “defensive lockdown.” For others 
with less fortunate childhoods intimacy and desire are juxtaposed against lack of interest 
and hurt. Likewise, Stern describes a ranging in long-term relationships between old and 
new object, and parent and lover. 
While some dissociation is normal, engagement relates to how deep an experience 
of the self one can tolerate. For Sullivan, the bad-me results from a drop in security or 
self-esteem. Even when good-me is predominant, bad-me will come into consciousness.  
Counter-transference involves a personal unconscious involvement. In order to 
tolerate conflicting perceptions of the other, in long-term relationships we need to reclaim 
tolerance of the internal conflict of good-me and bad-me. Dissociations are both 
continuously preserved and challenged by the interpersonal context. Mutual enactments 
end only when one partner can experience the internal conflict of what feels good and 




bad about oneself. In enactment, no such conflict is experienced. It can be excruciating to 
find oneself faced with the not-me. Trauma for children occurs when caretakers can no 
longer contain or symbolize experience. With regular trauma, experience becomes 
dissociated for the child.  
Long-term love means an ongoing enactment. The sameness allows predictable 
experiences of good-me and bad-me. New love involves an intense playing out of oedipal 
themes, and enactments do not yet take place. New love comes with immense freedom 
and excitement, being less intimate and also less defended than longer-term relationships.  
The more intense the need to keep not-me away, the more rigid the person, and 
often the more hateful their enactments need to be. Enactments, involving good-me and 
bad-me, or even not-me, are adversarial. For those who cannot tolerate intimacy, 
relationships threaten to erupt. Even love can be part of the not-me. Successful 
psychotherapy, then, is the repeated appearance and transcendence of enactments. 
Courage is necessary to help desire win against the need for security. 
Chapter 8. On Having to Find What You Don’t Know How to Look for: Two 
Views of Reflective Function 
Stern examined the roles of reflection, mentalization, and interpretation in 
hermeneutic psychoanalytic work, in which the object of the search cannot be known 
before it is actually located. 
Psychoanalytic work involves not-knowing for long periods of time, although it 
does eventually reach places of knowing. It involves waiting and being ready. Fonagy’s 
(Fonagy et al., 2002) definition of mentalization, according to Stern, may actually be 
missing during enactments; in fact, these entanglements are important opportunities in 




psychotherapy. When mentalization works, psychotherapists can help by labeling affect, 
and by, themselves, mentalizing during psychotherapy. The psychoanalyst treats 
experience as representation, and through reflection experience is changed. In psychosis, 
psychic equivalence occurs, that is, experience is treated as replica of the outside world, 
outside and inside are experienced as identical, the internal and external cease to be 
divided.  
Mutual enactment means both psychoanalyst and patient lose the ability to 
mentalize. When outside of enactment, the psychotherapist can be a vehicle for the 
patient’s alien side. The patient needs to internalize the psychoanalyst’s mentalizations. 
However, psychotherapy involves a continuous unconscious involvement. The 
psychoanalyst continuously looks for signs of this involvement and accepts the fact that 
she, too, is influenced and vulnerable. As we articulate this influence, and wait, new 
experience can come in. Reflection leads to insight, which then creates a new series of 
clinical phenomena. Our way of being changes. Hence, revising Fonagy’s mentalization, 
Stern suggested that new relations open us up to mentalization, rather than the other way 
around. Because the meaning of this new must be constructed, what we search for in 
psychotherapy does not exist prior to our discovering it. We can be aware of the new 
through enactments, which involve a feeling of discomfort or chafing. As 
psychotherapists become saturated in the effects of what we do not know, we begin to 
locate the mystery. Our participation in enactments begins unconsciously. 
Chapter 9. “One Never Knows, Do One?” The Relation of the Work of the Boston 
Change Process Study Group and Relational Dissociation Theory 




In this review of interpretation from a hermeneutic perspective, Stern has rejected 
an objectivist’s view that an interpretation can be judged by its accuracy; rather, he 
proposed that the patient’s experience of it determines the fit. The chapter is a response to 
questions raised by the Boston Study Group and includes discussion of the necessarily 
ethical stance of psychotherapy. 
RA holds a democratic attitude with a focus on detailed clinical process. Meaning 
is not discovery but creation. Intention is an implicit, unfolding process. Verbal reflection 
is not a higher form of thinking but it involves continuous mental influence. For Stern, 
implicit unconscious meaning can be formulated. Participation precedes knowing. We do 
not always know what we desire, instead we must feel our way into them, just as we 
observe desires in others.  
The psychotherapeutic interaction is a series of successes and failures. Over the 
course of psychotherapy, the not-me becomes me. Stern has come out starkly against the 
privileging of quantitative research. Contexts require different procedures and responses 
from us. Since the 1960s, the authority of the psychotherapist has changed. Reality allows 
many possibilities to us but it also constrains our perceptions. Reality comes to us 
through culture, relationship, and character. A decontextualized psychology then merely 
reinforces the status quo, missing unconsciously embraced values including ideology, just 
as the natural science view in the Social Sciences has missed issues of race, gender, and 
sexual preference in practice.  
In the hermeneutic view, the new is revealed as opposed to the familiar. An 
objective epistemology would require defining meaning in an objective way, and then 




applying it impersonally. Instead, we decide on questions with intuition, interpretation, 
and continuous debate. There is actually no final answer, just endless questioning.  
 
Stern, D. B. (2012). Implicit Theories of Technique and the Values that Inspire Them. 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 32(1), 33-49. 
This article addresses controversies due to the multiplicity of conflicting theories 
in contemporary psychoanalysis.  
Stern here rejected the view of technical rationality that claims that reality is 
unitary and facts are data that can be used to develop best practices developed for 
problem-solving. Rather, Stern maintained that data are constructed by interpretive acts 
and theories are interpretive tools used to organize our work. Experience cannot be 
reduced to a set of knowable causes. The emphasis hence shifts to understanding the 
goals of different techniques. Psychoanalysts can no longer plan the impact of their work 
on patients. Rather, like other professionals, they internalize long-familiar theories and 
are constantly inventing new, implicit theories, which may eventually develop into 
explicit theories. Both explicit and implicit theories originate from conscious and 
unconscious values. These change as the social worlds of patients also change. Even a 
technical theory made to address a given population makes certain assumptions about life 
values. The increased questioning of authority coinciding with RA and developmental 
theories based on interdependence are an example of this historicity of psychological 
thought. No theory can claim superiority. All interventions are infused with the results of 
ethical choices. 




Stern, D. B. (2012). Witnessing Across Time: Accessing the present from the past 
and the past from the present. The Psychoanalytic Quarterly. 31(1), 53-81.  
This article examines the temporality of traumatic experience, to suggest that 
reworking trauma affects not only future experience but that of the past as well. 
Traumatic memory is affectively drained and the past is frozen. For Modell, 
metaphor links experience to the past, forming an emotional category. For Loewald, an 
aspect of transference was the carrying of emotional power of the unconscious and the 
past to the preconscious of the present. In Stern’s thought, experience of the present 
connection not only brings a greater sensibility to the experience of the present, it can 
also enhance the memory of the past.  
Traumatic memories are rigid singularities, beta elements in Bion’s terms. As 
such they cannot be adapted, and are hence unamenable to generating new experience. In 
Modell’s theory, such experience comes to exist beyond the experience of time, beyond 
kairos, the cyclical human time that can turn back on itself. In kairos, experiences can 
take on later meaning with the unfolding of events. For new meaning, experience must 
move freely between the past, present, and future. In Modell’s reading of Freud, for 
memory to be experienced it must be linked with contemporary perception. Newer 
understandings of Freud’s Nachträgligkeit hold that it involves a retranscription of 
meaning, to potentiate new, previously unimagined aspects of old meaning. According to 
Reiss, traumatic memory involves a disruption of temporal experience.  
For Stern, metaphoric transformation necessitates the kind of witnessing which 
some writers maintain is the key to psychotherapeutic action. Witnessing can be internal, 
as with Benjamin’s internalized other. For Stern, memory continuously creates metaphor 




and that process requires continuous witnessing. Poland in 2011 proposed that 
psychoanalysis first involves an internal conversation with parts of oneself that likely 
originated as representations of involvements with others. For Stern, the listening of the 
psychoanalyst helps patients listen to themselves.  
Dissociation is a sequestering of self-states from each other, in which these states 
are unable listen to each other. With dissociation, memory cannot co-exist with 
experience of the present. Stern proposed here that trauma can also interfere with the 
experience of previous memories. He offered three vignettes to illustrate this point.  
For Laub, the internal witness comes through a lack of external witnesses. Stern 
here suggested that the retranscription of memory must work from both the past and, 
retroactively, towards the past. Hence, after trauma people often state they feel as if they 
have died, representing a disjunction of two lives separated by the trauma. For two parts 
of oneself to know one another, each must be capable of witnessing each other. Past and 
present self-states must be capable of consciously felt experience, and that experience 
must be tolerable to either self-state.  Stern described this as a bridge of affect across 
time.  
After trauma, the capacity to create new experience is to some degree derealized. 
Stern’s definition of this term is not a separation from reality; rather, it is a draining of the 
vitality of experience. For Boulanger, subsequent to trauma, there is a loss of the 
goodness of past experience. In trauma, both self-states of past and present lose the 
ability to hear experiences of the self-state of the opposite time frame. Stern labeled these 
two directions of loss prospective derealization and prospective derealization. The two 
states become, in Leed’s terms, incommensurable. Gerson described effects of the Nazi 




Holocaust as the presence of an absence, in which all that can be felt or known of an 
experience is the not-there-ness of what was present. For Gerson, this was the dead third, 
that is, the loss of the witness itself. Stern carried this absent of witnessing to an 
international level, noting that way the rise of the Third Reich was largely ignored in the 
international community.   
Techniques for the retrieval of the goodness of experience cannot be prescriptive. 
Instead, they involve a way of understanding unformulated aspects of clinical process and 
how to work with them. Aspects of therapeutic relatedness allow for new affectively vital 
interpenetration of past and present experience. In the Bionian sense, analytic relatedness 
makes it possible to transform dissociated experience into alpha elements, that is, to 
newly formulate the unformulated. It entails new ways for patient and psychotherapist to 
witness each other and themselves. Much of the witnessing in psychotherapy is implicit. 
Witnessing makes it possible for past and present to connect through metaphor, that is, 
affect categories. Healing comes not only through thawing memories of that past that 
have been frozen as in the traditional concept of trauma, but also of bringing some 
goodness of experience previous to the trauma, to bear on the memory of that trauma.  
Stern, Donnel. 2012. Relational Freedom and Therapeutic Action: Sensing and Relaxing the 
Interpersonal Field. In Press. 
Stern expanded concepts of relational freedom, the field, and transference and 
countertransference. The role and experience of witnessing are examined as a way to 
increase freedom in the interpersonal field.  
While traditional psychoanalytic thought held that an opening of meaning has 
resulted in freer relational effects, more open experience also results in greater relational 




freedom. For Stern, when growth is recognized it has already occurred. As with unbidden 
meaning, relaxation of the field cannot be controlled, it is an emergent quality of 
relatedness. Note that neo-Kleinian theories have also influenced this conception of the 
field.  
When new experience comes, it can take on a variety of forms and may seem to 
be irrelevant to relational freedom or transference and countertransference. Rather than 
being a goal, relational freedom is part of a dialectic of freedom and constriction in 
psychoanalysis. Relational freedom can occur on both the psychoanalyst’s side and that 
of the patient. It can come about through witnessing and the new experience may not be 
reducible to representation. Over a course of psychotherapy, relational patterns become 
habitual and conservative. Safety allows new experience; simultaneously it requires a 
mutually constricted avoidance in the relationship. Selective inattention hides knots in the 
interaction. Often, the breaking of constrictedness in the relationship may offer an 
anticipatory awareness, like a heliotropic orienting. Through the psychoanalyst playing 
with feelings of snags, relaxation and the voicing of a spontaneous thought can emerge. 
Even a technical prescription can involve a wish to comfort.  
This model of change may be an expression of linear or it may be a nonlinear 
dynamic systems theory. Since thoughts lag behind conduct, through training, the 
psychoanalyst’s own analysis and clinical experience come together in an act carried out 
without knowing, through courting surprise. 
